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A b s tr a c t
This thesis analyses the evolution and characteristics of Portugal’s inward and outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years and how they reflect changes in the 
country’s competitiveness. Inward FDI was investigated using regression analysis and a 
postal questionnaire. For outward FDI, semi-structured interviews were conducted at 
locally owned firms with productive capacity abroad. The investment development path 
(IDP) was the framework used to integrate the results obtained with the analysis of 
national competitiveness. The thesis also suggests a novel functional relationship for the 
IDP in order to reconcile the empirical tests with the underlying theory.
Inward FDI flows into Portugal have declined sharply in recent years, which was shown to 
be incommensurate with Portugal’s size and level of development. The questionnaire 
survey suggested that efficiency seeking investment was especially affected. This points to 
the geopolitical changes that have occurred in Europe as a major reason for Portugal’s 
lower attractiveness as a location for FDI. Bureaucracy and a shortage of skilled workers 
were other important obstacles to foreign investment. Both correspond to institutional 
failures: the failure to promote an efficient legal environment, and the failure to create 
advanced assets that compensate for rising production costs as locational determinants of 
FDI.
Outward FDI was found to be more in line with Portugal’s level of development. It is 
growing fast but requires consolidation. Investment is concentrated in few locations, and 
cultural proximity (particularly language) plays a major role. I Iowever, more than exploiting 
existing ownership advantages, the firms surveyed were internationalising in order to build 
new ownership advantages. To reach an efficient size, which is not possible at home when 
the market is small, or to consolidate the relationship with important clients in 
oligopsonistic industries were the dominant motivations for internationalisation amongst 
the firms surveyed.
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C h a p te r  1
In t r o d u c t io n
1.1. Fo r e ig n  d ir e c t  in v e st m e n t  an d  t h e  P o r t u g u e se  e c o n o m y
A small open economy of recent industrialisation, Portugal has the lowest GDP per capita 
amongst the European Union member states. The roots of Portugal’s economic 
underdevelopment seem to rest very deep, with Portugal’s inability to participate in the 
industrial revolution that spread through continental Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Industrialisation attempts seem to have been blocked by several 
deficiencies in the local economy, including the absence of an entrepreneurial class, 
inadequate infrastructure, low skills of the working force, political and institutional 
instability and, eventually, a very liberal trade agreement with the United Kingdom that led 
to an overspecialisation of the economy in primary products.
Despite the low levels of development, foreign direct investment has always been part of 
the Portuguese economy. Port wine, for example, which was Portugal’s main export since 
the seventeenth century until very recently, has always been largely controlled by foreigners 
(mostly British). Similarly, all the industrialisation attempts in the late 1700s and 1800s 
benefited from a strong presence of foreign investors. Various reports throughout that 
period and into the 1920s suggest that a substantial part of the Portuguese economy was 
controlled by foreign owned firms.
This picture changed substantially in the late 1920s. Following decades of political turmoil 
and economic mismanagement, a military coup in 1926 created the conditions for the 
establishment of an autocratic regime. The “New State” set as its primary aim the 
stabilisation of the country’s economic situation, even if at the expense of economic 
development and growth. Officially, FDI was still welcomed, but the autarchic nature of 
the regime was soon reflected in restrictive legislation. Only in the late 1950s was this 
attitude towards FDI reversed again.
The creation of EFTA in 1960 was to radically change Portugal’s economic policy. Being 
strongly dependent on the UK for its international trade, Portugal was one of the founding 
members of the free trade agreement. This was an unlikely outcome on the face of the 
country’s political regimen. Actually, Portugal was not admitted until very late in the 
negotiation process. It managed, nevertheless, to join EFTA with very favourable 
conditions. The other members agreed to take into account the country’s low level of 
development, certainly having in mind the tiny impact Portugal’s rather small economy 
would have in the new free trade area.
Engaged from then on in the process of economic integration in Europe (Portugal became 
an associate member country of the EEC in 1972), the policy of industrialisation through 
import substitution put into practice in the previous decade was abandoned in favour of a 
new strategy of export promotion. Foreign direct investment was an important player in 
this transformation, even if several sectors remained closed to international trade and 
investment (mostly in agriculture, services and ‘strategic’ heavy industries). Economic 
growth in the following years was impressive, but the result may have been an 
overspecialisation of the Portuguese economy. The markets opened to other EFTA 
countries were essentially those for which there was not local production at the time. 
Adding to this the effect of comparative advantage (Portugal was clearly the lowest labour 
cost location in EFTA), the subsequent specialisation in low value added labour intensive 
industries was probably inevitable.
The 1970s were marked by major social, political and economic transformations in 
Portugal. The first years of the decade registered very strong growth, record inflows of 
FDI, and a nascent stream of outward investment, all in the unlikely scenario of guerrilla 
wars being fought in three of Portugal’s five African colonies. However, a number of 
international and domestic factors completely changed this picture. The 1973 oil crisis sent
3the world economy into the biggest recession since the 1930s, with a great impact on 
Portugal’s balance of payments due to lower exports and a sharp increase in energy costs. 
At home the dictatorship was toppled in a coup in April 1974, and the revolutionary 
process that followed was associated with strong political instability and economic 
disorder. In 1975, much of the economy was nationalised, the big economic groups that 
controlled most of the economy before the revolution were dismantled, and international 
trade relations truncated by the independence of the colonies (which cut almost all 
economic ties with the former colonial power). The country still had to deal with the 
return from the colonies of about a quarter million people (some 8 per cent of the 
Portuguese population), unwelcome in the newly independent countries.
On the face of this it can be no surprise that the economy developed several imbalances. 
In both 1978 and 1983, Portugal had to seek the support of the IMF, which resulted in 
restrictive stabilisation plans. Inward FDI, largely untouched by the revolution, was 
substantially reduced in this period though the flows remained positive. As for outward 
FDI, the investments of the early 1970s were largely concentrated in the colonies and did 
not resist the political transformations. Most subsidiaries were nationalised or simply 
abandoned.
The country’s fortunes changed again in the 1980s. With the success of the stabilisation 
programs and the pacification of the political climate, the conditions were established for 
Portugal to become a full member of the European Union. Inflows of FDI, which had 
already been reaching record levels since the beginning of the decade, rocketed from 0.8% 
of GDP in 1986 to 4.1% in 1990. The political and economic guarantees that EU 
membership represented, relatively low labour costs and strong economic growth are some 
of the reasons that may explain this performance.
After 1990, however, FDI inflows registered a sharp decline at least as sudden as the 
increase in the second half of the 1980s. Despite strong economic growth, inward FDI in 
1999 reached its lowest level since the 1950s if measured as a percentage of GDP. Another 
important transformation of the 1990s concerned outward FDI. Negligible since the 
revolution, it made an appearance in the Portuguese economy in the late 1980s. But the 
pace of the transformation was such that in 1997 outward FDI flows were higher than
4inward flows for the first time in the country’s history1. And the gap has been widening 
ever since.
Several elements may be associated with the recent decline of inward I'DI. It is imaginable 
that after Portugal joined the European Union MNEs adjusted their positions in the 
country’s productive structures and markets. But after five years of EU membership ne 
investment opportunities will necessarily be less frequent. Second, the tall of the Berlin 
Wall radically changed geopolitical organisation in Europe, lhe historical ties between 
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe with some of the bigger I >U members a 
probably stronger than with Portugal. Moreover, labour costs were in general lower than 
Portugal, and some of the domestic markets potentially more attract!\ c. Another possib 
explanation is the economic recession in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. I Iowev , 
this cannot explain the steady reduction of Portugal’s share of the EU12 inward I DI flows 
between 1991 and 1995. In other words, the decline of Portugal’s inward FDI may well be 
associated with a loss of location advantages.
Existing research on the determinants of FDI in Portugal provide only superficial views of 
the subject. There is apparently a dichotomy in the motivations of foreign investors, whic 
seem to invest in Portugal partly to access the local market and partly to benefit 
relatively low labour costs (Matos, 1973; laveira, 1984; Simoes, 1)85, Santos, 1997). B 
overall the local market seemed to have a stronger impact than labour costs (la\eira, 
1984). Access to the EU market (Carrierc and Reix, 1989) and to natural resources 
(Carnere and Reix, 1989; Fontoura, 1995) have been less frequently suggested.
As for outward FDI, the number of existing studies is even smaller. A notable exception is 
the work of Simoes (1996, 1997, 1998), who provides a very good picture of the 
internationalisation of Portuguese firms. It seems that the expansion of outward I'DI in 
Portugal is associated with growing ownership advantages by local firms. However, an 
alternative explanation has been suggested (it is, for example, implicit in the arguments of 
Bessa, 2000); the international expansion of local firms could be fomented by the same 
factors that originated the reduction of inward FDI, that is, an eventual decline in the 
competitiveness of Portugal as an investment location.
1 Previously available data (e.g. Banco de Portugal, 1997b) put this change in 1995, but the official figures 
were recently corrected (cf. Banco de Portugal, 2000a), following the adoption of a new methodology that 
complies with international standards.
51.2. T h e  r e se a r c h  pr o je ct
The main concern of this research project is the characterisation of inward and outward 
FDI in Portugal and to analyse how the evolution registered in recent years reflects 
changes in the country’s competitiveness. It starts with a review of the relevant literature 
concerning foreign direct investment and the growth of multinational corporations 
(chapter 2). The different schools of economic thought arc introduced and confronted 
when relevant. It is suggested that the investment development path (Dunning, 1981a, 
1981b, 1996a) provides the most appropriate framework to analyse the competitiveness of 
Portugal from the perspective of the changing country’s position in the international 
production network.
Chapter 3 surveys existing evidence on the determinants of foreign direct investment. It 
provides an empirical foundation for the study of the Portuguese case, which is introduced 
in chapter 4. This starts with a description of the evolution of the Portuguese economy 
and a discussion of the roots of the country’s relative underdevelopment. It is followed by 
an analysis of the evolution of FDI in Portugal and a short survey of existing studies. In 
order to confront the empirical evidence for Portugal (dominated by regression analysis) 
with the most recent data available, two econometric studies are presented in chapter 4: a 
longitudinal investigation of the location determinants of FDI in Portugal, and a cross 
section analysis to include several ‘peripheral’ European locations, of which Portugal is 
one. Chapter 4 is concluded with the search for the Portuguese investment development 
path. The aim is to confront the Portuguese case with the IDP theory, and to introduce 
the issue of national competitiveness. A novel functional relationship is proposed for the 
IDP, in order to reconcile empirical testing with the underlying theory
The main empirical investigation is reported in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 
corresponds to a postal questionnaire survey of inward FDI. The research concentrates on 
manufacturing firms and provides a characterisation of foreign firms in Portugal, as well as 
providing a detailed investigation of the determinants of FDI. Industry, country of origin, 
size and the year of investment are the mam units of analysis. The survey also investigates 
alternative locations, the role of public incentives, the mam problems faced by foreign 
investors in Portugal, and, in the case of manufacturing firms, the characteristics of the 
production processes.
6Outward FDI is the concern of chapter 6. Investigation is concentrated on firms with 
productive capacity abroad, or with clear projects to do so in the future. As in the previous 
chapter, services firms are not considered. Given the small size of the population (27 
firms), short case studies based on semi-structured interviews and secondary data 
(company reports and assorted business news) was the methodology adopted. Chapter 6 
describes the development of these fairly recent MNEs, bearing in mind that the aim is to 
understand the expansion of outward FDI in Portugal rather than individual 
internationalisation processes.
Finally, chapter 7 provides the overall conclusions. The summary of the previous two 
chapters is the basis for a discussion of the competitiveness of Portugal. As mentioned 
above, the perspective is to what extent the recent trends in inward and outward FDI 
correspond to a change in the country’s competitiveness and/or are agents of that change. 
The chapter is completed with some suggestions for future research.
C h a p t e r  2.
F o r eig n  D ir ect  In v e s t m e n t  
a n d  t h e  M u l t in a t io n a l  
Co r p o r a t io n
2.1. In t r o d u c t io n
International business activity is by no means a recent phenomenon. The lives of 
Phoenicians and Carthaginians, in the ancient world, were deeply dependent on 
international business. This economic activity included foreign direct investment (FDI), 
joint ventures and strategic alliances, among other forms of internationalisation (Moore 
and Lewis, 1999). Several multinational corporations (MNEs) can also be identified in 
hurope in the middle ages and in the beginning of the modern era (Dunning, 1993a; Jones, 
1996).
The origins of modern international business activity however, are associated with the 
industrial revolution. Modern MNEs, in particular, have their roots in the massive 
international movement of factors that took place in the nineteenth century (Dunning, 
1993a: p.99). Resource-seeking was the most common motivation of FDI in this period, 
even if by 1850 many firms had already crossed the Atlantic, in both directions, in what 
can be defined as market-seeking investment (Dunning, 1993a: p.100; Jones, 1996: p.5).
8Despite the presence of FDI, most foreign investment in the nineteenth century - and 
indeed until the late 1940s — was portfolio capital. As a result, international business 
activity was largely ignored in economic theory until the late 1950s. On the one hand, the 
phenomenon did not have a major perceived economic impact. It was widely assumed that 
MNEs were a passing post-war phenomenon originating in the United States (Jones, 1996: 
p.3). On the other hand (and probably more importantly), the neo-classical theory, based 
upon perfect markets and the international immobility of factors, did not easily incorporate 
multinational activity.
The growth of FDI (and of the MNEs themselves) that followed World War II 
emphasised the inadequacy of the neo-classical theory to explain the phenomenon and the 
need for a whole new approach. The volume of FDI not only grew substantially, it started 
to reduce its concentration in primary goods, and to be increasingly directed towards the 
production of knowledge-based products in other developed countries (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976: p.36). Furthermore, important changes in the organisation of international 
business were taking place, in particular, the development of horizontal MNEs and the 
new Japanese vertical foreign investments (Dunning, 1979: pp.270-2; 1993a, pp.126-7)1.
Despite its late arrival, international business literature (and in particular that on FDI) 
proliferated with increasing speed. The publication of the product cycle theory by 
Raymond Vernon (1966) was followed by extensive research on the determinants of 
foreign production, in particular by scholars at the I larvard Business School led by Vernon 
himself. In the mean time, John Dunning brought a copy of Stephen Hymer’s 1960 PhD 
thesis to the University of Reading where, together with the work of Charles Kindleberger, 
it had a major impact. The two approaches of the ‘Reading School’ - the “internalisation 
theory” (Buckley, Casson, llugman, I Iennart) and the “eclectic paradigm” (Dunning) - 
provided a consistent explanation of the reasons why firms choose to own production and 
trading facilities abroad. Furthermore, scholars at the University of Uppsala (Johanson, 
Wiedersheim-Paul, Vahlne) started investigating the internationalisation process of 
individual firms, widening the scope of the new discipline.
1 Until World W ar II Japanese outward FDI was dominated by trading and financial companies (Dunning, 1993a: p .124).
92.2. T he D e t e r m in a n t s  o f F o r e ig n  D irect  In ve stm e n t
Over a quarter of a century ago, Dunning (1973: p.289) observed that “|t]here are few 
branches of economic analysis which are not directly relevant to an understanding of the 
origin and growth of multinational enterprises”. The result wras a wide range of approaches 
to international business, often dependent on the researchers’ backgrounds.
2.2.1. C apital theory
Until the 1950s, international direct investment was entirely explained within the traditional 
theory of international capital movements. Like other forms of international investment, 
FDI was seen as a response to differences in the rates of return on capital between 
countries. This suggestion was reinforced by the empirical observation that American firms 
(the major source of FDI in the 50s) obtained a higher rate of return from their European 
investments than at home (Mundell, 1960). However, the differential rate of return 
hypothesis did not resist the inversion in that relationship registered in the 1960s, which 
was still accompanied by increases in US investment in Europe (Hufbauer, 1975/ Neither 
did it receive much empirical support2.
Ilymer (1960) was the first to expose the deficiencies of this approach. He claimed that the 
differential rate of return hypothesis was not consistent with several observed 
characteristics of international investment. First, the United States combined net outflows 
of FDI with net inflows of portfolio capital. Second, flows of FDI in both directions 
between two countries were not rare. Third, many subsidiaries complemented the inflow 
of direct investment with capital borrowed in local markets. And, finally, manufacturing 
companies were at the time far more important in international direct investment than 
financial firms. Furthermore, an international difference in expected returns is not 
sufficient to induce FDI (Caves, 1982: p.25). Under perfect markets, an increase in the 
short run profits of firms in one country would not induce international investment. 
Instead, it would attract new entrants that would eliminate any excess profits. Perfect 
markets and MNEs are not compatible (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969; LIufbauer, 
1975).
2 For a survey o f  empirical tests see, for example, Agarwal (1980: pp.741-2). See also Caves (1996: p.26).
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Somewhat more refined than the differential rate of return hypothesis is the portfolio 
approach, developed in the 1960s using a Tobin/Markowitz stock adjustment model3. The 
portfolio approach assumes that part of the excess profits that should be earned in foreign 
markets are simply rents for higher risk associated with this alternative use of capital. As 
recently as 1992, Brainard and Tobin4 proposed a model in which FDI is simply one of the 
alternatives to portfolio investment. The rates of return of the different alternative 
investments are matched with an element of risk in the choice between (imperfectly) 
substitutable assets to build an efficient portfolio. However, the introduction of a risk 
correction element, more than being insufficient to eliminate the theoretical drawbacks of 
the underlying theory, highlights its deficiencies. In fact, Hymer’s criticisms of the 
differential rate of return hypothesis (see above) fully apply to the portfolio theory as well. 
Furthermore, MNEs can provide a cheap international diversification of a portfolio, but 
only at a cost: the difference between the (rigid) international mix provided and each 
investor’s optimal mix. And this is very likely to off-set the initial cost-advantage. Finally, 
the portfolio hypothesis cannot explain the differences between industries’ propensities to 
invest abroad (Agarwal, 1980; Taveira, 1984).
According to Dunning (1973: p-299), the reason why portfolio theory can only partially 
explain direct foreign investment is that it ignores that “direct investment does not involve 
changes in ownership. It does, however, involve the transmission of factor inputs other 
than money capital, viz. entrepreneurship, technology, and management expertise, and is 
likely to be affected by the relative profitability of the use of these resources in different 
countries as that of money capital”. Furthermore, MNEs are not necessarily profits 
maximisers. Even if they are, there is no reason why they should forcibly seek higher 
profits on FDI than on domestic investment (Agarwal, 1980: p. 743).
Also in the capital theory tradition is the risk diversification hypothesis (Rugman, 1975, 
1979; Lessard, 1976). The argument is that the international diversification of portfolios is 
a way of reducing the firm’s risk. This makes the MNE a vehicle for geographical 
diversification of investments. Caves (1996) explains, however, that although the empirical 
evidence shows that investors recognise the value of international diversification (p. 160), 
the diversification of MNEs is more likely to result from investments that were propelled 
by other motives (p.21). Indeed, the geographical distribution of the portfolios of existing
3 Tobin (1958), Markowitz (1959). See Dunning (1973: pp. 300) and Agarwal (1980: p.745) for references to the
application o f portfolio theory to FDI.
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MNEs, very much concentrated in highly correlated countries, is very different from what 
is suggested by the portfolio diversification hypothesis (Buckley, 1988: p.83).
2.2.2. The International Trade Tradition
It is certainly no surprise that International Trade economists were among the first to 
study the FDI phenomenon. Foreign production can be a substitute for exports, as it can 
influence the terms of trade and thus change the whole pattern of specialisation. However, 
in the neo-classical world of the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition there is no space for foreign 
direct investment. Any disequilibrium in the prices of goods or factors across countries 
brought about by different factor endowments would be immediately corrected by 
international movements of goods (the Samuelson theorem).
2.2.2.1. Mundell and the Heckscher-Ohlin model
Mundell (1957) used an extension of the basic model to show that trade and capital 
movements can be substitutes, namely, that the introduction of tariffs would induce a flow 
of FDI towards the country where tariffs are imposed". That is, the same way that 
restrictions to international movements of factors can be substituted by trade (the original 
H-O model), restrictions to trade can be replaced by international movements of factors, 
in particular capital given the intrinsic imperfect mobility of labour.
In a way, these hypotheses based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model are not very different 
from those based on capital movements. As Taveira (1984: p. 10) points out, in both cases 
“FDI was analysed as a re-equilibrium device within a generally perfectly competitive 
economy”, a major limitation of the explanatory potential of both approaches.
2.2.2.2. Kojima’s ‘Macroeconomic Approach’
Also in the neo-classical factor endowments tradition is Kojima’s ‘macroeconomic 
approach’ (Kojima, 1973, 1978, 1982). Kojima tried to explain the distinctive character of 
trade-oriented Japanese FDI, obeying the principle of comparative advantages, vis-a-vis US 
investment conducted in an oligopolistic market structure, anti-trade oriented and 
damaging to both home and host countries in the long run (Dunning, 1993a: p.90).
4 Cited in Jong and Vos (1994a: p.9)
5 Corden (1974) showed that tariffs are not the only impediment to trade that originates FDI from a situation o f 
different factor endowments.
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The basic theorem is that “Direct Foreign Investment should originate in the investing 
country’s comparatively disadvantaged industry (or activity), which is potentially a 
comparatively advantaged industry in the host country” (Kojima, 1982: p.2). If this is the 
case, Kojima argues, (pro-trade oriented, or Japanese) FDI and international trade are 
complementary and lead to a dynamic reorganisation in the international division of trade 
and the associated gains for all countries involved.
The role of FDI can thus be seen as to exploit the home country’s comparative advantages 
in intermediate inputs that are embodied in products whose final stages of production give 
a comparative advantage to the host country (Dunning, 1993a). This is a most significant 
suggestion: some factor endowments generate comparative advantages that are better 
exploited abroad. That is, firms can build their competitive advantages upon the home 
country’s specific location-advantages, but best exploit these advantages, partially or totally, 
abroad, an idea also developed by Dunning (1981a) and to be discussed later.
The macroeconomic approach was the target of many criticisms. Its neo-classical perfect 
market assumptions are clearly a major limitation, for they ignore economies of scale, 
product differentiation and other forms of market failure (Dunning, 1993a; Jong and Vos, 
1994b). It is not that Kojima is not aware of them. But being unable to distinguish firm 
level economies of scale from plant level economies (Buckley, 1983b: p.97), he fails to 
understand that in the presence of market failure hierarchies can improve the international 
allocation of resources (Dunning, 1993a: p.90).
Another limitation of the macroeconomic approach is its excessive concern with the 
distinction between the positive impact of Japanese “pro-trade oriented” FDI and the US 
“anti-trade oriented” FDI. Kojima’s belief is that US FDI in technologically advanced 
industries was premature and doubly damaging. On the one hand, it did not fit the host- 
country’s factor endowments and associated comparative advantages. On the other hand, 
it prematurely eroded the United States’ technology-based competitive advantages. 
Cantwell (1991), however, argues that export-oriented FDI is not necessarily better than 
import-substituting foreign investment. The latter can have highly positive spill-over 
effects. Its total long-term impact on trade can be positive. I'urthermore, if of an enclave 
kind, export-oriented FDI will have little impact on the host-country’s technology and 
entrepreneurial levels.
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Buckley (1983b, 1985, 1991) and Clegg (1987) further suggest that, because of its narrow 
assumptions, Kojima’s theory is not applicable even to most Japanese direct investment. 
“Japanese-type” investment is not more frequent in Japan than in other developed 
countries (Buckley, 1983b: p.346). As Japanese MNFs matured, the distinction between 
Japanese- and American- type FDI eroded. And Japanese import-substituting investments 
in Europe and in the US are certainly not less important than Japanese export-oriented 
FDI in (mostly) Asian countries (Clegg, 1987; Cantwell, 1991). Buckley (1985) goes as far 
as to claim that even the analysis by Kojima and Ozawa (1984) of the Sogo-Shosha, Japan’s 
traditional general trading companies, implicitly rejects the macroeconomic model.
2.2.2.3. The Product Cycle Model
Another stream of work that partially builds upon the factor-endowments tradition is the 
one that takes into account the role of innovation and the diffusion of knowledge. Posner 
(1961), Hufbauer (1966), Vernon (1966), Hirsch (1967) and Wells (1972) are probably the 
most important references, with the product cycle theory, normally associated with 
Vernon, being the model that better describes the role attributed to MNEs in the 
interaction between technology, international production and trade.
The argument is that technological development generates changes in the products’ factors 
intensity, thus changing the comparative advantages of countries. The role of demand, first 
discussed by Linder (1961), is also taken into account. Domestic demand can be an 
incentive to innovate, while international demand similarity facilitates exports. In a world 
with important technological and market barriers to trade (Hufbauer, 1966. Vernon, 1966), 
MNEs are the most likely institutions to organise the production and distribution of goods 
with an international demand for which the most efficient production location is changing 
over time.
The Product Cycle described that American endowments of highly skilled labour and 
R&D resources, matched with a highly sophisticated demand, prompted constant 
innovation among US firms. The consequent technological leadership was the basis for US 
exports and permitted the development of US multinationals which engaged in import- 
substituting FDI in other developed countries. As products and technology matured, these 
advantages were progressively eroded, and US companies were forced to move to new 
products and technologies, lhese arc then replaced by imitation-driven producers based, 
first, in other developed countries and, later, in developing countries. What was not clear in
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the first versions of the product cycle (usually designated as Mark I) was whether the 
maturation process would drive out the production of US firms or simply production in 
the US.
Clegg (1987: p.24) claims that “[the product cycle| is not, in itself, a complete theory of 
DM as it does not explain the ownership of production”. Not least because the 
competitive advantage of firms is frequently associated with country-specific advantages 
(Dunning, 1993a). Clegg (1987: p.26) adds that “the product cycle is primarily a theory of 
new FDI, and it has little to say on the extensions of existing investments by a mature 
foreign-investing nation”. Nevertheless, Dunning (1973: p.307) defends that “[trade based] 
models are of special interest in that they emphasise the role of innovations in forging new 
trade patterns within an imperfectly competitive environment, conditions which are the 
seed-bed of growth of the modern ME”. The trade approach has the merit of highlighting 
the fact that FDI is but one alternative to service foreign markets. Furthermore, it 
postulates “the distinctive character of the ME as an owner of resources in different 
countries compared with national firms”.
The Mark I Product Cycle received much empirical support from studies covering the 
1950s and 1960s. But Vernon (1971: p.108) himself acknowledged that “by 1970, the 
product cycle model was beginning in some respects to be inadequate as a way of looking 
at the US-controlled multinational enterprises”. The successive revisions of the model - 
Product Cycle Mark II (Vernon, 1974, 1979) - drove it very close to the Ilymer- 
Kindleberger approach (Buckley, 1981) - see section 2.3.2.
2 .3 . M a r k e t  I m p e r f e c t i o n s  a n d  I n d u s t r i a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n
I he bases for a whole new approach of international production based on market 
imperfections were laid by I Iymer (1960). However, his work was largely ignored until 
Kindleberger (1969) published his own research6. I lymer’s work is clearly in the industrial 
organisation tradition - his major concern is with the organisation of production rather 
than trade flows - and largely inspired by Bain’s (1956) theory of barriers to entry in 
domestic industries7.
6 Hymer’s 1960 Doctoral dissertation was not to be published until 1976.
7 Cantwell (1991: p.22), however, observes that “in Hymer’s original version it was a theory o f the firm and of the 
behaviour of the hrm rather than a theory of industrial organization in the modern sense”.
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2.3.1. The Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis
The Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis suggests that, because foreign firms have necessarily 
some disadvantages vis-a-vis domestic firms (e.g., knowledge of the market, 
communication), they must possess some firm-specific advantages if they are to engage in 
foreign production (Mymer, 1960; 1968). Furthermore, foreign direct investment is not 
about the transfer of capital - this could be supplied to local firms using other forms of 
international financing. It is about the international transfer of proprietary and intangible 
assets - technology, business techniques, and skilled personnel (Ilymer, 1960: p.69). Ilymer 
(1960, 1968) claimed that the existence of FDI is exclusively due to the imperfection of the 
international markets for these assets. The firm “internalises or supersedes” these market 
failures through direct investment (Hymer, 1960: p.48).
The problem facing prospective international firms was summarised by Dunning (1973: 
p.313): “there are two primary determinants of the amount of international production. 
The first is the extent of the market in each country and the second is the competitiveness 
of foreign affiliates vis-a-vis indigenous and non-resident firms”. That is, the aim of any 
analysis should be “to identify both the location and ownership of firms”8.
A second key element in the I Iymer-Kindlebergcr approach is why firms should choose to 
exploit their ownership advantages through direct investment rather than exporting, 
licensing, or other forms of international markets servicing. Buckley and Casson (1976: 
p.68) and llugman (1980: p.370), among others, claim this was never clearly explained by 
I lymer. This was, nevertheless, implicit in Hymer’s (1960) original work, and extensively 
discussed in a later paper9. Ilymer (1968: pp. 966-970) seems to believe that FDI is the 
most efficient internationalisation strategy, in particular when compared with licensing; if 
the advantage is based on technology or on some intangible asset, FDI was considered the 
most likely solution to maximise profits. Three reasons were presented: (i) the firm’s 
advantage may be very difficult to price; (ii) FDI eliminates the costs of defining and 
managing a licensing agreement; (iii) it is simply not possible to sell oligopolistic power.
Hymer (1960, 1968) viewed FDI very much as a way of defending and reinforcing market 
power in oligopolistic industries. In this, it is fully supported by Caves’s (1971) analysis of 
vertically integrated firms. Caves’s (1971: p. 10) explanation of vertical FDI is an implicit
8 Italics in the original.
9 Hymer (1968). Apparently, the very existence this paper, published in French, was widely ignored until the middle 
1980s.
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assertion that multinationals can not only exploit perccived market imperfections, but they 
can use their ownership advantages to create market imperfections themselves. This is, 
nevertheless, an element only fully understood and integrated in the theory of international 
investment by Buckley and Casson (1976). However, Caves (1971: p.9) seemed to believe 
that imperfect markets for knowledge associated with product differentiation were the key 
for horizontal FDI (p.6). Despite being part of the truth, this is a restrictive view of the 
reasons behind horizontal foreign direct investment.
Before moving on to the next section, it is interesting to make a brief note on the 
surprising consistency between Ilymer’s market power view of FDI and the mainstream 
Marxist approach to foreign investment, or neo-imperialism1°. The marxist argument is that 
the level of concentration (“monopolisation”) of the industries in capitalist countries 
generates very high profits. Flowever, since oligopolistic collusion imposes restrictions on 
the re-investment of those profits at home, they must be invested abroad. Despite the 
difference in emphasis, this does not differ much from I Iymer’s explanation of the role of 
oligopolies in the existence of FDI. Nevertheless, the Marxists tend to ignore the 
competitiveness of oligopolies that was central in Hymer’s approach. Instead, they 
emphasise the collusive anti-competition aspect of market power. As a result, the two 
approaches reach rather different conclusions: the neo-imperialists conclude that the 
expansion of MNFZs (mostly from developed countries) into new (usually less developed) 
locations is nothing else but one more vector of the expansion of imperialism and yet 
another vehicle for the underdevelopment of the “Third World”.
2.3.2. The internalisation approach
Despite the invaluable contribution of Hymer, Kindleberger and Caves, the credit for 
transforming internalisation into a full paradigm of international production is usually 
attributed to Buckley and Casson (1976). These scholars did not simply complement 
previous work; they re-centred the analysis by building upon the theory of the firm (Coase, 
1937). Looking at the firm as an alternative institution to markets, their theory “views the 
MNE as a special case of the multiplant firm” (Buckley and Casson, 1976: p.36).
Buckley and Casson’s (1976) assertion that MNEs are typically both vertically and 
horizontally integrated led them to a model centred on the relationship between 
knowledge, market imperfections and the internalisation of markets for intermediate
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goods. This comprehensive treatment of vertical and horizontal FDI is possible in so 
much as “the vertically integrated firm internalises a market for an intermediate product, 
just as the horizontal MNE internalises markets for proprietary assets” (Caves, 1996: p .13).
Additionally, internalisation will happen - and MNEs will grow - only as far as the benefits, 
including those associated with the barriers to new entrants, are not outweighed by the 
costs of communication, co-ordination and control, and the ‘foreignness’ inevitably 
associated with vertical and horizontal integrated firms. Rugman (1980, 1985) goes as far as 
to claim that this made internalisation a (the?) general theory of FDI, which will be 
discussed later.
The internalisation theory evolves from the concept of market failure. Some transactions 
are more efficiently performed inside the firm than in the market. Buckley and Casson 
(1976: pp.37-38) specified five types of market imperfections that call for internalisation:
~ when the co-ordination of resources over a long period is needed;
-  when the efficient exploitation of market power requires discriminatory pricing;
-  when bilateral monopoly produces unstable bargaining situations;
-  when the buyer cannot price correctly the (usually intangible) goods on sale, or when 
public goods are involved;
-  when government interventions in international markets create incentives for transfer- 
pricing.
Buckley and Casson (1976: p.39) listed several markets where internalisation is very likely 
to happen: perishable agricultural products, intermediate products in capital-intensive 
manufacturing processes, and raw-materials geographically concentrated11. However, these 
were secondary in the analysis. As with Hymer, at the centre of the analysis were the 
imperfections in the markets for knowledge12. These were ideal to illustrate why 
internalisation is the most efficient vehicle to exploit a proprietary advantage without 
putting at risk the monopoly it represents to the firm.
10 See Jenkins (1987: p.27) for references.
11 Casson (1982: p-20) put it in different words: “MNEs will predominate in R&D-intensive industries, in resource-based 
industries, and when the international division o f labour is inhibited by tiscal intervention which can be avoided by 
transfer-pricing”.
12 The emphasis was, nevertheless, different, since 1 [ymer overlooked the concept o f transaction costs and emphasised 
market failure (Dunning and Rugman, 1985: p.229; Casson, 1987: p.6).
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Also relevant in the internalisation theory is the perception that the firm is able to 
internalise externalities even when no market existed before: “the actions of firms can 
replace the market or alternatively can augment it” (Buckley, 1981: p.9). That is, 
internalisation includes a theory of how new knowledge is created, a major departure from 
the I lymer-Kindleberger approach (Clegg, 1987: p.20).
The dichotomy replace/augment emanates from different connotations of ‘internalisation’ 
and has important welfare implications: “Internalisation o f  a market refers to the replacement 
of an arm’s length contractual relationship by managerial co-ordination within the firm. 
Internalisation o f  an externality, however, refers to an improvement in social efficiency 
achieved by removing a defect or distortion in the price system” (Casson, 1987: p.36).
Several other authors made important contributions to the development of the 
internalisation theory. I lorst (1971) presented the first microeconomic model of the choice 
between investing abroad and exporting from the home base. His model of the 
horizontally-integrated MNE demonstrated I lymer’s suggestion that FDI can be a strategy 
to enforce collusion. Horst (1972) also distinguished for the first time between ownership 
and location advantages, to be introduced in the next section (Clegg, 1987: p.32; Caves, 
1996: p.54).
Aliber (1970, 1971) proposed a variant of the I lymer-Kindleberger model based on the 
existence of different currency areas. He argues that firms from countries with strong 
currencies can borrow at lower cost, which enables them to engage in risky investments in 
weak-currency areas. Aliber did not try to create a general theory of FDI. His model can be 
seen as the suggestion that firms internalise imperfections in the capital and exchange rate 
markets, as they do with any other market failure.
Johnson (1968, 1970) was the first to suggest that knowledge is a public good with near­
zero social cost but non-zero private cost. This is the reason why the firm better exploits 
its knowledge-based advantages through internal markets, as fully addressed in Buckley and 
Casson (1976). Magee (1977a, 1977b) extended Johnson’s work to build the notion of 
“industry technology cycle”, largely inspired by the product cycle theory. He argued that 
the incentive for firms to internalise the market for technology varies over time. New 
technologies are more likely to be internalised (Magee used the expression 
‘appropriability’), but as the technology matures licensing becomes increasingly attractive. 
The licensing of a mature technology is easier to price and cheaper to monitor, thus
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reducing the risks and costs associated with the non-internalisation of the firm’s ownership 
advantage (Rugman, 1981).
Knickerbocker (1973) found that because of oligopolistic behaviour foreign subsidiaries 
tend to be clustered. Firms tend to follow competitors in their internationalisation 
decisions, a behaviour also found in the case of domestic diversification (Lamfalussy, 
1961). lhis showed “that it was not just locational variables that determined the spatial 
distribution of the economic activity of firms but their strategic response to these variables 
and to the anticipated behaviour of their competitors” (Dunning, 1993a: p.72).
lh is notion of oligopolistic behaviour is at the centre of the revision of the product cycle, 
known as ‘mark IF. The emphasis of the “new” product cycle theory has moved away 
from technological development and international allocation of industries to strategic 
behaviour and how erected barriers to entry support international oligopolistic structures 
(Vernon, 1974). In this new version, import-substituting FDI was expected as the product 
matured (as well as the technology, as Magee would put it). This strategic move intends to 
prevent damaging price wars. Because it is compelled by security rather than efficiency, the 
welfare outcome is not necessarily a world first-best.
The similarity with the internalisation theory discussed above is evident. I Iowever, and 
despite all the common ground, it must be stressed that a significant difference in 
approach still exists between product cycle mark II and internalisation. While the latter is a 
theory of the (international) firm, the former places itself at an industry level of analysis. It 
is a theory of international location based on oligopolistic behaviour, not a theory of the 
nature of the international firm.
Cantwell (1991: p.30) suggested an important distinction between the product cycle 
“competitive international industry approach” and the “market power school” of the 
Hymer-Kindleberger tradition. “While the market power school suppose that, in general, 
internationalization lowers the extent of competition and increases collusion amongst 
firms, competitive international industry approaches share the view that in general the 
growth of international production tends to be associated with rivalry and to sustain the 
process of technological competition amongst MNEs”. The observation seems to 
overlook, nevertheless, that in both cases FDI is both the response to and a vehicle of 
market change.
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A rather different approach is Aharoni’s (1966) use of the behavioural theory of the firm to 
introduce the role of management and decision-making process in the explanations of the 
internationalisation of the firm. Recently, this approach has been substantially developed 
by Buckley (1993a, 1996a) who has been integrating the new developments in international 
business theory with those in the theory of strategic management.
2.3.3. The eclectic paradigm
According to Dunning (1979: p.274), the eclectic paradigm resulted from his dissatisfaction 
with existing theory of international production: the Hymer-Kindleberger approach, the 
product-cycle theory, and the internalisation theory. The three were considered to be 
partial explanations of international production. I Ienceforth, he proposed an alternative 
line of development which tried to integrate the existing theories in a general and ‘eclectic’ 
model in which “the subject to be explained is the extent and pattern of international 
production” (Dunning, 1991: p. 124).
Dunning (1979: p.275) suggests that a firm engages in FDI if three conditions are satisfied:
(i) It possesses net ownership (O-) advantages vis-a-vis firms from other countries;
(ii) It is beneficial to internalise (I-advantages) those advantages rather than to use the 
market to pass them to foreign firms;
(iii) There are some location (L-) advantages in using the firm’s ownership advantage in a 
foreign location rather than at home.
The concept of ownership advantage is especially important to the eclectic paradigm, not 
least because it is probably what draws the line with the internalisation theory (Rugman, 
1980, 1985; Casson, 1987). Dunning (1979: p.276) distinguished two sets of ownership 
advantages: those that result from an exclusive access to inputs, intangible assets or 
markets; and those directly associated with multinationality. Later (1983b), however, he put 
this distinction in slightly different, eventually more clear, terms. He distinguished between 
those ownership advantages that arise from the proprietary ownership of specific assets of 
the firm - asset (Oa) ownership advantages - which the firm can choose to internalise or 
not; and the ownership advantages that can only be exploited if internalised, since they 
result from the superiority of hierarchies vis-a-vis external markets in the common
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governance of a network of assets located in different countries - transaction (Ot) ownership 
advantages13.
Dunning (1981a: pp.34-35) also considered necessary a systematic distinction between 
country (home and host), industry and firm determinants of the OLI characteristics: “the 
propensity of enterprises of a particular nationality to engage in foreign production will 
vary according to the economic at a l characteristics of their home countries and the 
country(ies) in which they propose to invest, the range and type of products they intend to 
produce, and their underlying management and organisational strategies”.
More recently, Dunning (1993a: p-79) added a fourth, firm-specific, condition to the basic 
three proposed in 1979:
(iv) Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a particular firm, the extent to 
which the firm believes that foreign production is consistent with its long-term 
management strategy.
One of the mam criticisms of the eclectic paradigm is that it includes so many variables 
that it loses any operationality. Dunning (1991: p.125) partially accepts it, although he sees 
it as an inevitable consequence of trying to integrate the rather different motivations 
behind FDI in one general theory. He also accepts that the first versions of the OLI 
paradigm did not give full account of the dynamic interaction between the variables. The 
answer to this criticism was the Investment Development Cycle, or Path, which Dunning first 
introduced in 198114, and which will be discussed later.
2.3.4. OLI versus internalisation
Dunning (1993a: p.85) argues that “the [eclectic] paradigm is less an alternative theory of 
international production than one which pinpoints the essential and common 
characteristics of each of the mainstream explanations”. That is the reason why he re­
named it ‘paradigm’ instead of the original ‘theory’. However, the claim that the eclectic 
paradigm has uniquely the global explanation of international production is not universally 
accepted. Rugman (1980), in particular, claims that internalisation is in itself a general
13 The actual expressions used in Dunning (1983b) were ‘asset-power’ and ‘transaction-power’ (p.334). The terms asset 
(Oa) and transaction (Ot) ownership advantages only appear in subsequent works.
14 Dunning (1991: p .134, footnote 13; 1981a: p.30, footnote) refers that the notion o f an Investment Development Cycle 
was first proposed by him and Peter Buckley in 1975 at a conference o f the UK Chapter o f the Academy o f 
International Business, and again in 1978 with Peter Buckley and Robert Pearce in a similar conference.
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theory of foreign direct investment15. [ Ie extensively analysed previous contributions to the 
theory of I'DI to demonstrate that internalisation is the key element in all existing 
explanations. Hennart (1986) and Casson (1987) seem to agree.
Supporters of internalisation consider that the concept of ownership advantage is irrelevant 
in explaining multinational activity. Buckley (1983a) saw it as the consequence of applying 
static concepts to a dynamic issue - the growth of the firm. Casson (1987: p.135) went 
further, to argue that “Dunning’s eclectic theory implicitly denies the original powerful 
insight of Coase, which is that internalization is the raison d ’etre of the firm”. Dunning’s 
distinction between asset and transaction ownership advantages may be seen as a 
concession to this criticism (Corley, 1992: p .11). But Casson (1987) admitted that the 
empirical work recognises the importance of ownership advantages.
Dunning’s interpretation is that the difference is one of semantics: “I accept that some 
ownership-specific advantages are the direct result of firms internalizing the market for 
their intermediate products across national borders. However, ( ...)  I think it appropriate to 
refer to the benefit as an ownership-specific advantage and internalization as the modality 
by which this advantage is realized” (Dunning, 1991: p.132). Ownership advantages may be 
dynamic and volatile, but they are the factors that, by being internalised, allow firms to 
cross borders and become MNEs.
Dunning (1991) accepts that the internalisation theory has the leading explanation of why a 
firm should choose to engage in foreign investment. But he dismisses its capacity to 
explain the level, structure and location of all international production. Dunning’s claim is 
that for the internalisation theory to achieve that status all kinds of market imperfections 
would have to be considered in the approach, “in which case the theory loses much of its 
incisiveness” (p. 120). Dunning sees the internalisation theory not as an alternative but as a 
very important contribution to his own approach. One, he admits, that considerably 
influenced the evolution of his own view of foreign direct investment (1991: pp. 122-123).
The most important distinction between the two versions of the Reading School is 
probably the explicit reference to the role of macroeconomic variables in shaping 
international production. Since the very beginning, and despite the many subsequent 
developments, the internalisation approach is a theory of the firm that chose to cross 
national borders - a theory of the MNE. By contrast, the eclectic paradigm is a theory of
15 Although he seems to associate Dunning with the internalisation school (see Fina and Rugman, 1996: p.200)
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FDI. It wraps the theory of the firm with the macroeconomic and socio-political 
environment in which the decisions are made: “The main difference between the 
determinants of intra-national and international production lies in the unique economic, 
political and cultural characteristics of separate sovereign states” (Dunning, 1993a: p.86).
2.3.5. Motives for foreign production
The motives for firms to engage in foreign production can be classified in four groups: 
natural resources seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking16. 
Natural resources seeking FDI is justified by the fact that these resources -  e.g. minerals, 
raw materials and agricultural products - tend to be location specific. The need to 
guarantee a cheap and safe supply of natural resources justified much of the FDI flows in 
the 1800s and early 1900s, largely from the most industrialised nations (i.e. Europe, USA 
and Japan) to the less developed areas of the globe (Dunning, 1993a: pp.110,124). Market 
seeking corresponds to FDI that aims at supplying the local market or markets in adjacent 
territories. It may represent a deeper involvement of the firm, following the success of 
exports, or the expansion of the firm to a wholly new market. Transportation costs and 
government regulations are the main reasons behind market seeking FDI. However, 
Dunning (1993a: pp.58-59) suggested that strategic reasons may also be associated with 
this type of FDI. Some examples are to follow the firm’s clients in their foreign expansion, 
the need to adapt products to local conditions and tastes, or the reduction of transaction 
costs.
Efficiency seeking FDI has two mam forms. First, and probably the most frequent type, 
firms often seek to increase their cost efficiency by transferring production, totally or in 
part, to low labour costs locations. This is especially likely to happen in industries where 
unskilled or semi-skilled labour represents an important part of the production costs. 
Common examples are US investment in Mexico’s maquiladoras, and investment in Portugal 
and Spain by north and central European countries (cf. chapter 5). The second type of 
efficiency seeking FDI corresponds to investment aimed at rationalising the operations of 
existing MNEs. I he target may be the exploitation of comparative advantages in adjacent 
territories (e.g. following a process of economic integration, such as the creation of the 
Single European Market, in 1992), or to exploit economies of scale and scope across
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borders. I lowever, prior market seeking FDI or costs reducing FDI is a pre-condition for 
this variation of efficiency seeking foreign investment.
Finally, strategic asset seeking FDI is probably the fastest growing of the four motives for 
overseas investment (Dunning, 1994). Firms increasingly use FDI to obtain strategic assets 
(whether tangible or intangible) that may be critical to their long-term strategy but are not 
available at home (see also section 2.3.3). In contrast to the other motives for FDI, 
strategic assets seeking investment does not imply the exploitation of an existing 
ownership advantage of the firm. Instead, FDI may be a vehicle for the firm to build the 
ownership advantages that will support its long-term expansion at home and abroad, as 
argued, for example, in the network literature (see section 2.4.1). Alternatively, strategic 
asset seeking investment may not involve strengthening the firm’s position, but rather to 
weaken the competitive position of its competitors (Dunning, 1993a: p.60).
2 .4 . A  D y n a m i c  A p p r o a c h  t o  F o r e i g n  P r o d u c t i o n
All the explanations of foreign production discussed so far are static approaches. Yet the 
choice of international production and management is essentially a dynamic issue. 
According to Dunning and Rugman (1985: p.231), this intrinsic dynamism was already 
present in Hymer’s original work, in his treatment of ownership advantages. I lymer (1960) 
presented internationalisation as a way of enforcing market power, which implies an 
evolving world where there is no space for the notion of equilibrium. In a later work, 
Flymer (1968) made even more explicit this dynamic bi-directional interaction between the 
internalisation of markets and market structure (Buckley, 1990).
However, the credit for the first consistent attempt to create a dynamic model of 
international production goes to Raymond Vemon (1966, 1974). The product cycle theory 
evolves around technological change and how it affects the distribution of production 
worldwide. The emphasis on dynamic interactions was reinforced in the revision of the 
model (Mark II) where oligopolistic behaviour, dynamic and in permanent disequilibrium 
by nature, takes the centre stage. Nevertheless, the classical tradition of general equilibrium 
that has always dominated economic thinking was not fully eliminated. The stages analysis
16 It should be noted that this classification differs from that o f Dunning (1993a), which considered a category of 
‘resource seekers that included the natural resources seekers, the search for cheap supplies o f unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour, and the acquisition o f technological capabilities, management or marketing expertise, and organisational skills 
(Dunning, 1993a: p.57).
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suggests that the dynamic phases are periods of evolution between intermediate points of 
equilibrium.
Kojima (1982: p.8) expected to explain the dynamic effects of FDI with his 
macroeconomic approach. In a concession to his earlier critics, however, he admitted that 
the use of a comparative static method for a real dynamic model of international division 
of labour is restnctive. Nevertheless, Kojima and Ozawa (1985) insisted on the dynamic 
nature of their analysis of the impact of the international transfer of factors of production 
and goods in the welfare of countries. They believed that “a study of the creation and 
international dissemination of entrepreneurial endowments is the key to developing a 
theory of dynamic comparative advantage” (Kojima and Ozawa, 1985: p. 136). But their 
method was still ‘comparative static’.
In his criticism of Kojima’s model, Buckley (1985, 1991) exploited the dynamic elements 
associated with internalisation. He argued that internalisation provides a greater 
cooperation between the different units of the firm, which in the long run stimulates R&D 
and is likely to provide dynamic welfare improvements (Buckley, 1985: p.119). Cantwell 
(1989, 1991) has a very similar reasoning, only with the emphasis on the role of technology 
accumulation. Nonetheless, the internalisation theory lacks a truly dynamic approach. 
Buckley (1990: p.663) seems to agree when he argues that there is a need to integrate 
approaches that pay attention to “the dynamics and disequilibrium at the levels of the firm, 
markets and international competitors” both in the strategic trade theory and in the theory 
of international business.
It must be said that attempts were made to incorporate dynamic elements in the theory of 
international production. Partially influenced by Aliber (1970), Buckley and Casson (1981) 
analysed the foreign market servicing decision of firms. In their model, firms switch 
between modes of foreign market servicing with different fixed and variable costs in 
response to changing market conditions. However, Buckley (1983a) considered that the 
assumptions required by the model made it too complex to be operational.
More importantly, Buckley (1983a) demonstrated that the incorporation of dynamic 
elements in the analysis of international production refuted the proposition, central to 
Hymer’s original work, that local firms have an advantage over foreign entrants. Buckley 
(1983a) argued that a stepwise analysis of foreign market entry highlights the importance of 
elements intrinsic to multinationality that “make the established MNE a radically different
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competitor than a first-time foreign entrant” (p.48). The determinants of foreign 
expansion for new foreign investors can differ from those of established MNEs.
The increasing importance of dynamic issues is the central element in Buckley and 
Casson’s (1998) ‘state of the discipline’ discussion. They consider that uncertainty and 
market volatility made MNEs’ flexibility the leitmotif of the new research agenda. Foreign 
market entry decisions can no longer be seen as a sequence of one-off events, but as a 
contmuos systemic process (Buckley and Casson, 1998: p.22). New issues must be brought 
to the fore: international joint ventures; cooperation and business networks; 
entrepreneurship and corporate culture; organisational change.
2.4.1. The Scandinavian School
With an intrinsic dynamic approach to international business, the Scandinavian school (also 
called “Uppsala” or “internationalisation” - Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; Vahlne and Nordstrom, 1988) 
was largely developed in the 1970s from the empirical observation of the 
internationalisation process of individual (mostly Swedish) firms. From their empirical 
observations, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
concluded that firms gradually develop their international operations by a process of 
incremental knowledge and commitment.
As m Hymer (1960), it is believed that, because they have little or no knowledge of the 
local conditions, foreign firms are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis local competitors. Although 
‘objective’ knowledge about foreign countries can be bought by the company, ‘experiential’ 
knowledge can only be obtained through direct experience (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Only the effective presence in foreign countries provides this critical element if the firm is 
to become an efficient player in international markets. Moreover, the process of foreign 
expansion is influenced by the firm’s past experience, the size of potential markets and, 
most importantly, the firms’ psychic distance to each potential host country. The latter is 
defined by factors such as the differences between home and host countries in terms of 
language, culture, political systems, level of education, and level of industrial development. 
Because of the correlation between cultural and geographic distance, psychic distance is 
also normally strongly associated with geographic distance17.
17 Johanson and Vahlne (1977: p.33) defined psychic distance as "the sum o f factors preventing the flow o f information 
from and to the market".
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Typically, internationalisation starts with exports via independent representatives (agents), 
followed by the establishment of sales subsidiaries and, eventually, productive subsidiaries. 
This is clearly a process of increasing resources’ commitment, as well as progressive 
knowledge acquisition. The fact that foreign subsidiaries are frequently established through 
the acquisition of former agents or by contracting key persons in the agents’ structure 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977: p.33) is consistent with the knowledge acquiring view.
At the same time, the knowledge acquired in neighbouring countries (in terms of psychic 
distance), where internationalisation is likely to start, will permit the progressive expansion 
to countries increasingly further apart. That is, economies of scope in the learning process 
allow the firm to expand to new foreign countries, ever more distinct from the home 
country. These economies of scope also permit the firm to overcome the restrictions 
imposed by limited managerial capacities, which would not permit the firm to enter several 
foreign markets simultaneously (Casson, 1994). Furthermore, the impact of the 
internationalisation process in the firm’s organisational capacity, human resources and 
organisational structure (see Welch and Luostarinen, 1988) will probably enable it to jump 
stages after certain critical knowledge of international markets is obtained. This is 
particularly evident when the firm expands its operations to countries psychologically far 
from the home country, but close to others where it is already established.
On the face of this, internationalisation is no more than “the consequence of a process of 
incremental adjustments to changing conditions of the firm and its environment 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977: p.35)18. However, a fully dynamic approach to international 
production was not provided by the Scandinavian researchers until the mid 1980s. The 
original model only tried to explain early stages of internationalisation, ignoring 
competitive factors that change over time, in particular international competition. 
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) and Vahlne and Nordstrom (1988) argued that in order to 
analyse situations where both the firm and the market are highly internationalised it is 
necessary to look at industrial markets as networks of relationships between firms19.
Knowledge and resource commitment remained the cornerstones of the network 
approach. However, it considers that the internationalisation of the firm depends on its 
capacity to build long term links with other firms in foreign networks (Johanson and
'8 Aharoni (1966) is recurrently cited by the authors o f the internationalisation school.
19 Arguably, the original analysis applies essentially to investors from small countries (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988: 
p.299). Firms from countries with big domestic markets may be large enough to start internationalisation with a big 
productive FDI project.
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Mattsson, 1988: p.296). This network of relationships permits the creation of a capital of 
trust that reduces transaction costs and increases cooperation in the development of new 
products and technology. In other words, it represents a specific competitive advantage 
even when it is an unintended by-product of the firm’s short term options (Vahlne and 
Nordstrom, 1988: p.262). But the network is also in permanent change, and the firm’s 
position in it requires constant investment.
Vahlne and Nordstrom (1988: p.262) argued that a successful entry in an international 
network depends on the firm possessing some specific (e.g. technological) advantage (an 
Oa-advantage in Dunning’s parlance). But once established in the network, the knowledge 
of the market and the special relationship with suppliers and customers becomes an 
advantage in itself, allowing the firm to maintain its international position even if the 
original advantage erodes20.
According to this approach, internationalisation depends on the firm’s network 
relationships rather than on firm-specific advantages (Coviello and McAuley, 1999: p.227). 
Henceforth, firms may not internationalise to exploit existing ownership advantages (cf. 
section 2.3.3). Instead, internationalisation may be the vehicle to access foreign strategic 
assets that will permit to offset prior deficiencies in the firm’s ownership advantages (cf. 
section 2.3.5 on strategic asset seeking FDI). The network is, in this sense, a facilitating 
element. Both Fujita (1995) and Gomes-Casseres (1997) found evidence that smaller firms 
(less likely to possess strong ownership advantages) rely on network linkages to build up 
their ownership advantages and to gain economies of scale and scope (Chen and Chen, 
1998: p.446).
2.4.2. Modes of foreign market servicing
The internationalisation school presented foreign market entry as an incremental process. 
However, the choice was limited to that between a subsidiary (FDI) and a contractual 
arrangement (licensee or agent). The latter was expected to precede the former (Vahlne 
and Nordstrom, 1988: p.258), as well as purely commercial FDI being expected to precede 
productive FDI. Furthermore, in a process of incremental involvement, joint ventures 
represent an intermediary stage between contractual arrangements and wholly owned 
international projects.
20 The convergence with Buckley’s (1983a) suggestion that multinationality is an advantage in itself (Dunning’s Ot-
advantages) is obvious.
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Buckley and Casson (1976) used a costs-benefits analysis to suggest a very similar 
international involvement path. Their claim was that, in normal conditions, the fixed costs 
associated with licensing are lower than those resulting from FDI. They are, however, 
higher than exports because of the need to guarantee that the licensing agreements arc 
respected by the licensees. Since the opposite happens with variable costs, market servicing 
tends to follow the sequence: exporting - licensing - FDI. Buckley and Casson (1981) 
added that the switch in modes of market servicing is also affected by the life-cycle of the 
product, the firm’s familiarity with the foreign market, and the firm’s degree of 
internationalisation.
Rugman (1981) also examined the choice between exporting, FDI and licensing. He was, 
however, very much concerned with the appropriability problem (Magee (1977a, 1977b) 
and believed that licensing is a risky modality. “The very existence of the MNE is 
threatened by premature or otherwise inappropriate licensing” (Rugman, 1981: p.70). 
Hence, he concluded that licensing will only take place in highly mature industries, which 
results in that the sequence between the three foreign market servicing strategies will be 
exporting-FDI-licensing. This negative view of licensing, in particular in the earlier stages 
of the product cycle, is shared by Vahlne and Nordstrom (1988: pp.258-259).
In fact, it seems that Rugman provided a very detailed analysis of a special case of Buckley 
and Casson’s (1981) model - when one of the modes (licensing) is inefficient"1. 
Alternatively, it may be suggested that Buckley and Casson (1976) underestimated the fixed 
costs associated with licensing. Nevertheless, Rugman (1981: p.74) concedes that the 
growth of standardised products and a better government regulation are increasing the use 
of non-equity forms of international involvement (licensing, joint ventures). In other 
words, better regulation reduces the costs of licensing, increasing its attractiveness at any 
stage of maturity.
2.4.3. The Investment Development Path
The Investment Development Cycle, or Path, was introduced as a dynamic approach to 
the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1981a: p.34). However, contrarily to the eclectic paradigm 
where the macroeconomic variables are simply one level of analysis, the investment 
development path is largely a macroeconomic approach (Cantwell, 1991: p.39).
21 This possibility is generically discusscd by Buckley and Casson (1981: p.80). They also suggested that the choice 
between foreign market servicing alternatives is affected by the product cycle (p.85).
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The investment development path suggests an association between a country’s level of 
development (proxied by GDP p er capita) and its international investment position (net 
outward I’DI stock p er capita). The basic hypothesis is that, as the country develops, the 
conditions facing domestic and foreign companies change. This will have an impact on the 
flows of inward and outward FDI. However, inward and outward FDI affect the 
economic structure as well. In other words, there is a dynamic interaction between the 
two. The IDP also accepts that governments can influence the country’s conditions and, 
consequently, FDI flows and domestic firms’ ownership advantages, a notion new to the 
mainstream theory of FDI.
According to the IDP, countries evolve through five stages of development (Dunning, 
1981a, 1981b, 1986b; Tolentino, 1987; Dunning and Narula, 1996b):
Stage 1
The first stage is associated with pre-industrialisation. Countries in this stage will not 
attract any foreign investment, except probably for a few companies eventually interested 
in exploiting existing natural resources, but with little or no integration in the national 
economy. Very small domestic markets, inadequate infrastructure, a poorly educated 
labour force and undeveloped commercial and legal frameworks are some of the factors 
that explain this low attractiveness. On the other hand, domestic companies do not 
possess any significant ownership advantages, and outward FDI will be nil. Dunning 
(1981a: p.38) suggests that, if they exist at all, O-advantages are probably best exploited 
through other forms of international contracting (e.g., minority direct investment, portfolio 
resource flows or exports).
Governments at this stage usually have two sets of actions. They try to improve basic 
infrastructure and to upgrade human capital; and they adopt macroeconomic policies that 
are intended to change the structure of domestic markets and industries - import 
protection and export promotion are two examples.
Stage 2
The combination of national policies pursued by the government will eventually create 
some location specific advantages. In consequence, inward FDI starts to rise, probably 
attracted by an emergent domestic market in consumer goods, but also in transport, 
communications and construction (including public demand in infrastructure). Frequently, 
this happens in response to tariffs imposed by the government. As in stage 1, export-
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oriented FDI will probably exist in natural resources-based industries. Some vertical 
integration into labour-intensive activities upstream in the value-chain can also be expected 
if and when basic infrastructure has been provided. Labour-intensive manufacturing and 
tourism are other sectors likely to attract foreign investment at this stage.
Outward direct investment at this stage will be low, reflecting the scarce ownership 
advantages of domestic firms. It is likely that existing O-advantages have been developed 
in industries connected with natural resources or other primary activities that managed to 
produce semi-skilled and moderately knowledge-intensive consumer goods. Hence, despite 
its initial low level outward FDI will start to rise as domestic firms engage in market- 
seeking FDI in (probably less developed) adjacent territories and, more important to the 
development of their O-advantages, in strategic asset-seeking investment in developed 
countries.
The domestic government frequently has an active role in inducing these early 
internationalisation attempts. Dunning (1993a) argues that the combination of domestic 
and foreign investment that results from the country’s improved L-advantages will 
generate agglomerative economies and increase labour productivity. This will positively 
affect both domestic firms O-advantages (and decrease foreign firms’) and the country’s L- 
advantages themselves. Hence, it is claimed, “in these initial stages of development, the 
role of government is especially important” (Dunning, 1993a: p.88)” .
An important characteristic of this stage is that the combination of fast growing inward 
FDI with only exploratory outward foreign investment will make the country an 
increasingly net receiver of FDI. Or, in other words, the country’s net stock of foreign 
investment is increasingly negative.
Stage 3
The development of domestic firms’ O-advantages and increasing production costs 
associated with higher wages will translate, sooner or later, into a reduction in the rate of 
growth of inward FDI and an increase in the rate of growth of outward direct investment. 
As a result, net inward investment per capita will start to fall. That is, comparative 
advantages in labour-intensive industries will deteriorate, creating an incentive to search for 
new less developed locations for these industries. At the same time, stronger O-advantages 
of local firms make them more able to cope with an increasingly exigent domestic demand
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prompted by the rising incomes, and with foreign competition. Larger markets also mean 
more opportunities for economies of scale, favouring the development of domestic firms’ 
O-advantages. Market seeking outward FDI to both less and more developed countries is 
also expected, as it is strategic assets-seeking investment in stage 4 and 5 countries.
Furthermore, the changing O-advantages of domestic firms will be decreasingly associated 
with the home country’s specific characteristics or government policies and more with the 
possession of intangible assets and knowledge by the firms themselves. In other words, O- 
advantages, at first largely country-specific, will become progressively firm-specific. FDI 
induced O-advantages, or the advantages resulting from managing and co-ordinating 
geographically dispersed assets (Ot-advantages), make their appearance. O-advantages also 
become an active element in the reshaping of the country’s L-advantages, side by side with 
government policies and economic growth. These L-advantages will now be defined by a 
large domestic market, a growing stock of human capital, and a stronger technology 
capacity. In response, import-substituting inward FDI will be progressively replaced by 
efficiency-seeking production.
Dunning (1981a: p.41) still recognises a significant role for governments at this stage. 
Governments have the tasks of further reducing market imperfections and of encouraging 
a deeper integration between domestic and foreign firms. Dunning claims that 
governments’ policies should have two distinct aims. On the one hand, to attract foreign 
investment to industries where domestic firms are unable of exploiting existing L- 
advantages. On the other hand, to provide incentives for the internationalisation of 
domestic firms in those industries where they already possess significant O-advantages and 
the country’s L-advantages are weak or eroding. This may mark the beginning of the 
country’s international investment specialisation. In any case, “structural adjustment will be 
required if the country is to move to the next stage of development” (Dunning and 
Narula, 1996b: p-6).
Stage 4
Countries in stage 4 are those that became net outward investors, with outward FDI still 
growing faster than inward FDI. It means that domestic firms now possess the ownership- 
advantages to compete in any domestic or foreign market. 1’hey grew in size and they 
diversified both geographically and in terms of industries. At this stage, Ot-advantages,
22 Dunning (1993a: p.88) cites also Porter (1990) and Ozawa (1989).
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those resulting from multinationality, are far more important than (^-advantages. 
Production processes are capital and knowledge intensive. The reasons to engage in 
outward FDI will also diversify. In labour-intensive industries, domestic firms will continue 
to engage in efficiency-seeking FDI in (less developed) countries with lower wages. 
Outward investment to overcome trade barriers will be found in countries in any stage of 
development. Rationalised and strategic asset-seeking investment in other countries in 
stages 4 and in countries in stage 5 will take place in innovatory industries.
Following a tendency felt since the very first stages of the IDP, the country’s 1,-advantages 
are now almost entirely based on created assets. Consequently, inward FDI will include 
market- and asset-seeking direct investment from countries in lower stages of 
development, but it will mostly be rationalised and strategic asset-seeking investment from 
other stage 4 countries. Intra-industry production is a consequence of the growing 
similarity in the O-advantages of firms from countries at this stage, and it generally follows 
prior growth in intra-industry trade. In part, it translates the increasing propensity by 
MNEs to internalise trade and production (Dunning and Narula: 1996b: p.7).
At this stage, the role of government has changed. It still concentrates on improving 
market efficiency and reducing transaction costs. However, and more importantly, 
governments begin to take a more strategic intervention in supporting infant industries and 
reducing the economic and social impact of eliminating declining industries.
Stage 5
The existence of a fifth stage of the IDP to include the leading developed countries was 
first suggested by Dunning only in 1986 (Dunning, 1986b: pp.30-31). It resulted from the 
difficulty to explain the convergence and balancing of FDI stocks in most developed 
countries since the middle 1980s. Despite permanent high stocks of both inward and 
outward FDI, the net outward investment (NOI) position of stage 5 countries will revolve 
around zero, alternating between positive and negative balances according to the short 
term evolution of exchange rates and economic cycles.
Dunning (1986b)23 suggests that this is the combined influence of economic and 
technological convergence among the leading developed countries with the tendencies 
already described in stage 4: countries’ L-advantages are increasingly associated with 
created assets, and firms’ O-advantages are more transactions-based and less assets-based.
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As a result, cross-border trade and investment are essentially conducted mside the MNEls. 
International investment flows of any country in stage 5 will be more dependent on the 
strategies of its MNEs and of MNEs from other countries in stages 4 and 5 than on 
differences between the countries themselves (which are very few anyway). These MNEs 
will increase their commitment to rationalising their international production networks 
(which they certainly started in previous stages) with investment in other developed (stages 
4 and 5) countries. They will also continue to direct FDI to less developed countries, 
mostly in natural resources and labour intensive industries. At the same time, stage 5 
countries will be the recipients of market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investment 
from countries in lower stages of development.
It should be noticed that it is implicit in the description of stage 5 that no single country 
has an advantage over the other developed economies. MNEs, alone and independently of 
the domestic or host country’s location advantages, are the dominant force in shaping 
international production and trade. MNEs increasingly behave like “mini-markets” 
(Dunning and Narula, 1996b: p.8) and to some of them the whole concept of home 
country is becoming meaningless, as they transform themselves from Multinational 
Enterprises into Transnational Corporations.
Governments, nevertheless, retain a role in the dynamic economic restructuring. Buckley 
(1996b: p. 2) suggests that “a fundamental role of government is to seek to appropriate 
some of the rents earned by transnational firms”. As firms assume a greater importance in 
shaping the world economy, national governments are increasingly assuming the role of 
strategic oligopolists. They must take into account the behaviour of MNEs, but also that 
of other governments (Dunning and Narula, 1996b). Inevitably, some governments will be 
more able to play the dual oligopolistic game than others.
2 .5 .  C o n c l u s i o n
It is clear from the above review that different approaches to international business 
resulted in a wide ranging body of literature. The reasons why individual firms engage in 
international activities are the centre concern. And the key seems to be market 
imperfections, which prompt companies to internalise cross border activities. In many 
respects, this is not very different from what firms do inside national borders. As such,
23 See also Dunning and Narula (1996b: pp.7-9).
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internationalisation can be seen as just another dimension of the growth of the firm 
(Buckley, 1993b). Nonetheless, this is a dimension unlike the others. On the one hand, 
countries differ in their legal, political and cultural characteristics, which generates a whole 
set of managerial problems. On the other hand, multinationality changes the very nature of 
the firm, and can be in itself a source of competitive (ownership) advantages'4.
The issue of change, or the intrinsic dynamic nature of the internationalisation process, 
was of particular appeal to the Scandinavian school. As any disadvantage faced by any firm, 
those associated with doing business in a foreign country are neither permanent nor 
universal. Internationalisation is a learning process. It can be managed through a process of 
progressive commitment of resources, starting in more familiar countries and moving to 
ever more distant ones. If the internalisation of ownership advantages explains why MNEs 
exist at all (Dunning, 1991), only this dynamic approach to internationalisation can 
describe the process of the development of a multinational corporation.
However, in order to understand the way international production is organised worldwide 
a last critical element is needed. And that is the importance of locational factors. Only the 
interaction between the internalisation of ownership advantages with location advantages 
can explain the configuration of MNEs’ activity worldwide. This seems to be a desenption 
of the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1979), except that it cannot be dissociated from the 
dynamic elements of the investment development path (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b).
The aim of this research project is to analyse the competitiveness of Portugal from the 
perspective of the country’s position in the international production network. From what 
was described above, this will entail the investigation of the locational advantages 
associated with foreign and domestic firms operating in Portugal, as well as the process of 
internationalisation of domestic firms. The eclectic theory and in particular the investment 
development path will constitute an appropriate framework of analysis.
24 That the geographic distribution o f the firm’s activities can be in itself an ownership advantage was 
recently restated by Dunning (1998a).
C h a p t e r  3.
E m pir ical  Ev id e n c e  o n  t h e  
D e t e r m in a n t s  o f  F o r e ig n  
D ir ect  In v e s t m e n t
3.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The task of reviewing the empirical investigation of the determinants of FDI is not an easy 
one. The existence of competing theories (see previous chapter) and the very broad 
characteristics of countries and markets originated a wide range of methodologies and 
levels of analysis that are frequently difficult to compare (Dunning, 1993a). The variety of 
the researchers’ interests also contribute to the diversity of empirical approaches to 
international business activity.
The 1950s and, in particular, the 1960s marked the first attempts to explain FDI1. Due to 
the limitations faced by researchers, these were essentially surveys or case studies. First, the 
theoretical body of knowledge, still dominated by the neo-classical school, provided little a 
priori insight into the determinants of FDI. Second, statistical analysis was at the time 
restricted by very limited computing capacity. Third, data on FDI was rare or did not exist 
at all. It is symptomatic that Dunning (1973) engaged in a discussion of measurement 
issues before embarking on a survey of the existing theory.
1 See Dunning (1973) for a survey o f these early studies.
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A much more relevant stream of research was the one led by Raymond Vernon in the late 
1960s2. Very much concerned with testing the product cycle hypothesis, these 
investigations expanded existing theory while collecting valuable data on MNEs and on 
FDI flows and stocks. The work of the ‘Multinational Enterprise Project’ was continued 
by many other surveys that since the 1970s have been trying to identify the determinants 
of FDI and of the growth of MNE activity. The development of new statistical techniques 
was, naturally, of great support.
Although several limitations to the explanatory power of surveys remained, these studies 
permitted to identify important issues, many now considered ‘evident’. One such idea was 
that ownership specific advantages are very much culture specific. MNEs that operate in 
different industries but which are from the same country seem to share many O- 
advantages (Dunning, 1990). In other words, even if O-advantages should be, by 
definition, firm specific, they are inevitably influenced by locational factors. Another 
element identified to be relevant in the shaping of O-advantages is the degree of 
multinationality. This includes the MNE’s age and the number and cultural variety of 
countries in which it is present (Archer, 1986). Location advantages, on the other hand, 
were identified as largely industry specific.
The type of FDI was the other mam defining element (Dunning, 1993a: p.143). Political 
stability, an appropriate institutional and legal framework, and good infrastructure seemed 
to be relevant for every kind of investment. However, determinants like market size and 
growth were identified to be critical for market seeking investment but largely irrelevant 
for resources or efficiency seeking FDI. The role of the host government, including tax 
and other fiscal incentives, on the other hand, was held to be essentially associated with 
efficiency seeking investment (e.g. McAleese, 1985). Technology and highly sophisticated 
markets were considered important in explaining efficiency seeking investment in the most 
developed countries (Dunning, 1993a). However, this is probably better classified as 
strategic asset seeking investment.
Internalisation elements were less frequently identified. Nevertheless, Archer (1986) and 
Ozawa (1989)3 concluded that the need to control strategic inputs was frequently
2 Dunning (1993a: p .138) cites a number o f articles associated with the ‘Multinational Enterprise Project’ that 
Vernon led: Aharoni (1966), Hufbauer (1966), Hirsch (1967), Gruber, Mehta and Vernon (1967), Keesing 
(1967), contributors to Wells (1972), and Knickerbocker (1973).
3 Cited in Dunning (1993a: p. 145)
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associated with FDI. The immediate reason could be to assure a stable supply or to bar the 
access to competitors. Another determinant was to control the relationship with the final 
clients (Buckley and Mathew, 1979). Yet another reason was the fear that a licensee would 
turn into a competitor (Archer, 1986) or that it was not sufficiently efficient (Dunning and 
Norman, 1987). Economies of common governance associated with FDI were also 
frequently identified in the literature (Dunning and Norman, 1987; Dunning, 1993b).
3.2. US INVESTMENT IN THE EEC
The progressive improvement in the quality and availability of data on FDI since the end 
of the 1960s permitted the development of an increasing number of econometric studies. 
Not surprisingly, American investment in the EEC concentrated the researchers’ attention 
for many years (Scaperlanda, 1967; Bandera and White, 1968; Scaperlanda and Mauer, 
1969; Goldberg, 1972; Schmitz and Bieri, 1972, Lunn, 1980; Scaperlanda and Balough, 
1983). Two mam hypotheses dominated these studies: tariff discrimination and market 
size, actual and potential.
The tariff discrimination hypothesis is of neoclassical origin (Mundell, 1957). It was among 
the most frequently cited variables in survey studies. However, the evidence from research 
on US investment in the EEC was not absolutely conclusive. Schmitz and Bieri (1972), 
Lunn (1980) and Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) found tariff discrimination to be 
important. Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969) did not find it statistically significant. Goldberg 
(1972) and Culem (1988) obtained inconclusive results4.
In a much more recent study of US investment in Europe, Clegg (1996: p. 193) suggested 
that, in the presence of imperfect markets, the impact of protectionism may be more 
subtle than suggested by the level of external tariffs. The process of creating a customs 
union is likely to increase discrimination against non-EEC producers, even if external 
tariffs are not increased (or have been reduced through GATT negotiations, as has been 
the case). Clegg (1996) concluded that this ‘relative discrimination’ is better supported by 
the data than the absolute level of tariffs.
The market size hypothesis also derives from neoclassical theory - Jorgenson’s (1963) 
model of domestic investment. It was introduced in the studies of the determinants of 
FDI as a location variable associated with economies of scale (Scaperlanda and Mauer,
4 Culem (1988: p .894) attributed his unexpected results to the presence o f multicollmeanty.
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1969: p.560) and, thus, market imperfections. It assumes two levels: the absolute size of 
the market, and its growth rate.
Despite the strong theoretical sense of the claim, the empirical support is apparently 
inconclusive. Studies that used data prior to the first enlargement of the EEC, when new 
investment was dominant (Bandera and White, 1968; Scaperlanda and Mauer, 1969), found 
market size significant, but not market growth. The opposite was found by Culem (1988) 
with more recent data3. Nevertheless, the results of Schmitz and Bieri (1972), Lunn (1980) 
and Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) support both hypotheses.
Clegg (1995) tested both variables with data for a 40 years period (1951-1990). The 
aggregate data produced very poor results. However, after dividing the period of analysis 
there was strong support for the market size hypothesis in the period 1951-72, and for the 
market growth hypothesis in the period 1973-90. In other words, new investment seems to 
be associated with market size, while expansionary investment is responsive to market 
growth.
Other variables were occasionally found to be associated with US FDI in the EEC. 
Exchange rates were supported by Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) and Lunn (1983). 
Clegg (1995), however, did not find them significant, which was explained with the 
expected long run impact of exchange rates on international investment. Cultural links 
(between the US and the UK) and prior exports were found by Culem (1988) to be 
relevant. Clegg (1995) found relative interest rates significant for US investment in the 
EEC, although the relationship was stronger in the 1950s and 1960s than in the next two 
decades. This contradicts Culem’s (1988) results, which reported only to the second period 
of Clegg’s research6. Clegg also found expected changes in interest rates to be significant in 
the first of those periods, but not in the second. I le believed that floating exchange rates, 
imposed in 1973, may have reduced the chances to arbitrate between home and host 
country.
Few of the investigations of the determinants of US FDI in the EEC covered labour costs. 
Since market seeking was the dominant motivation, labour variables could eventually be 
expected to be secondary. One exception was Culem (1988), who tested the relevance of
5 In the same study, Culem (1988) found European investment in the US (mostly first time investment) to be 
related to the size o f the market but not to its growth
6 Surprisingly, a regression for the full period found the variable not to be significant, which suggests caution 
in the interpretation of Clegg’s result.
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absolute and relative labour costs, both corrected for differences in productivity. I Ie found 
none to be significant for US investment in the EEC, despite being positive for intra-EEC 
FDI. A different result was obtained by Clegg and Scott-Green (1998). They found labour 
costs negatively associated with US FDI in the EEC (EC 12). However, when they divided 
their data into three groups of countries according to the respective level of development, 
labour costs were only significant for the poorer countries (Greece, Portugal, and Spam), 
and positively signed. Their suggestion was that US FDI was attracted to regions with low 
wages, but inside these sub-regions locations with higher labour skills (proxied by higher 
costs) were preferred.
3 .3 .  T h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t
The study of US investment in the EEC is simplified by the homogeneity of the 
phenomenon analysed. The hypothesis tested is that FDI is attracted by a large and 
growing internal market protected to some extent by trade barriers. Other empirical studies 
of the determinants of FDI have a far more complex task. Differences across countries of 
origin and destination, and between industries make the development a consistent model 
particularly difficult. Still, a substantial amount of research on the determinants of FDI in 
developed and developing countries alike was produced in the last twenty years. They vary 
widely in the objectives, countries and period covered, underlying theory (many totally lack 
one), and level of analysis. As a result, a wide number of hypotheses and potential 
determinants were tested.
3 .3 .1 . D o m e s t ic  m a r k e t
As seen above, the potential impact of the domestic market on FDI derives from neo­
classical theory. A big domestic market permits the exploitation of economies of scale, 
which is likely to increase the attractiveness of FDI vis-a-vis alternative forms of 
internationalisation. Empirical evidence of the relevance of the host country’s market as a 
determinant of FDI was recurrently found in survey studies and in the investigation of US 
FDI in the EEC (see above). Naturally, all the subsequent econometric tests of the 
locational determinants of FDI included the domestic market as an independent variable. 
Most found it to be significant.
Several proxies for the relevance of the domestic market are available. Market size is 
normally measured by total GDP, as in most studies of US investment in the EEC. Private
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and public consumption can be used as alternatives (Lucas, 1993). GDP per capita is a 
common proxy when the relative level of sophistication of heterogeneous local markets is 
at stake. As for market potential, real GDP growth rate or population can be used. The 
latter is less frequent because of the limitations associated with overlooking the economic 
data7.
Interpretation of the results, however, must be undertaken carefully. GDP per capita, for 
example, is normally correlated with the level of skills of the workforce. This implies that 
without a properly specified model it may be impossible to know if the variable is 
measuring the sophistication of the domestic market or the quality of the labour force. 
Another example results from the correlation between GDP and exports. Access to big 
export markets can be a location advantage in itself (see next sub-section). But exports and 
GDP tend to be correlated (not least because exports are one of the components of 
GDP), which can generate multicollinearity if the two variables are used simultaneously (an 
empirical limitation frequently ignored). Lucas (1993) avoided multicollinearity with the use 
of private and public consumption instead of GDP.
Another difficulty is that foreign direct investment is itself a source of growth. If FDI 
flows have an expansionary effect in the economy, the econometric test may take the cause 
for the effect. In fact, the likelihood is that there will be a bi-directional effect between 
FDI and GDP, which can only be appropriately modelled by a system of simultaneous 
equations (O’Sullivan, 1993).
3 .3 .2 . E x p o r t  M a r k e t s
Most of the empirical evidence of the attractiveness of export markets to FDI is indirect. 
The importance of export markets is implicit in the observation that FDI grew steadily in 
Europe after the announcement of the creation of the EEC, in the 1950s, and that of the 
1992 Internal Market. 1'he same can be concluded from the findings of Root and Ahmed 
(1979) that economic integration is a significant variable among developing countries8.
More direct approaches were used by O’Sullivan (1993) and Lucas (1993). O’Sullivan 
(1993: p. 141) based his model on the fact that in the period studied (1960-80) foreign
Taveira (1984) found it to be a significant determinant o f inward FDI in developing countries but not in 
the developed countries.
8 In the period covered by Root and Ahmed’s study (1966-70), Latin America was the most economically 
integrated developing region, and also the one attracting more FDI. The results would certainly be very 
different today.
42
investors in Ireland exported over 80 per cent of their non-food output. Since the United 
Kingdom was the destiny of a big percentage of these exports, export markets were 
proxied by the UK’s real GDP. It was found strongly significant. Lucas (1993) used an 
index of foreign GDP to assess the importance of export markets in attracting FDI to the 
export oriented countries in East and Southeast Asia. He concluded that FDI was more 
responsive to foreign markets than to the home market despite being both significant.
Adopting a different level of analysis (the firm rather than the country), Caves el al (1980) 
and Saunders (1982)9 found a positive relationship between the export propensity of 
Canadian-based firms and inward FDI. Access to the Commonwealth preference schemes 
might have been a major motivation for the investing firms, most of which were from the 
US.
The degree of openness was found by Kravis and Lipsey (1982) to be a significant 
determinant of the location of export oriented investment by US MNEs. The variable was 
introduced as a proxy for the price of material inputs - the more open the economy the 
lower the price. However, a high degree of openness also represents important export 
markets. Which of the two effects the variable was really measuring is hard to identify.
3.3.3. G o v e r n m e n t  p o l ic ie s  a n d  p r o t e c t io n is m
The potential of export markets is very much linked with economic policy. Of particular 
importance is the option between protectionist and outward looking policies. There is 
abundant empirical support for the claim that export orientation attracts FDI (Riedel, 
1975; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Hein, 1992; Dollar 1992; Lucas, 1993; Jun and Singh, 1996). 
MNEs are attracted to export-oriented countries, on the one hand, because of the export 
potential per se, and, on the other hand, because export-oriented countries have better 
economic records, suggesting a more stable economic an social climate, and eventually 
more attractive domestic markets.
There is, however, a clear contradiction between these results and the tariff discrimination 
hypothesis discussed above for the studies of US investment in the EF1C. The suggestion 
was that FDI can be encouraged by barriers to trade (Schmitz and Bieri, 1972; Lunn, 1980; 
Scaperlanda and Balough, 1983). This was also the conclusion reached by Horst (1972) for 
US investment in Canada, by Lall and Siddarthan (1982) for inward FDI in the US, by
9 Cited m Dunning (1993a: p. 166)
43
Wheeler and Mody (1992), for US investment across the world, and by Jeon (1992), who 
found a dummy variable representing non-trade barriers to be a significant determinant of 
Korean FDI in developed countries.
A number of factors help to explain the contradicting results associated with 
protectionism. Market imperfections and ‘relative discrimination’ (Clegg, 1996) between 
foreign and domestic firms vary widely across industries and countries, making the results 
particularly sensitive to sample and methodology. Furthermore, protectionism often 
coexists with export orientation. Protected economies can attract export-oriented FDI by 
opening selected industries to FDI or by creating export processing zones.
In any case, barriers to trade tend to be significant only when market seeking is the main 
motivation of FDI. When that is not the case, protectionism becomes less important. 
Moore (1993) did not find evidence that German FDI was induced by tariffs in the host 
countries. Similarly, Kumar (1990) concluded that protection was not a determinant of 
investment in India. Dunning (1993a: p .165) mentions that Agodo (1978) obtained the 
same result for US investment in Africa.
3 .3 .4 . G o v e r n m e n t  in c e n t iv e s
The incentives given to foreign investors represent another important element of 
government policy. This is a determinant of FDI frequently cited in surveys (Robinson, 
1961; Forsyth, 1972; Andrews, 1971; all cited in Dunning, 1993a). The relevance of 
government incentives was equally acknowledged by McAleese (1985). It is a fact that an 
increasing number of countries are taking part in ‘location tournaments’ (David, 1994), 
competing programs of incentives designed to attract multinational firms. This includes 
developed and developing countries alike, often due to an imitation effect. However, it was 
the opinion of UNCTAD (1998: p .104) that incentives are not a relevant determinant of 
inward FDI. They are much more likely to influence the precise choice of location within a 
country or region once the investment decision has actually been made.
Government incentives are difficult to quantify. There is a huge variety of packages that 
governments can provide. The incentives they include are frequently confidential, indirect 
(the building of specific infrastructure, cooperation in training schemes), differed in time 
(tax reliefs), or simply impossible to measure (preferential access to the domestic market, 
favourable legislation). Probably as a result of that, regression analysis of the importance of 
government incentives failed to produce the expected results. Kumar (1994) found
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incentives less successful than export processing zones. Lim (1983) and Wheeler and Mody
(1992) concluded that they were no substitute for good infrastructure, natural resources, or 
an expanding domestic market. Tsai (1991) and O’Sullivan (1993) claimed that government 
support was not a significant determinant of FDI in Taiwan and Ireland, respectively, in 
spite of massive programs to attract FDI10.
3.3.5. N a t u r a l  R e so u r c e s
Until World War II the exploitation of local resources was the main reason why firms 
engaged in FDI (Dunning, 1993a). Since then, the characteristics of foreign direct 
investment changed substantially, but the possession of natural resources can still be an 
important determinant. Developing countries in particular, often have to rely on their 
endowed resources to compensate for very low levels of created assets. But natural 
resources are also very important for the economy of developed countries such as Canada 
or Australia.
Dunning (1981a: p.44) demonstrated the impact that natural resources have in the 
expected pattern of FDI. For any level of development, resource-rich countries receive 
consistently higher levels of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, scarce natural 
resources can be a push factor to the internationalisation of domestic firms, transforming 
the country into a net foreign investor at early stages of development.
Given this, it should be expected that most econometric studies of FDI, in particular those 
concerning developing countries, include some proxy for the possession of natural 
resources. Surprisingly, this is not the case. The influence of the original studies of US 
investment in the EEC, which understandably ignored natural resources, can be part of the 
explanation.
Among those that included natural resources, the results are mostly supportive of their 
relevance to inward FDI. Owen (1982) found a dummy variable representing natural 
resources intensity a significant determinant of FDI in Canada. This is consistent with the 
results o f Buckley and Dunning (1976), who found a similar variable not significant for the 
UK. Taveira (1984) studied the determinants of US investment in two sets of developed 
and developing countries and found the percentage of primary commodity exports in total
10 O’Sullivan (1993) acknowledges that the variable used may not appropriate all the support effectively 
provided to foreign firms by the Irish government. Lim (1983) was equally critical o f the data available to 
him.
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exports to be significant in both cases, l im  (1983) obtained similar results with the share of 
minerals in total exports in 27 developing countries. Contradicting results were obtained by 
Root and Ahmed (1979) for the ratio of raw materials exports to GDP, but they excluded 
extractive FDI from their study, which certainly influenced the findings.
3.3.6. La b o u r  C o st s
The importance of labour costs as a determinant o f FDI is almost self imposing. Contrarily 
to capital and technology, labour has very low mobility. Therefore, MNKs can reduce 
production costs by transferring the more mobile production factors to areas where labour 
is cheaper. Usually this implies moving operations from developed to developing countries, 
but can also involve rationalisation investment among developed countries.
The evidence obtained from the literature, however, is not absolutely conclusive. In the 
case of investment among developed countries labour costs were normally found to be 
irrelevant. Some examples arc Buckley and Dunning (1976), Owen (1982), Gupta (1983), 
Dunning (1980), Taveira (1984), or Culem (1988). A different conclusion was, 
nevertheless, reached by Caves et a l (1980) and by Saunders (1982). Both studies found 
wages a significant determinant of US investment in Canada.
When developing countries were included in the sample, the relevance of labour costs 
tended to increase. This was the case with Schneider and Frey (1985), despite wages being 
less important than the level of development or the balance of payments, Lucas (1993), 
and Kumar (1994). [eon (1992) found that increasing domestic wages at home were 
associated with Korean FDI in developing countries. Riedel (1975) and O’Sullivan (1993) 
suggested that relative wages were among the most important determinants of FDI in 
Taiwan and Ireland, respectively. Finally, Flamm (1984) concluded that offshore 
investments were sensitive to labour costs, despite a moderate response to wage changes.
Two exceptions to this were Kravis and Lipsey (1982) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). 
Neither of the studies found labour costs to have a significant impact on the location of 
US subsidiaries in samples that included both developed and developing countries. Kravis 
and Lipsey (1982) suggested that labour skills, which were not accounted for in the model, 
could be the reason for the unexpected result. Wheeler and Mody (1992) provided a 
different interpretation. Their results suggested that, as the national income increases, 
market size offsets the importance of labour costs as a location factor - the loss of one
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location advantage is compensated by improvements in the other, which invalidates the 
regression analysis.
One problem associated with measuring labour costs is whether they should be corrected 
for differences in productivity. There are arguments in both directions. On the one hand, 
differences in labour costs reflect to some extent differences in productivity, which implies 
that the correction should be made. On the other hand, MNEs can obtain high levels of 
productivity anywhere in the world with the transfer of managerial and organisational skills 
alongside capital and technology. Due to differences in culture and labour skills, 
productivity levels are still likely to differ between similar plants of one MNE. But the 
differences can be expected to be much smaller than between national averages.
As Dunning (1958: p. 135) demonstrated for US firms in the UK, foreign subsidiaries tend 
to have higher productivity levels than their domestic counterparts. Productivity 
differences can be expected to be particularly high in less developed countries, precisely 
where the wage differences ought to be bigger. This would explain why MNEs tend to pay 
wages above the national average. According to The Economist (2000b: p. 19) wages paid 
by foreign firms in Turkey, for example, are more than twice the national average. Even in 
the US foreign firms pay more than domestic ones: 4% in 1989; 6% in 1996 (The 
Economist, 2000a: p .87), even if in this case productivity differences may not be the main 
explanation.
Another important factor is that firms probably base their decision in relative rather than 
absolute labour costs. But to find the appropriate benchmark is not easy. Differences 
between home and host countries are the most immediate solution. I lowever, the 
comparison with alternative locations is equally important (Tsai, 1991). Lansbury et al 
(1996) used two alternative measures to test the determinants of FDI in Central and 
Eastern Europe, (i) Relative labour costs between the countries studied11, (ii) The ratio of 
each country’s labour costs and those in Portugal and Spain (considered the main 
competitors for FDI). The latter seemed to produce stronger results.
Finally, there is the impact of previous experience to be considered. The presence in a 
particular labour market represents valuable information in terms of human resources 
management and the estimation of future costs. Therefore, when considering alternative 
investment locations, the firm can be expected to favour countries where it already has
11 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
47
operations, unless the wages differentials are very high. Tu and Schive (1995) found that 
MNEs that first invested in Taiwan in the period of low wages were still investing in 
Taiwan in the 1990s. However, the size of individual projects had been negatively affected 
by labour costs, and most labour-intensive investments had been relocated overseas.
3.3.7. L a b o u r  S k il l s
A highly skilled workforce was one of the product cycle explanations for US leadership in 
innovative products. Labour skills were also associated with other countries’ imitation 
ability, and even in mature industries minimum skills are required to obtain a productivity 
level that allows economic production. As with other determinants, however, measurement 
difficulties frequently discourage researchers. Taveira (1984) and Schneider and Frey (1985) 
used the percentage of population in secondary education, but found no evidence of its 
significance. This variable is, however, too aggregated and is probably no more than an 
indicator of the level of development.
In fact, school attendance is unlikely to be the relevant element. March (1988) extracted a 
sample of 200 British men from the General Household Survey of which 41 per cent had 
no qualifications and a further 10 per cent had only an apprenticeship. However, only 3.5 
per cent were classified as unskilled manual workers. This suggests that even in the 
presence of low levels of formal education, the existence of an industrial tradition, for 
example, may lead to reasonable productivity levels with low training costs.
Most support for the relevance of labour skills is, in fact, indirect. Swedenborg (1979) was 
surprised by a positive relationship between the wages of foreign Swedish subsidiaries and 
FDI. Her suggestion was that high wages simply reflected the skills of foreign workers 
(Dunning, 1993a: p.164). Lall (1980)12 and Kravis and Lipsey (1982) made a very similar 
interpretation of their results regarding labour costs, while Lansbury el al (1996) concluded 
that MNEs were attracted to Central and Eastern Europe by labour skills as much as by 
labour costs.
At the firm or industry level, the investigation of the role of labour skills is much simpler. 
Lall and Siddarthan (1982) tested both total remuneration and the proportion of non­
production workers in the labour force as determinants of inward FDI in the US. Neither
12 “Monopolistic Advantage and Foreign Involvement by US Manufacturing Industry”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, vol. 32: pp. 102-122.
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was significant, which is consistent with the fact that foreign investment in the US is likely 
to be predominantly market or strategic asset seeking.
3.3.8. P h y s ic a l  a n d  C u l t u r a l  P r o x im it y
Physical distance is frequently presented as a proxy for transport costs (e.g. Dunning, 
1993a: p .166). Because they increase the costs of exporting from the home country, 
transport costs may induce horizontal FDI. Nevertheless, they increase the costs of intra- 
firm co-ordination and input transfers, which restricts vertical FDI. Physical distance is 
also a good proxy for cultural or psychic distance, which the Scandinavian (or 
internationalisation) School proved to have a strong impact on FDI (see chapter 1).
The development of the internationalisation theory (johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; Vahlne and Nordstrom, 
1988) was essentially inductive. Its development was based on evidence from small 
samples of Scandinavian firms. But the same conclusions were reached by Davidson 
(1980), for example, with a much wider sample. Moreover, Taveira (1984) found US 
investment in both developed and developing countries to be negatively affected by 
physical distance. Grosse and Trevino (1996) identified an association between physical 
and cultural distance and investment in the US. Veugelers (1991) concluded that a shared 
language and neighbourhood increase FDI. The latter was equally supported by Moore 
(1993). Papanastassiou and Pearce (1990) found dummy variables for EC and 
Commonwealth countries positively related to UK investment but a negative association 
with physical distance. Previous levels of bilateral trade were identified by Lansbury et al 
(1996) to be a determinant of FDI in the US.
3.3.9. P o l i t ic a l  r is k
Political instability reduces a country’s attractiveness as a location of FDI. Political events 
can disrupt the economic order, eliminate markets or even put past investment at risk, as in 
the case of nationalisation of foreign owned assets. Even in less radical situations 
investment is likely to suffer, because instability makes it difficult to predict cash flows. 
Not surprisingly, political risk is normally identified in survey studies to be at the top of 
managers’ concerns (Tu and Schive, 1995; Akhtar, 1999).
However, econometric studies frequently fail to establish a relationship between political 
risk and FDI flows (e.g. Chase et al, 1988; Flamm, 1984). Tu and Schive (1995) combined
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survey analysis with econometric testing to conclude that political stability and social order 
are, in general, preconditions for FDI, but have little influence on the amounts invested. 
This is consistent with Lucas’ (1993) suggestion that events which generate political 
instability (e.g. Marcos’ martial law in the Philippines, Park’s assassination in South Korea) 
do reduce FDI, but have a short run impact13.
Another difficulty to the political risk hypothesis is that firms’ assessment of political risk 
depends on the country of origin, the managers background, or the timing of investment. 
Tu and Schive (1995) were surprised by the fact that foreign firms’ perception of political 
instability in Taiwan varied widely with the year of first investment in the country. 
Furthermore, a country with a record of political struggle and social unrest but ruled by a 
“ friendly” government can be an attractive location. Schneider and Frey (1985) found 
political aid received from Western countries and the World Bank to have a strong positive 
effect on FDI in developing countries, while aid received form the Communist block had a 
negative impact. Political instability had, nevertheless, a significant negative impact.
The composition of their investment portfolios may also influence firms’ attitude towards 
the risk associated with individual countries, since geographically diversified firms can 
dilute individual risks (Cosset and Suret, 1996; Butler and Joaquin, 1998). Moreover, a 
portfolio balancing effect may even incentive firms to invest in countries with relatively 
high political risk. This was, for example, Flamm’s (1984) finding for the semiconductors 
industry. Flis subjects openly admitted scattering production facilities across a broad range 
of countries as a protection for potential political disruptions in one location14.
3 .3 .10 . E x c h a n g e  R a t e s  a n d  B a l a n c e  o f  P a y m e n t s
The eventual importance of exchange rates to the location of FDI was first suggested by 
Aliber (1970). Ilis argument was that the existence of different currency areas would 
generate FDI flows (see chapter 2). l ie  considered that “the greater the fixed capital stake 
of an investment, the more important it is to take account of possible movements in future 
exchange rates” (Dunning, 1993a: p.62). A model that explains the impact of exchange 
rates volatility on location decisions of MNEs was provided by Goldberg and Kolstad
13 Lucas (1993) also found that “good news”, such as the Olympic Games in South Korea or Acquino’s 
succession in the Philippines, have a positive short term impact on FDI.
14 In the previous chapter it was shown that the risk diversification hypothesis (Rugman, 1975, 1979; Lessard, 
1976) does not hold as a general theory o f FDI. It seems to be, nevertheless, one o f many factors that can 
influence the investment decision.
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(1995). All this helps to understand why exchange rate fluctuations are frequently cited in 
survey studies.
To measure the risk associated with international capital markets, Schneider and Frey 
(1985) included the deficit of the Balance of Payments in their ‘politico-economic’ model. 
A bigger deficit means a higher risk that restrictions to free capital movements will be 
imposed. They obtained a very significant negative relationship between the deficit of the 
Balance of Payments and the level of FDI. Similarly, Lucas (1993) found a positive 
association between FDI and the level of foreign reserves, which suggests that foreign 
investors are sensitive to the risk of currency devaluation. O’Sullivan (1993) claimed that 
exchange rate risk contributed significantly to explain FDI in Ireland. And Grosse and 
Trevino (1996) suggested that exchange rates were one of the most significant factors in 
explaining FDI in the US.
Contradicting results, however, were obtained by Moore (1993) who found no evidence 
that German investors favour countries with fixed exchange rates with the deutsche mark. 
Moore, however, used membership of the ERM as a proxy dummy variable, which 
overstates the risk associated with currencies that are not members but follow the 
movements of the participating currencies.
3.3.11. In d u s t r ia l is a t io n  a n d  In f r a s t r u c t u r e
Good infrastructure is generally identified as a determinant of any type of FDI by survey 
studies. As for industrialisation, its importance results from the more structured economic 
life that accompanies it, and from the informal skills embodied in the labour force that 
result from a tradition of industrialisation. More industrialised countries also attract more 
technology intensive investments and, eventually, strategic asset seeking FDI.
Root and Ahmed (1979) used the ratio of manufacturing output to GDP as a proxy for 
industrialisation in their study of developing countries, but concluded it was not a 
significant determinant of FDI. Taveira (1984), on the other hand, found the level of 
industrial development to be a significant determinant of FDI in developed and 
developing countries alike, although more so in the latter than in the former. Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) also found the level of industrialisation strongly significant in both groups of 
countries. However, in the case of developing countries it was less relevant than the quality 
of infrastructure.
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Infrastructure, on the other hand, seemed to be the clement associated with two of the 
determinants of manufacturing FDI in developing countries identified by Root and 
Ahmed (1979): the ratio of commerce, transport and communication to GDP, and the 
extent of urbanisation. As mentioned above, the quality of infrastructure was also 
identified as the main determinant of US FDI in developing countries by Wheeler and 
Mody (1992). It was irrelevant in the case of developed countries. Kumar (1994) used a 
combined approach. His variable ‘industrial capability’ was built to capture skilled 
manpower and quality of industrial services and infrastructure. The corresponding 
coefficient was strongly significant, with a positive impact on the relocation of US 
production abroad.
This evidence suggests a conclusion very similar to that obtained for other determinants 
(e.g. political risk). The quality of infrastructure (or its absence) can be a deterrent of I' DI - 
low levels of infrastructures can substantially increase operational costs. But once a certain 
level is attained its influence is likely to disappear.
3 .3 .1 2 . O w n e r s h ip  a n d  in t e r n a l is a t io n  d e t e r m in a n t s
The test of the ownership determinants associated with FDI is more difficult than that of 
the location variables discussed above. Ownership advantages are to a great extent firm 
specific, but are also influenced by industry and country (Dunning, 1993a: p. 142). Two 
examples are Australian firms’ ability to adapt foreign technology to small markets (Parry, 
cited in Dunning, 1993a: p .143), or the capacity of US MNEs to exploit large and fairly 
homogeneous markets (Dunning, 1993a: p .142). Other examples arc those ownership 
advantages that are rooted in the culture of the home country. This is the case of some of 
the O-advantages of Japanese MNEs pointed by Dunning (1993a: p .143), such as their 
approach to human resource management or the role of Kievetsu-type relationships in 
reducing market failure.
In any case, country specific O-advantages can often be tested indirectly, because they 
frequently represent location advantages as well. One example is technological capacity, 
which was found by a number of studies to be a significant determinant of FDI by US 
MNEs (Dunning and Buckley, 1976; Lall, 1980; Owen, 1982; Pearce, 1989). This 
ownership advantage clearly resulted from the conversion of the home country’s 
technological leadership, itself a significant locational determinant for inward FDI (Kogut 
and Chang, 1991; Ajami and Ricks, 1981). Other examples of asset based ownership (Oa)
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advantages that can be tested indirectly are knowledge capital, financial asset advantages or 
natural resources availability. Evidence of their relevance as determinants of FDI was 
summarised by Dunning (1993a).
A different case is that of determinants such as the capacity for product differentiation or 
transaction ownership (Ot) advantages in general (e.g. economies of plant or firm size, 
oligopolistic behaviour, or the length of time involved in international production). 
Although less easy to test, there are substantial evidence in support of their role as 
determinants of FDI (cf. Dunning, 1993a).
As for internalisation determinants, these are largely the result of ownership advantages, 
depending exclusively on the decision of whether to trade them in the market. Dunning 
(1993a: p. 145) suggests that few studies looked at the reasons behind the decision between 
FDI and licensing or other forms of non-equity involvement. The role of government 
seems to be of particular relevance in this decision (Contractor, 1984; Davidson and 
McFetridge, 1985; Kumar, 199015). Technology was another element identified in the 
literature to be associated with the licensing option (Dunning, 1993a: p. 167). 
Internalisation seems to be negatively associated with the technological capacity of the 
home country (Contractor, 1984), as well as with the technology’s age, the industry’s R&D 
intensity, or the licensor’s previous experience in the licensing of technology (Davidson 
and McFetridge, 1985).
3 .4 .  S u m m a r y
Despite evidence of the importance of all the determinants of FDI analysed in this 
chapter, it was clear that the determinants could not all be simultaneously relevant. It was 
implicit in the survey (and sometimes explicit) that the relevance of each determinant 
depended on the home and host countries, industry characteristics, and the type of FDI 
being analysed.
The size and growth rate of the domestic market, as well as high levels of protectionism, 
were relevant variables for market seeking FDI. Investment attracted by a location’s 
preferential access to specific export markets may also be considered as market seeking. In 
this case, however, variables associated with efficiency seeking investment, such as labour 
costs and skills, and government incentives were equally relevant. As for strategic asset
15 All cited in Dunning (1993a).
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seeking FDI, technology, a sophisticated domestic market, a highly skilled workforce, or 
very specialised infrastructures were all relevant factors. On the other hand, variables such 
as political and economic stability, an efficient legal framework, physical and cultural 
proximity, or good infrastructure were relevant for all types of investment.
Flistoncally, variables associated with natural resources were the main determinants of 
FDI. However, the decreasing importance of natural resources in the post-war world 
economy, and the emergence of large locally owned firms in newly independent natural 
resources producers, resulted in a decline in natural resources seeking FDI (see section 
2.3.5 and UNCTAD, 1998: p .106). From the end of World War II until the 1970s, market 
related variables assumed a dominant position, as was clear from the studies of US FDI in 
the EEC in section 3.2. Also important during the period was cost reducing FDI, for 
variables such as labour costs (UNCTAD, 1998: p .108).
In more recent years, deregulation and liberalisation gave rise to a process of global 
integration of national economies as well as of the operations of MNEs (with the latter 
eventually assuming even greater emphasis than the former). As a result, efficiency seeking 
and strategic asset seeking FDI became increasingly important motives of FDI (section 
2.3.5), which resulted in the growing influence of created assets (e.g. skilled labour and 
specialised infrastructures) as the locational determinants of foreign investment 
(UNCTAD, 1998: p.111). In this highly integrated world, the importance of physical and 
cultural proximity may also increase. Physical proximity and deregulation stimulate the 
restructuring o f MNEs’ operations, whilst cultural proximity facilitate the management of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which may be an incentive to engage in this form of 
operations.
The survey focused especially on country specific factors. That was due to the aims of the 
research project it was designed to support, which looks at foreign direct investment from 
a national perspective. However, it must be borne in mind that firm related factors also 
play a critical role in the distribution of world FDI, and that role is growing in importance. 
As seen above, many of these factors are rooted in the location advantages of the firms’ 
country of origin. However, many more resulted from MNEs’ ability to tap into the 
natural or built resources of foreign locations (their ownership advantages). A consequence 
o f the evolution of recent years has been to increase the relevance of the factor. As MNEs
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grow larger, multinationality itself and firms’ own culture and history, become increasingly 
important determinants of the location and characteristics of FDI in the world economy.
Chapter  4.
F oreign  D irect in v e s tm e n t  
a n d  the  Portuguese  Ec o n o m y
4.1. In t r o d u c t io n
The poorest member of the European Union as measured by GDP per capita, Portugal is 
often characterised as a small open economy of recent industrialisation. Unlike most other 
European countries, it is not possible to speak in Portugal of the modernisation of the 
economic structures (including industrialisation) until the second half of the twentieth 
century. Ironically, however, Portugal has been at the forefront of European expansion, in 
the fifteenth century. It has also been absent from most of the political struggles in the 
continent, shielded by its peripheral geographic position and an early option for overseas 
expansion.
The decline of the Portuguese economy started at the end of the sixteenth century. The 
loss of independence to Spain, in 1580, anticipated that decline of the Asian trade on 
which the economy had been thriving for almost a century. The strategic interests of the 
Spanish crown lay in Europe and in Central America, and little effort was made to retain 
control in Asia1. By the time of the ‘restoration’ of independence, in 1640, the strategic 
interests of Portugal had definitely moved to Brazil. Sugar, tobacco and exotic timber were
1 In a short period o f time, the Portuguese lost control o f their many Asian possessions, with the exception 
o f Goa (India), Macao (China) and Hast Timor. These territories remained under Portuguese administration 
until the second half o f the twentieth century.
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the main products traded until substantial deposits of gold were found, at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century (Serrao, 1993). A new period of growth followed. As before, it was 
essentially based on overseas trade.
Indeed, a striking feature of the Portuguese economy in this period was the low 
importance of manufacturing. African gold, in the fifteenth century, was obtained in 
exchange for products that were almost all imported from Europe or the North Africa 
(Castro, 1985: p. 129; Magalhaes, 1993a: p. 315). In the sixteenth century, European and 
local (Asian) products were used in the spices trade. Magalhaes (1993b: p. 287) is of the 
opinion that manufacturing was discouraged by the abundance of gold and silver. This is 
clearly an early example of the “Dutch disease”2, and manifested itself again in the first half 
of the eighteenth century, with the discovery of abundant deposits of gold in Brazil.
Histonans do refer to ‘outbreaks of industrialisation’ during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries which, significantly, tended to coincide with periods of difficulties in 
the balance of payments (Serrao, 1993: p.89). One such example -  probably the most 
significant - was the industrialisation effort conducted by the Marquis of Pombal, in the 
1760s. Based on a model of import substitution, new manufacturing firms were offered 
substantial financial support, tax breaks, and a protected market. Many of the new firms 
received direct royal support (Serrao, 1993: p.92). Nevertheless, even in this case the 
impact on the country’s economic structure was relatively small. The size of the domestic 
market represented an important obstacle, only partially compensated by exports to Brazil’. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Portuguese manufacturing industry was 
already in deep recession (Serrao, 1993: p. 94; Mendes, 1993: p .356).
Despite this, all estimates suggest that the level of development of the Portuguese 
economy at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not differ much from that of 
other European countries (see Table 4.1). According to Gonsalves (1998), the roots for the 
low level of development of the Portuguese economy in more recent years can only be 
explained by the country’s failure to join the European industrial revolution of the 
nineteenth century. Some of the elements that may have contributed to that failure were: a 
very liberal trade agreement with the UK conducted the Portuguese economy to specialise 
in the primary sector, where productivity growth is slower; scarce natural resources, which
2 Cf. Abdelkader (1987).
3 Exports to Europe were also relevant in this period, benefiting from the climate created by the 
independence o f the USA and the rivalry between the UK and France (Mendes, 1993: p. 356).
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at the time represented an important element for growth; low skills of the labour force at 
all levels, including management; deficient infrastructure; and unfavourable political and 
legal arrangements (Gonsalves, 1998: p.89; Mendes, 1993: p.365)4.
T a b le  4.1 : P o r t u g a l ’s GDPpc a s  a  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  
GDPpc in s e le c te d  E u ro p e a n  c o u n t r ie s  (1830-1950)
Year
As estimated by 
Bairoch (1976)
As estimated by 
Nunes et al. (1989)
As estimated by 
Lains (1995)
As estimated by 
Maddison (1996)
1830 95.3 81.7 - -
1850 80.4 58.0 70.2 -
1870 63.7 49.1 53.6 54.4
1890 51.7 55.9 48.9 -
1913 39.0 38.7 38.1 38.4
1929 34.5 37.4 - 35.2
1950 32.4 37.1 - 38.3
Source: Gongalves (1998: pp. 94, 96, 97). USD and constant 1970 PPP.
Notes: The 10 European countries used in the comparison were: Austria (Austria-Hungary until 1913), 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.
This is not to say that manufacturing industries were completely alien to nineteenth 
century Portugal. A list of some 20 firms created before 1850 can be found in Mendes
(1993). One of them (Vista Alegre, established in 1824) remains today as the leader in its 
industry (ceramics) and is now involved in a process of internationalisation (see chapter 6). 
Many more firms were established in the following years, in particular in textiles, fish 
preserves and cork products (Gonsalves, 1998). But this was insufficient to accompany the 
development of other European nations or to reduce the role of agriculture in the 
country’s economic structure. At the beginning of the twentieth century, relative GDP per 
capita in Portugal was down to about 38 or 39 per cent of that of the most developed 
European nations (see Table 4.1).
The relative decline of the Portuguese economy continued through the first half of the 
twentieth century, even if to a less dramatic extent (see Table 4.1). The first years of the 
republic, installed in 1910, were marked by great political, social and economic turmoil. 
Amid an incredibly high rotation of governments3, total GDP shrunk and inflation 
rocketed. Not surprisingly, the autocratic coup of 1926 was welcomed by a majority of the 
population. But the subsequent economic recovery was slow. Concentrated on the 
elimination of the main cause of concern over the previous years, the new government put 
the emphasis on economic stability, but at the expense o f economic growth (Neves, 1994).
4 Several changes were registered in the second half o f the century in terms o f the legal framework and 
public investment in education and infrastructure (Mendes, 1993). However, they were not sufficient to stop 
the relative decline o f the Portuguese economy (Gonsalves, 1998: p.91).
3 Sixteen governments between 1910 and 1916 alone (Neves, 1994: p .49).
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The end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s marked the starting point for the 
transformation of the Portuguese economy into what it is today. Although reluctantly 
(Rollo, 1993), the authorities started to promote the development of the manufacturing 
industries by investing in infrastructure (e.g. electricity generation) and in industries such as 
steel or cement. As with many governments at the time, the model of growth adopted was 
based on import substitution and the positive discrimination of domestic investors. 
Industrialisation yielded its results, and the economy registered an annual growth rate of 
4.1 per cent between 1950 and 1960. However, the strategy was unsustainable in the 
medium and long run due to the small size and low sophistication of the domestic market. 
Furthermore, albeit high, the growth rate was lower than that, for example, of Greece or 
Spain in the same period (Lopes, 1996: p.44)6.
It was after 1960 that the catching up of the Portuguese economy did take off. Between 
1960 and 1973 real GDP per capita registered an annual growth rate of 6.9 per cent 
(Lopes, 1996: p .15). In comparison to the most developed European countries, it leaped 
from about 32 per cent in the early 1950s to 50 per cent in 1973 (Table 4.2). lh is is 
particularly remarkable since the period corresponds to the ‘golden age’ of the European 
economy, with all countries expenencmg very strong growth.
T a b le  4 .2 : P o r t u g a l ’s G D P pc as  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  th e  a v er a g e  
G D P pc in  s e l e c t e d  E u r o p ea n  c o u n t r ie s  (1 9 50 -1995 )_____
Year
As estimated by 
OECD Year
As estimated by 
OECD
1950 32.6 1975 45.5
1960 33.3 1980 47.8
1965 36.9 1985 44.5
1970 42.4 1990 49.1
1973 49.5 1995 49.2
Source: Gongalves (1998: pp. 94, 96. 97). USD and constant 1970 PPP.
Notes: The 10 European countries used in the comparison were: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, itaiy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.
The abandonment o f import substitution policies and the promotion of exports was the 
element behind this transformation. Despite the political regime, Portugal was admitted in 
1960 as a founding member of EFTA, accompanying its main trading partner - the UK. 
The following year Portugal joined the G A IT , which entailed a reduction of tariffs with 
non-EFTA members. The Portuguese authorities managed to negotiate the country’s 
participation in EFTA in very favourable conditions. The remaining EFTA members 
agreed to take into consideration the much lower level of development of the Portuguese
6 Gonsalves (1998: p.94) refers that, when compared with the ten countries he used as benchmark, GDP per 
capita in Portugal registered a very small growth in the 1950s, from 32.6 to 33.3 per cent.
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economy, and accepted the maintenance of high levels of protection in agriculture and 
several industries. In practice, tariff barriers were only eliminated for the manufacturing 
products that were not produced in Portugal at the time.
Despite the success registered, these policies may have produced a negative side effect 
(Lopes, 1996: p .113). The inevitable exploitation of comparative advantages between 
Portugal and its main trading partners led to an excessive specialisation in labour-intensive 
industries with little technological incorporation. However, it seems that the Portuguese 
government had little choice. The model of growth based on import substitution was not 
suitable for the Portuguese economy, and clearly failed to produce the expected results 
even in countries with a much bigger domestic market (e.g. Brazil, India). A much 
discussed alternative at the time was to intensify the economic relations with the colonies, 
or ‘overseas provinces’. They represented an important source of raw materials, but their 
markets were small and not sophisticated. The impact on the Portuguese industrial 
structure would certainly had been much less significant than the ‘European option’.
The year o f 1974 represented the end of economic growth and was followed by a new 
period of divergence with the most developed European countries (see Table 4.2). lhe 
importance international trade came to assume in the economy in the previous years7 made 
it much more sensible to the 1973 oil shock than to previous international crises. Imports 
increased in response to soaring oil prices (and to the new domestic conditions - see next), 
while stagnant external demand had a deep negative impact on exports. The second oil 
shock, in 1979, only amplified these difficulties.
By unfortunate coincidence, at the same time external forces were dragging the Portuguese 
economy into recession, the internal situation deteriorated as well. The democratic 
revolution of April 1974 was followed by a period of great political and social unrest. Only 
wTith the 1976 general election was institutional order again stabilised. In the meantime 
(March 1975), the mam industries and all the financial services were nationalised. If the aim 
was to eliminate the power of the few groups that controlled the economy during the 
dictatorship, it created grave short term problems to the organisation of the production 
process. Furthermore, firms not directly affected by intervention were still affected by the 
new labour legislation, higher wages, and a general climate of poor labour discipline.
The degree o f openness o f the economy was in 1973 near 60 per cent, a substantial increase from the 1960 
level - 40 per cent (Castro, 1993).
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The independence of the African colonies, in the summer of 1975, represented another 
difficulty to the Portuguese economy. Trade with the newly independent countries, more 
than 15 per cent of Portugal’s international trade in 1974, was halved in just two years 
(Lopes, 1996: p. 25). Even more dramatic was the massive flow of population generated by 
the independence of the colonies. A quarter million people may have returned to Portugal 
during 1975 - a population increase of 7 to 8 per cent. To help the newcomers, specific 
support schemes were created and jobs were offered in the public sector and nationalised 
firms with little concern for economic efficiency. Integration was surprisingly fast and 
smooth, despite the stretch it put on public expenditure.
The combined impact of these external and internal factors8 was to shape the Portuguese 
economy until 1985. The balance of payments deteriorated rapidly, inflation rose, and 
external debt reached unsustainable levels. In order to correct the imbalances, twice (1978 
and 1983) the Portuguese government was forced to seek the help of the IMF. Despite 
their success in terms of the mam objective of external equilibrium, the stabilisation 
programs (the second in particular) had serious consequences upon economic growth, 
inflation, unemployment, and the public deficit. In 1983 and 1984 the growth rate was 
even negative. Although the conditions were created for a more stable macroeconomic 
management, there was in this period a clear subsidence in the process of convergence 
with the most developed countries (Table 4.2). In 1985 relative GDP per capita was down 
to the level of 1971 (Gonsalves, 1998: p.95).
The year of 1985 marks the beginning of a new cycle of growth. The recently gained 
economic stability was accompanied by a much more calm political situation. The central- 
right minority government that took over in 1985 managed to consolidate its position with 
a clear parliamentary majority in the 1987 general election, which was further extended in 
1991. The new government put in practice important structural reforms, including a broad 
privatisation program, the restructuring of the financial system, the elimination of most 
remaining trade barriers, and an ambitious public works program.
The adoption of these measures was, nevertheless, only possible because Portugal joined 
the European Union on January 1st 1986. EU membership contributed positively to the 
climate of stability and optimism and, more importantly, made available substantial
8 Lopes (1996: p.24) is o f the opinion that the impact o f the external factors was much more relevant than 
that o f internal ones. His opinion was based on the fact that other European economies with similar level o f 
development (e.g. Spain or Greece) did not perform  much better than Portugal in this period.
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financial resources, under the form of structural funds. Also important in the second half 
o f the 1980s was the reduction of the oil price, with a very positive impact on the energy 
balance and on exports in response to economic growth in Europe. By 1992 convergence 
with the most developed European economies put relative GDP per capita at 50.2 per 
cent, the highest level ever (Gongalves, 1998: p-97)'J.
By this time, however, a new economic recession in Europe highlighted the debilities that 
persisted in the Portuguese economy. This was amplified by restrictive measures necessary 
to pursue nominal convergence with the European Union. Recession fully hit the 
Portuguese economy in 1993 and 1994, originating a new backward movement in the 
convergence indicator (cf. Table 4.2). But growth and convergence resumed in 1995. 
GDPpc grew seven per cent a year in Portugal between 1996 and 1998 if measured at 
current PPP, which compares with four per cent in the ten countries used as benchmark in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.210.
4.2. In w a r d  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  In v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  e c o n o m y
Foreign direct investment has been part of the Portuguese economy at least since the 
country started trading in the Indian Ocean, in the sixteenth century. The very 
characteristics of that trade, largely based on re-exports, and the high profits generated 
attracted people of all nationalities to Lisbon11. It was, nevertheless, with the 
industrialisation attempt o f the eighteenth century, led by the Marquis of Pombal, that 
FDI truly became an important part of the Portuguese economy. Matos (1973: p. 83) 
suggests that some 30 per cent of the manufacturing firms created in this period were 
owned by foreigners.
FDI was also a critical characteristic of the Portuguese economy throughout the 
nineteenth century and until the 1920s. Vogel (1860, cited in Matos, 1973: p .84) observed 
that most important manufacturing companies, banks, and commercial firms existing in 
the country at the time were controlled by foreigners. Bntish investors, followed by French 
and Germans, were the most frequent in a list that, curiously, did not seem to include 
Spanish citizens (Matos, 1973: p .85). As was clear from the previous section, however,
9 l  his represents approximately 60 per cent o f the average GDP per capita o f the EU12 (Lopes, 1996: p .49).
10 Own calculations based on OECD (1999a).
11 “No foreigner visiting Lisbon will return to his country, so the city has more foreigners or their 
descendants than Portuguese nationals” (Vasconcelos, 1608, cited in Matos, 1973: p.82; own translation).
62
these flows of I'DI have been clearly insufficient to permit that Portugal accompanied the
industrial revolution that was taking nlo™ T-idKing place in other European countries.
Subjacent to this regular presence of foreign firms throughout Portuguese history was the 
favourable attitude of the Portuguese authorities towards FDI. However, this changed 
radically after the establishment of the autocratic regime, in 1926. Although the official 
discourse was still favourable to the presence o f FDI, the policies adopted by the new 
regime o\ertly discriminated against the foreign ownership of capital1". As a result, I'DI 
flows were almost insignificant during the first decades of the dictatorship (Lopes, 1996: 
p. 167) . I his nationalist legislation was completely in tune with the dominant policies of 
the 1930s across the globe. They indirectly confirmed, nevertheless, the disproportionate 
weight that foreign capitals assumed in the Portuguese economy at the time.
1 he import substitution industrialisation policy adopted in the 1950s was still made under 
this nationalist setting. However, its abandonment at the end o f the decade was 
accompanied by a new attitude towards FDI. The application of the legislation became 
much less restrictive, and eventually, in 1965, new legislation reinforced the guarantees 
offered to foreign investors and increased the number of industries open to FDI (Matos, 
1973: pp. 103-107)14.
During the 1960s, FDI flows were ten to twenty times greater than in the previous decade 
(Lopes: 1996: p .168). In terms of GDP, inward FDI flows represented an average of just 
0.6 per cent between 1965 and 1974 (Figure 4.1). However, Lopes (1996: p.169) estimated 
this to be around 30 per cent of GFCF in the manufacturing industries and 20 per cent in 
the commercial sector. The importance of I’DI flows was also reflected in the 
development of new segments of export oriented industries (e.g. electric equipment, pulp, 
chemicals) with great impact in the future productive structure (Simoes, 1985: p.358). Most 
I'DI in the period was, however directed towards labour intensive industries - clothing, 
footwear and electric equipment (Lopes: 1996: p. 169).
12 The most relevant pieces o f legislation were the “Law o f industrial conditioning” (1937) and the "Law o f 
nationalisation o f capital" (1943) - nationalisation in the sense o f ownership by Portuguese nationals, rather 
than public ownership. Several other laws restricted FDI in specific sectors o f the economy (Matos, 1973).
13 The poor performance o f the Portuguese economy in this period certainly contributed to further 
discourage foreign investors.
14 Matos (1973: p .100) suggested that the need to finance the colonial war, which started in 1961, was a 
decisive factor to the new attitude o f the Portuguese authorities towards FDI.
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Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (1997a. 1997b. 2000a. several)
The second half of the 1970s was marked by very small inflows of FDI (Figure 4.1). The 
causes lie clearly in the combination of external and internal conditions described in the 
previous section. The attractiveness of Portugal as a location for FDI was reduced at a 
time when investment worldwide had been seriously affected. The flows remained, 
nevertheless, positive, to which the fact that foreign firms were left untouched by the 
nationalisations of March 1975 has certainly contributed. New legislation in 1976 and 1977 
restated the guarantees previously offered to foreign investors and admitted direct public 
support to individual projects, evaluated on a case by case basis (Lopes, 1996).
The flows of FDI started to recover in 1980. Despite the economic instability, the political 
climate was now much more stable. The attraction of big individual projects was also 
important. The most significant was Renault’s new assembly plant, which received 
substantial government support and served as a symbol of the new environment foreign 
investors could meet in Portugal. The prospect of EEC membership further contributed 
to the attractiveness of Portugal in the first half of the 1980s.
In 1986 Portugal joined the European Union, and FDI inflows rocketed from 0.8 per cent 
of GDP to 4.1 per cent in 1990. Membership expanded the guarantees of free access to 
the EU markets from a low labour costs platform and worked as a reassurance of 
economic and political stability15. Lopes (1996: pp. 173-175) considered that the inflows of 
FDI in this period were also encouraged by the privatisation program, put into practice
13 Commenting on a similar evolution of inward FDI in Austria after the country joined the EU, Beliak
(1998: p.9) considered that “although there were not many restrictions left in trade and capital flows, it seems
that the decision to join the EU gave a positive signal to investors that the business location will also be 
attractive in the future”.
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after 1988, by better infrastructure, and by (EU sponsored) incentives to new projects in 
manufacturing, tourism and agriculture16.
Some o f the factors that explain the growth of inward FDI after Portugal joined the EU 
may also explain the sharp decrease in the 1990s. If EU membership created new 
investment opportunities, it is reasonable to assume that they would have been exploited in 
the years immediately before and after Portugal joined the Union. Similarly, the 
privatisation program necessarily slowed down after the main companies had been sold. 
The external environment was also a negative factor in this period. First, the European 
economy entered a period of recession, which reduced investment. Second, the fall of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe radically changed the geopolitical map of 
Europe, seriously affecting the position of Portugal.
As seen before, part of the attractiveness of Portugal has long been dependent on low 
labour costs and preferential access to the most developed markets in Europe. The fall of 
the Berlin Wall, however, eliminated the uniqueness of this situation. The former 
communist countries (at least the most developed among them) were fast to recover 
historic ties with Western Flurope (Lansbury et al., 1996; Holland and Pain, 1998). In turn, 
EU members were more than willing to support their economic development. They 
expected to consolidate the new political regimes and to avoid an unwanted flow of legal 
and illegal immigrants. Furthermore, there was the prize of potentially big domestic 
markets and labour costs that were often a fraction even of those in Portugal (Podkaminer, 
1998). The fact is that by 1995 FDI inflows in Portugal were again at levels prior to EU 
membership (see Figure 4.1, above).
The creation of the European Single Market (ESM) is a further element to take into 
account. Dunning (1996: p .29) argued that total FDI in Europe has risen as Fu rope an and 
non-European firms became prepared for the new competitive conditions. This was 
confirmed by Agarwal (1997) and by Pain and Lansbury (1997). The latter estimated that 
the ESM may have risen the stock of German FDI in other EU countries by 17.5 per cent 
and cite similar results obtained by Pain (1997) for FDI from the UK. Still according to 
Pain and Lansbury (1997), Portugal and Spam benefited from this additional investment, 
although substantially less than the UK, the Netherlands, or Italy.
16 The privatisation program mcludcd several restrictions to foreign participation, but they were often 
‘creatively avoided’ (I.opes, 1996: p. 161).
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Two important points should be noted, however. First, Portugal’s share of inward FDI in 
the European Union (EU12) went through an evolution similar to the weight of FDI in 
GDP, only to a lesser extent (cf. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.1). Second, the behaviour of 
inward FDI in Spain was very similar to the one registered in Portugal (Figure 4.2). This 
clearly suggests that external factors were more important than internal ones in the 
evolution of inward FDI in Portugal.
Own calculations based on OECD (1997a)
The analysis of FDI in Portugal in more recent years is complicated by a break in the 
statistical series (both of inward and outward FDI). In order to comply with the 
recommendation of several international bodies, in 1998 the Bank of Portugal organised a 
massive questionnaire of foreign affiliates established in the country. This permitted a long 
due estimation of the stock of FDI and an improvement of the estimation of the flows 
(Banco de Portugal, 1998b). Largely because of the new figures for reinvested earnings, the 
exercise resulted in a substantial upward revaluation of inward FDI flows in Portugal when 
compared with the previously available figures (see Table 4.3). Being a much more recent 
phenomenon (see section 4.5), outward flows were little affected.
T a b le  4.3 : FD I f l o w s  in P o r t u g a l  (19 9 6 -98 ), o ld  an d  n ew  s e r ie s
In w a r d  F D I O u t w a r d  FD I
old series % GDP new series % GDP old series % GDP New series % GDP
1996 94,982 0.57 210,540 1.27 118,854 0.72 119,863 0.72
1997 201,661 1.15 447,007 2.54 337,296 1.92 340,160 1.93
1998 142,954 0.76 316,876 1.69 517,929 2.77 522,327 2.79
1999 47,602 0.24 105,515 0.54 407,585 2.08 411,046 2.09
Sources: Old series: own estimations based on Banco de Portugal (1997b, 2000a, 2000b)
New series: Banco de Portugal (2000a, 2000b);
Unfortunately, new data for the period before 1996 is not yet available. And because the 
old series stops in 1996 inferences are risky. For the sake of coherence, Figure 4.1 (above)
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was based on the old series. The values for 1997 to 1999 were estimates based on the 
figure for 1996 and the growth rates implicit in the new series. But it is necessary to be 
aware o f the substantial differences between old and new data (Table 4.3). In any case, the 
sharp reduction of inward FDI in Portugal in 1998 and 1999 is rather evident from Table
4.3. In percentage of GDP, the latter is the lowest value since the beginning of the 1960s, 
which may be a cause for concern for the Portuguese authorities.
Another merit of the data on inward FDI recently made available by the Bank of Portugal 
(Banco de Portugal, 1998b) was the provision of long due estimates of the stocks of FDI 
and their distribution per industry and country of origin. Some data existed for the 
distribution of the flows of FDI, but it was not very reliable and remained largely 
unpublished. According to Banco de Portugal (1998b: p.28), the manufacturing industries 
represented in 1996 about one third of the stock of inward FDI in Portugal, commerce 
was responsible for a further 17 per cent, financial services for 16 per cent, and real estate 
for 24 per cent. The primary sector was associated with just over 1 per cent of the 1996 
stock of inward FDI in Portugal (Figure 4.3).
F ig u r e  4.3: S to c k  o f  in w a r d  FD I in P o r t u g a l , 1996
Other services Prim ary 
8% 1%
17%
Source: Banco de Portugal (1998b)
In terms of the distribution of the stock of manufacturing FDI (Figure 4.4), transport 
equipment and electric machinery represented, in 1996, respectively, 19 and 17 per cent of 
the stock of manufacturing FDI in Portugal. Forest products, chemicals, and food and 
beverages were the other industries with a share above 10 per cent. This distribution 
confirms the claim of Goncalves and Guimaraes (1996: p.lO) that FDI is essentially 
concentrated in capital intensive industries. Given that domestic investment is stronger in 
labour intensive industries, they concluded that FDI contributes to diversify the 
Portuguese industrial structure.
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F ig u re  4 .4 : S to c k  o f  M a n u fa c tu r in g  in w a rd  F D I, 1 9 9 6
Not surprisingly, three quarters of the 1996 stock of inward FDI in Portugal originated in 
the European Union. France, the UK, Spain, and Germany, in that order, were the main 
European source countries (Figure 4.5). US multinationals were also strongly represented, 
but half the US investment was made through third countries (cf. Figures 4.5 and 4.6). The 
data suggest that Spain was the most common platform used by MNCs to invest in 
Portugal, but the level of aggregation does not permit the investigation of which countries 
most used the ‘Spanish route’. All it was possible to assess was that the use of third 
countries was also common among French and UK firms. Apart from Spain, the most 
significant platforms seemed to be the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany (cf. 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
F ig u re  4 .5 : S t o c k  o f  in w a rd  FDI, c o u n t r y  F ig u re  4 .6 : S to c k  o f  in w a rd  FDI, c o u n t r y
OF ORIGIN OF P A R E N T  FIRM , 1 9 9 6  OF D IR E C T IN VESTO R , 1 9 9 6
Source: Banco de Portugal (1998b) Source: Banco de Portugal (1998b)
One of the novelties of the new data published by Banco de Portugal (1998b) was 
information on the industrial distribution of FDI for the main investing countries. This
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confirmed substantial differences. Investment from Germany is probably the most 
idiosyncratic, given that almost three quarters is directed to the manufacturing industries, 
nearly three times the overall figure (Banco de Portugal, 1998b: p.31)17. As a result, 
Germany is the main origin of manufacturing FDI, with a share of 23 per cent. France 
(16%) and Spain (15%) arc next in the ranking (see Table 4.4). Spain is also the origin of 30 
per cent of FDI in commerce, well ahead of the UI< (20%), and in the financial services is 
second only to France (respectively, 14.6% and 15.7%).
T a b le  4 .4: C o u n t r y  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  s t o c k  o f  in w a r d  FDI in d iffe r e n t  in d u s tr ie s , 1996
Germany Spain France UK Netherl. US Other Total
Manufacturing 23.0 14.6 15.7 4.5 6.1 4.1 32.1 100.0
Commerce 5.8 29.5 10.4 19.5 7.1 6.6 21.2 100.0
Financial services 5.5 18.9 21.6 6.4 1.8 4.3 41.4 100.0
Real estate 2.6 13.1 12.5 19.2 17.3 9.7 25.6 100.0
Other 5.1 14.1 13.4 18.7 17.2 3.6 27.9 100.0
Total FDI 9.9 13.2 16.6 14.2 6.1 11.6 28.4 100.0
Source: Banco de Portugal (1998b: p. 31)
4.3. P r e v i o u s  w o r k  o n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  FDI in  P o r t u g a l
The first thorough study of foreign direct investment in Portugal was published by Matos 
(1973). Political and monetary stability and a friendly environment were presented as the 
top advantages offered by Portugal to foreign investors. Although small and 
unsophisticated, the domestic market was considered another important determinant. It 
was protected by high tariffs and transportation costs and could also reach the colonial 
markets in Africa. The low efficiency of local firms was considered a further attraction for 
foreign investors. However, according to Matos (1973), investors also opted for Portugal 
because of natural resources (mining, tourism, pulp) and low labour costs; privileged access 
to the EFTA and EEC markets increased the attractiveness of the latter18.
Carriere and Reix (1989) and Saraiva (1993) adopted a descriptive approach similar to that 
of Matos (1973), and reached very much the same conclusions. Low wages, privileged 
access to the EU markets, and natural resources were the elements Carriere and Reix 
(1989) associated with inward FDI in Portugal. Saraiva (1993) ignored natural resources, 
but added political and social stability, financial and technological limitations of local firms, 
privatisations, and public incentives.
17 The concentration o f German FDI in manufacturing had already been pointed out by Simoes (1989) and 
Camara de Comercio e Industna Luso-Alema (1996).
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With the support of regression analysis, Taveira (1984) exploited the dichotomy of inward 
FDI in Portugal advanced by Matos (1973). The suggestion that market-seeking FDI was 
predominant in Portugal was confirmed. Taveira (1984) found domestic market oriented 
FDI to be associated with the foreign firms’ capacity to differentiate their products, with 
market size and concentration, and with government non-interference. Curiously, these 
variables were also relevant for export oriented industries, as were labour costs (which 
were insignificant for domestic market oriented investors). It seems that access to the local 
market was an important motivation even in the case of export oriented FDI. Natural 
resources were not found by Taveira (1984) to be a determinant of FDI in Portugal.
In a descriptive analysis Simoes (1985) also distinguished between exporting industries and 
those oriented towards the domestic market. In the exporting industries, he distinguished 
between “traditional labour intensive industries” (textiles, clothing, footwear), “modern 
labour intensive industries” (electronics, transport equipment, professional goods), and 
resource based industries (beverages, pulp and paper, wood products). All the remaining 
industries were considered to be domestic market oriented.
Fontoura (1995) used regression analysis to investigate the determinants of FDI in 
Portugal. Predicting a two-way relationship between FDI and exports, she adopted a 
model of simultaneous equations19. The results, however, did not confirm the relationship. 
Furthermore, Fontoura (1995) concluded, rather surprisingly, that the exploitation of 
natural resources was the main reason for foreign firms to invest in Portugal. Labour costs 
were considered irrelevant since FDI was more common in industries with high labour 
costs, intensive in human capital and technology, and with substantial economies of scale. 
However, to infer from this that low labour costs was not a determinant of FDI in 
Portugal (Fontoura, 1995: p. 135) seems to be abusive. It may simply reflect the industries 
where the Portuguese relative labour costs are lower or where the competitive advantages 
of foreign firms vis-a-vis local investors are stronger20.
With a different methodology - a survey of 37 foreign firms established in Portugal - 
Santos (1997) obtained quite distinct results. Labour costs and access to the local market 
were pointed to as the main reason to invest in Portugal by, respectively, 43 and 46 per
18 Matos (1973) suggested that stability/domestic market and natural resources/labour costs/export markets 
attracted distinct groups of investors, the group associated with the latter being smaller than that associated 
with the former.
19 Fontoura (1995) used a cross industry model for FDI and exports in 1991/92.
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cent of the respondents. A further 30 per cent of the participants included labour costs in 
the top four reasons to have chosen Portugal, but only 3 per cent mentioned market 
access. Other relevant determinants were the international image of Portugal, labour skills, 
transportation costs, social and political stability, access to other markets, and geographic 
and cultural proximity. Natural resources were selected by only 11 per cent of the 
respondents (i.e., four), although always as first or second choice.
4.4. P r e l i m i n a r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  FDI i n  P o r t u g a l
As just seen, the number of empirical studies on the determinants of FDI in Portugal is 
quite small and their results are often contradictory. Henceforth, it may be relevant to use 
available secondary data to develop a preliminary econometric investigation of the 
phenomenon. Two regressions will be provided: a longitudinal study of the determinants 
of FDI in Portugal, and a cross-section analysis to include potentially competing locations. 
Given the level o f aggregation of the data, only the locational determinants will be tested.
4.4.1. The locational determinants of FDI in Portugal
This longitudinal study of inward FDI in Portugal covers a period of eighteen years, 
between 1980 and 1997. The period prior to the revolution was excluded due to the 
unavailability of data or inconsistency between statistical series. As for the second half of 
the 1970s, social, political, and economic instability, plus rather small flows of FDI, 
reduced its relevance for the regression analysis. The proposed model (see Appendix 4A) 
was inspired by the results of previous studies. Four determinants of FDI were considered: 
attractiveness of the local market, costs reduction, economic stability, and Portugal’s 
geopolitical position. Each was proxied by different variables, some complementary, some 
alternative to each other. Variables associated with natural resources were not included. 
Being largely constant over time they were unlikely to be relevant in a longitudinal study. 
Real FDI inflows were used as the dependent variable. Data sources are presented in 
Appendix 4A.
One important element associated with the model was the adoption of two years lags21. 
This was longer than in any other known analysis of the determinants of FDI (most 
macroeconomic studies adopt only one year lags), but it seemed to be more realistic. Not
20 The concentration of FDI in capital intensive industries and that o f Portuguese firms in labour-intensive 
sectors was confirmed by Gonsalves and Guimaraes (1996).
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only the decision process can be lengthy, as investment rarely takes place immediately after 
the decision to invest is made. A period of two years between the beginning of the analysis 
and the moment the investment is made seems to be a reasonable estimate.
The small number of observations represents one of the limitations of this study, a 
problem more acute on the face of the number of variables proposed. Several of the 
variables were alternative proxies for the same element, but not all of those that were 
supposedly complementary could be considered at one time. The solution was to test 
reduced specifications of the model until the final model was found (Table 4.5). The risk 
of this unorthodox strategy was that the eventual under-specification of the model would 
generate biased estimators and potentially misleading statistical tests22. However, all the 
variables that were initially found to be insignificant were later re-introduced in order to 
confirm that none was statistically significant (at the 10% level). Also important is that the 
signs initially estimated held in all these alternative models while the t-tests suffered only 
small changes. The impact on the significance levels was also very small.
T a b le  4 .5 : R eg r e s s io n  r e s u lts  for  in w a r d  FDI in Po r tu g a l
Dependent Variable: Real inward FDI flows
R R Square Adjusted R Sqr F F (sig.) DW
0.844 0.713 0.651 11.573 0.000 1.520
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients t-test Signif.
P Std. Error Beta value Level
(Constant) 192.509 189.517 1.016 .327
Real GDP 60.480 12.742 .869 4.747 .000
GDP growth rate 24.903 6.744 .550 3.693 .002
Relative labour costs -30.601 10.181 -.555 -3.006 .009
Despite the limitations stated above, the results obtained were very interesting (Table 4.5). 
The regression was able to explain just under two thirds of inward FDI flows in Portugal 
in the period considered. The small number of observations certainly reduces its relevance, 
but the figure suggests, nevertheless, a reasonable fit. The results did not seem to be 
significantly affected by serial correlation or multicollineanty. Only three of the proposed 
variables were statistically significant at the 10% level (in fact, the three were significant at 
1%), but they were all correctly signed. As described above, all the remaining variables
21 As a result, the independent variables used data from 1978 onwards.
22 If the omitted variables were correlated with those included, under-specification would cause the 
estimators to be not only biased but also inconsistent. On the other hand, the inclusion of unnecessary 
variables would result in biased (but consistent) OLS estimators. The statistical tests would, nevertheless, 
remain valid (Gujarati, 1988: pp. 403-404).
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were progressively added to the model in Table 4.5 but were found not to be statistically 
significant. Infrastructure was, however, the only one not correctly signed.
4.4.2. The locational determinants of FDI in the European periphery
The cross-section analysis aimed to complement the longitudinal study described above. 
The main target was to confront (even if  crudely) the results obtained for FDI in Portugal 
with data for competitive locations. For that sake, the model adopted was based on the 
same four locational determinants tested for Portugal. Naturally, some of the variables 
associated with each determinant differed in order to include those that could not be 
considered in the longitudinal study (e.g. distance to the most developed countries, labour 
skills). Political stability was not included in the model because the relevant data could not 
be obtained.
In order to reduce the impact of short term fluctuations, the dependent variable was 
calculated as the average inward FDI flow in 1995 and 1996 (see Appendix 4A). The 
independent variables were also computed as the average for two consecutive years, 
although in this case it was for 1994 and 1995. Due to data limitations, only a one year lag 
was used, but in the case of a cross-section this element has little impact. When data for 
one of the years considered was not available, the figure for the other year was adopted. 
Twelve countries were used in the analysis. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spam were at the 
time the less developed EU members. Finland and Austria were also selected despite their 
relatively high level of development. Their geopolitical position during the cold war must 
be considered peripheral, although they thrived by bridging East and West. The other 
countries in the sample were Turkey and the East European countries most advanced in 
the process of market reform - the Czech Republic, Flungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The Baltic states should have probably been included, but it was not possible to 
obtain all the relevant data23.
Estimation of this cross-section model faced very much the same problems that affected 
the study of FDI in Portugal (the number of observations was even smaller in this case). 
Henceforth, a strategy similar to the one described above was adopted. As in the case of 
the previous regression, the introduction of any of the remaining variables did not affect 
the signs of the estimated coefficients. The significance levels were also little affected. The
73
exception was the variable ‘distance’, which in some cases fell marginally below 10 per 
cent.
Four variables were found to be statistically significant at 10% (Table 4.6). The regression 
explained 80 per cent of inward FDI in the European periphery, although the figure is 
certainly influenced by the small number of observations. The interpretation of the results 
must bear in mind this limitation of the model, even if  they are fully compatible with those 
o f the previous section.
T a b le  4.6 : R e g re s s io n  r e s u l t s  f o r  in w a rd  FDI in th e  E u ro p e a n  p e r ip h e ry
Dependent Variable: Inward FDI flows
R R Square Adjusted R Sqr F F (sig.)
0.934 0.873 0.800 12.025 0.003
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients t-test Signif.
P Std. Error Beta value Level
(Constant) -13608.27 4835.948 -2.814 .026
GDP 15.541 2.573 .953 6.040 .001
Labour costs -43.057 11.033 -.825 -3.903 .006
Labour skills 17923.73 5468.878 .614 3.267 .014
Distance -6.927 3.508 -2.75 -1.976 .089
4.4.3. Discussion o f the results
The size and growth of the domestic market were the variables with a stronger association 
with inward FDI in Portugal. This should constitute no surprise on the face of what was 
described in section 4.3. The domestic market was found by Taveira (1984) to be a relevant 
determinant even for export oriented FDI. In the case of the cross-section, only the size of 
the market was significant. The market’s growth rate did not seem to be relevant when 
different peripheral locations were compared. Neither was the market’s level of 
sophistication (GDPpc). Clegg (1995) argued that total GDP is more likely to be 
associated with new investment, while the growth rate can be expected to be more relevant 
for expansionary FDI. If that is the case, the results in Table 4.6 would simply show the 
predominance in the European periphery of new projects over expansionary investment. 
Given the period of analysis this may be justifiable, but the level of aggregation of the data 
does not permit more than speculation.
23 To discuss the concept o f ‘periphery’ is out o f the scope o f this section. Nevertheless, the countries 
selected were not truly peripheral in the European economic and political scene, but rather ‘semi-peripheral’, 
in the sense that they were fully integrated in the economic structure o f the continent.
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Labour costs were strongly significant in both regressions. As expected, their impact was 
negative. A substantial body of literature in support of this result was discussed in chapter 
3. It contrasts, however, with the results of previous research for Portugal, which found no 
statistical association between labour costs and inward FDI when using aggregate data (see 
section 4.3). Labour skills were also a significant determinant in the cross-section24, and 
positively signed. Once again, the level of aggregation of the data limits the interpretation. 
It seems, nevertheless, that foreign investors seek locations with a favourable combination 
o f labour costs and skills, very much as suggested by Santos (1997) for Portugal.
Contranly to expectations, membership of the European Union was not found to be 
significant in any of the regressions, despite being correctly signed. Lor/ (1993, cited in 
Agarwal, 1997: p. 110), for example, estimated that EU membership raised the chances of 
receiving German FDI by 1.4 times. The result was especially surprising in the longitudinal 
regression due to the evolution of FDI flows immediately after 1986 (see section 4.2). It 
seems that after Portugal joined the EU foreign investors did seek to gain or reinforce their 
position in the country. I lowever, the EU membership effect may have vanished once 
investors adjusted to the new conditions. Part of the explanation may be the free trade 
agreements that all countries included in the cross-section maintain with the European 
Union (despite important exceptions in agriculture and services). The same was true for 
Portugal before 1986. Moreover, with the exception of Turkey, the countries selected were 
the frontrunners for EU membership. This seemed to be the interpretation of Agarwal 
(1997: p. 108) also.
Other geopolitical considerations were, however, found to be relevant in the cross-section 
analysis. Distance to the ‘core’ of the European Union was significant at 10 per cent and, 
as predicted, negatively signed2'. The variable represents proximity to the most important 
export markets, but also physical and psychic distance to the major investing European 
countries (see Appendix 4A for the variable’s definition). In a sense, there is a parallel 
between this result and Agarwal’s (1997) investigation of German F'DI in Central Europe, 
which he claimed to be strongly associated with geographic proximity and low cultural 
barriers.
24 The variable was not tested in the longitudinal study because the proxies available showed little changcs 
over time.
25 As mentioned above, however, the significance level was sensitive to the sample adopted. W ith the 
exclusion of Finland or Hungary it felt below 10 per cent, even if only marginally.
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In the longitudinal study evidence of the importance of geopolitical considerations was 
much weaker. A dummy for the 1990s was the excluded variable with a stronger level of 
statistical significance (14.6%). Although this was substantially above the 10% level usually 
accepted by econometricians, the figure was inflated by the strong multicollinearity present 
in the regression. Nevertheless, this dummy may have appropriated more than the impact 
of the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe upon Portugal’s geopolitical 
position (the original aim). It is very likely that it was equally affected by other elements 
associated with Portugal’s recent history (see section 4.3). The creation of the ESM may 
have been of particular relevance. In favour of this point is the fact that Portugal, Spain 
and Ireland, all saw their share of total FDI flows into the Union reduced after 1991/1992 
(slightly less in the case of Ireland)26.
4.5. O u t w a r d  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  I n v e s t m e n t
On the face of the novelty of the industrialisation process in Portugal, it is hardly 
surprising that outward foreign direct investment is in Portugal a very recent phenomenon. 
The first stream of outward investment was registered in the first half of the 1970s. After a 
decade of very strong domestic growth (see section 4.1), several firms started to expand to 
the (then) African colonies, in particular Angola and Mozambique. Investment by 
Portuguese banks in countries with big Portuguese communities27 was also significant in 
this period (Simoes, 1985: p. 341). Most of the investors were large firms, usually linked 
with the economic groups that dominated the Portuguese economy before the revolution.
This international expansion was, nevertheless, short lived. It did not resist the dismantling 
of the economic groups by the new political powers and the independence of the colonies, 
in 1975. Almost all subsidiaries created in the Portuguese-speaking Africa between 1971 
and 1974 were either nationalised by the governments of the newly independent countries 
or had their buildings and equipment destroyed in the civil wars that followed 
independence. It was also a weak movement. Between 1970 and 1974 outward flows 
averaged just 0.2 per cent of GDP, with a peak of 0.3 per cent in 1973 (Figure 4.7). 
Nevertheless, they were substantially higher than the values registered in the following
26 Own calculations based on OECD (1997a).
2 Lopes (1996: p .196) estimates that more than 750,000 workers emigrated between 1960 and 1973, mainly 
to European countries. France, Germany, and Luxembourg were the most popular destinations. Emigration 
to the United States, Canada, and South Africa was also important.
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years. Outward FDI flows represented less than 0.1 per cent of GDP in every year 
between 1975 and 1989.
Gnly in the 1990s foreign direct investment by Portuguese firms became an important 
characteristic of the country’s economy. Outward flows were affected by the economic 
crisis of 1993-94, but recovered again, to reach 2.8 per cent in 1998, the highest level ever 
(see Figure 4.7 and Table 4.3). In 1997 outward FDI was for the first time in the 
Portuguese history bigger than inward investment, and the margin seems to be widening, 
despite a small reduction o f outward FDI flows in 199928.
F ig u re  4.7: O u t w a r d  F D I f lo w s ,  1965-1998  (% G D P )
As in the case of inward investment, the figures for outward FDI were recently revised by 
the Bank of Portugal using a questionnaire survey. Unfortunately, no information on 
stocks is available yet and the disaggregation of the flows is limited to the mam economic 
sectors and a few investing countries. The information is, nevertheless, relevant. Ih e  
services sector accounted for over 90 per cent of the Portuguese outward FDI between 
1996 and 1999. However, there was a substantial change in 1999. While in previous years 
real estate and the financial services concentrated most investment, in 1999 it was transport 
and communications which made the major contribution29. Portugal Telecom’s acquisition 
in Brazil of Telesp Celular, a privatised mobile operator, explains most of this surge. 
Manufacturing and commerce represented just 4 and 5 per cent of outward investment in
28 According to the data previously available, outward FDI was higher than inward FDI since 1995 (Buckley 
and Castro, 1998). However, the most recent data suggests that this was not true until 1997 (Banco de 
Portugal, 2000).
29 The 1999 data on outward FDI is strongly biased by substantial divestments in real estate in the EU 
(Spain, and to a much less extent France, were the only countries the data permitted to identify). 60 per cent 
o f those divestments took place in the same month (May), which suggests that one single company may be 
behind most o f the operations.
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the period, respectively. The contribution of the primary sector was not significant and 
even slightly negative (Table 4.7).
Data for previous years is not comparable because of the methodological change 
mentioned above. Although the figures for 1996 (the only common year available) 
obtained using both methodologies were very similar (cf. Table 4.3), the old estimates put 
manufacturing FDI at 29 per cent of the total in 1996 (Banco de Portugal, 1997b), which is 
rather different from the new figure (cf. Table 4.7).
T a b le  4.7: O u t w a r d  FDI f lo w s  by s e c t o r  o f  a c t iv i ty ,  1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 1996-1999
Agriculture and fishing -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2
Mining and quarrying -1.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Manufacturing 6.3 3.9 2.8 4.4 3.8
Commerce 2.6 6.9 2.6 5.8 4.6
Services 93.0 89.5 94.7 90.2 92.0
(Financial services) 28.8 20.6 14.1 5.0 14.3
(Real estate) 29.4 55.1 47.2 -6.7 31.7
(Communication, transports) 0.8 11.4 6.5 50.7 20.3
Source: Banco de Portugal (2000a, 2000b).
Brazil has been the most important destination of Portuguese FDI since 1996. In that 
period, it received more investment than all members of the European Union put together 
in every year except 1997 (Table 4.8). This is a very recent trend and is associated with the 
success of the stabilisation program put in practice by the new Brazilian government in 
1995. The opportunities for foreign investors created by the privatisation program that 
started a couple years later were also important.
T a b le  4.8: C o u n t r y  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  o u t w a r d  FDI f lo w s ,  1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 1996-1998 1996-1999
Spain 9.7 14.9 10.3 -33.6 11.9 -1.5
UK 1.6 2.0 0.7 2.3 1.3 1.6
Germany 1.7 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.4 1.0
France 0.3 2.1 0.7 -0.5 1.1 0.7
Total EU15 29.3 54.1 42.4 -91.0 44.9 4.8
Brazil 32.2 25.1 46.0 53.5 37.1 41.9
PALOP(a) 4.8 3.8 2.0 5.3 2.9 3.6
US 6.0 2.4 2.6 2.4 3.0 2.8
Source: Banco de Portugal (2000a, 2000b) 
(a> Portuguese-speaking African countries
As for the EU members, they represented 45 per cent of outward flows between 1996 and 
1998 (cf. footnote 29). Unfortunately, the data available is very limited. Spain, which was 
the destination of about one quarter of the investment, is the only sizeable destination 
identified.
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4.6. A n  in v e s t m e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t  p a t h  f o r  P o r t u g a l
As described in chapter 2, the investment development path suggests an interaction 
between the country’s level of development and its international investment position. 
Henceforth, it may help the understanding of the evolution of inward and outward FDI 
flows in Portugal and its implication for the Portuguese economy.
4 .6 .1. D ata
As described in section 4.2, data on the stock of inward FDI in Portugal only covers the 
period after 1996 and is not compatible with existing information for previous years. Data 
on the stock of outward FDI is not yet available at all. In order to analyse the Portuguese 
IDP it was necessary to estimate historical figures on stocks using existing information for 
the flows of FDI (Banco de Portugal, 1997a, 1997b, 2000a). Narula (1996) was very critical 
of the use of FDI flows to estimate stocks. He argued that the sum-of-flows method 
underestimates both inward and outward investment stocks, particularly in the case of 
industrialised countries. But in his comparison of stocks’ estimations Narula (1996: p.41) 
used only five year flows. In this research a much longer period was adopted. Published 
data existed for 1965-1998, and estimations were made to extend the data set as much as 
possible.
Information on medium and long term capital flows since 1943 was available from Matos 
(1973), but only after 1962 could the figures be disaggregated between FDI and other long 
term capital flows. It was, then, necessary to estimate the percentage of those capital 
movements that corresponded to FDI. This situation was made by computing, for 1964- 
1974, the ratio between the new figures for FDI (Banco de Portugal, 1997a) and the old 
figures for medium and long term capital movements (Matos, 1973: p .11; Taveira, 1984: 
p. 149). The values obtained (20.0% for inward, and 8.2% for outward capital movements) 
were adopted as estimations of the weight of FDI on Matos’ 1943-1964 medium and long 
term capital movements30.
There was little information to assess the reliability of the estimations. The only 
comparison that could be made was with the 1996 stock of inward FDI (Banco de
30 A similar method was used by Matos (1973) and Taveira (1984) but with a different data set. The data 
available (Taveira: 1984: p. 149) permitted to use a longer period, but the figures suggested that the 
proportion of FDI in total capital movements changed considerably after the revolution, in 1974. On the 
other hand, the use o f the new values for FDI and the old ones for capital movements in the calculation o f 
the ratio was necessary to assure the compatibility o f the estimates with the post-1965 data.
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Portugal, 1998b). The value obtained with the sum-of-flows method described above was 
2,441 billion Portuguese escudos, only 16 per cent lower than Bank of Portugal’s figure. 
Despite the shortcomings of the method and of the FDI series, this was a positive 
indicator that these estimations of the stocks of inward and outward FDI in Portugal could 
be used in the investigation of the Portuguese IDP.
As for the remaining variables involved (GDP and population), the main source (1965- 
1995) was Banco de Portugal (1997a). The figures for the subsequent years (1996-1998) 
were computed using the growth rates implicit in OECD (1999b), in the case of GDP, and 
INE (1999) in the case of population. The growth rates were adopted instead of the actual 
figures because the latter were incompatible with the Bank of Portugal’s data.
4.6.2. The model - an alternative specification
Dunning (1981a, 1981b, 1986a), Tolentino (1987, 1993), and Narula (1996) all used a 
quadratic function to describe the IDP curve. However, this option defies the very theory 
of the IDP. Implicit in the quadratic function is the assumption that FDI is the engine of 
growth. Net outward investment (NOI) per capita decreases sharply in the early stages of 
the IDP, reflecting high inward FDI and nil or low outward investment, while GDP per 
capita has a slow start. This is not in line with the IDP rationale. In the first stage of the 
IDP, both inward and outward FDI will be low. Governments must intervene “providing 
basic infrastructure and the upgrading of human capital via education and training” 
(Dunning and Narula 1996b: p.3). In other words, before a country can attract significant 
inward FDI it must develop its locational advantages, including the increase of GDP per 
capita11. Consequently, what is to be expected in the first stage of the IDP is a more rapid 
increase of GDP per capita than NOI per capita. Only in the second stage should the 
growth rate o f NOI per capita be higher than that of GDP per capita. This evolution can 
be translated by a function of the type:
NOIpc = a + Pi GDPpc3 + GDPpc5 + /u
where (3, should be negative and (3, positive. Having an inflection point to the left of the 
turning point (a minimum if  the proposed signs are confirmed), it models the expected 
slow growth of the independent variable in the earlier stages. In a second stage the 
independent variable grows faster than the dependent variable. Nevertheless, it later slows
31 Even if  not a policy target in itself, GDP growth will inevitably be a consequence of such policies.
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down and eventually reaches a minimum -  the U-turn that corresponds to the transition 
between stages 2 and 3 of the IDP, when the country becomes a net outward investor in 
terms of flows.
4 .6 .3 . E stim a tio n  an d  co m m en ts
Using ordinary least square estimation and the 34 available observations (1965-1998), the 
model suggested above provided the following results:
NOIpc = -2.823 -119.439 GDPpc3 + 28.175 GDPpc5
All coefficients, including the constant, were correctly signed and significant at 1% (5% for 
the constant). Adjusted R square was very high, at 99%, and the overall model significant 
at 1%. Fitted and real values can be compared in figure 4.8.
F ig u re  4.8 : E s tim a tio n  o f  th e  ID P  f o r  P o r t u g a l ,  1965-1998
GDP per capita
The estimation seems to support the claim that FDI follows a more or less predictable 
path, accompanying and influencing economic growth. From what was described in 
sections 4.2 and 4.5, Portugal was undisputedly a stage 1 country until the early 1960s. The 
transition to stage 2 of the IDP occurred during the 1960s, although Figure 4.8 suggests 
that it may have not been completed until the early 1980s, when GDP reached 250-300 
thousand escudos (some US$2,500 at the time). Stage 3 seems to have been reached in the 
middle 1990s, with GDP per capita at 1,300-1,400 thousand escudos, about 10,000 US 
dollars.
The fact that Portugal’s net stock of outward FDI has increased every year since 1995, 
however, must be carefully analysed (cf. previous section). At the first glance, it suggests a 
strong improvement of the country’s competitive position. If competitiveness can be
81
measured in terms of local firms’ ability to expand abroad, that is certainly the case. 
However, the use of net outward stocks of FDI conceals a decline in the country’s 
attractiveness as a location of foreign investment. This implies that Portugal is no closer to 
stage 4 of the IDP than it was in the mid-1990s. Stage 4 is associated with high volumes of 
both inward and outward FDI (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b), which is not the case in 
Portugal. Figure 4.9 depicts very clearly the real evolution of the Portuguese competitive 
position: a movement inside the area that corresponds to Stage 3 of the IDP.
F ig u r e  4 .9 : A n a l t e r n a t iv e  r e p r e s e n ta tio n  o f  th e  Po r tu g u e s e  IDP
Source: Adapted from Ubeda (1999: p. 59)
Another element that arises from the case of Portugal is the limited potential of the IDP as 
a prediction mechanism. According to Narula (1996), Portugal seemed to be approaching 
stage 3 of the IDP both in 1975 and 1988. That was also the opinion of Ubeda (1999), 
who used a different methodology, for every year studied between 1975 and 1990. Despite 
that, not until the mid-1990s was the transition between stages 2 and 3 completed (cf. 
Figure 4.8). This difficulty in predicting the evolution of the countries’ investment 
positions is to a great extent due to the influence of non-economic factors. Government 
policies, in particular, were recurrently identified in studies of individual countries as being 
o f major influence (Lall, 1996). In the case of Portugal, the beginning of Stage 2 coincided 
with the political decision to abandon import substitution policies in favour of export 
promotion (around 1960). That the prediction that Portugal was entering stage 3 was not 
confirmed until 1990 is probably linked with the 1974 democratic revolution and with EU 
membership, in 1986, which changed the country’s economic and geopolitical conditions. 
To their credit, it must be made clear that ‘politics’ was explicitly pointed out by Dunning 
and Narula (1996b) as one of the elements that make each individual IDP idiosyncratic.
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Government policies are themselves a central piece of the IDP rationale (see chapter 2) 
Furthermore, the IDP was never conceived of as a prediction tool. This stresses, 
nevertheless, the need for a careful analysis of the inward and outward phenomena, which 
will be done in the next two chapters.
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A ppen d ix  4A.
T h e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  FDI
VARIABLES, EXPECTED SIGNS AND DATA SOURCES
____________ T a b le  4A1. T h e  d e te r m in a n ts  o f  FDI in P o r t u g a l ________
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b l e  S o u r c e
Inward FDI flows 1980-1996: Banco de Portugal (1997a, 1997b);
(constant prices) 1997: own calculations based on Banco de
Portugal (1997a, 2000a).
Deflator: GFCF deflators, in OECD (1999).
E x p e c t e d  
In d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b l e s  s ig n
Mar ket  seeking  
Real GDP +
Real GDP growth rate +
EU15 Real GDP +
EU15 Real GDP growth rate +
C o st  effic iency  
Relative labour costs
Infrastructure +
Export prices
G eo po litical position  
European Union membership +
1990s
Eco no m ic  stability  
Public deficit
Inflation rate
Interest rate
Exchange rate 
1999b).
Current account deficit
S o u r c e
1978-1995: Banco de Portugal (1997a); 
1996-1997: Own calculations - growth rates 
published in OECD (1999b)
1978-1995: Own calculations based on Banco 
de Portugal (1997a).
1996-1997: OECD (1999b).
OECD (1999b).
Own calculations based on OECD (1999b).
'EU=100', Own calculations based on Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (1998).
Telephones per 100 inhabitants’, UN, Statistical 
Yearbook, several.
OECD (1994, 1999b).
Dummy variable: ‘O’, 1980-1985 
‘1’, 1986-1997
Dummy variable: ‘O’, 1980-1990 
‘1’, 1991-1997
1978-1995: Own calculations based on Banco 
de Portugal (1997a);
1996-1997: OECD (1999b).
OECD (1994, 1999b).
OECD (1999b).
'Effective exchange rates', in OECD (1989, 
OECD (1992, 1999b).____________________
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T a b l e  4A2. t h e  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  FDI in  t h e  E u r o p e a n  p e r ip h e r y  
D e p e n d e n t V a r ia b le  S o u r c e
Inward FDI flows OECD members: OECD (1997b)
.Million USD Slovenia and Slovakia: OECD
(1997c)
.1995 and 1996, average
E x p e c t e d
In d e p e n d e n t  V a r ia b l e s  s ig n  S o u r c e
M arket  seeking
Nominal GDP 
.Billion USD, at exchange rates 
.1994, 1995, average
Real GDP growth rate 
.1994,1995, average
GDP per capita 
.1994, 1995, at PPP, average
(1997c)
Population
.1995
C o st  effic iency
Labour costs 
.Gross Wages per month, 1994
Labour skills 
.Education index, 1994
Infrastructure 
. Telephones per 100 inhabitants, 1994
Personnel in R&D 
. Per 100 inhabitants, latest available
G eo po litical position
EU membership 
.EU15
Distance 
.Minutes to fly between capital city 
and Paris and Frankfurt, average.
Eco no m ic  stability
Current account deficit 
.Percentage of GDP 
.1994, 1995, average
Inflation rate 
.1994,1995, average
Interest rate 
.Rate of discount of Central Bank 
.1994, 1995, average
Public account deficit 
.Percentage of GDP 
.1994, 1995, average_______________
+ OECD members: OECD (1999a)
Slovenia and Slovakia: own 
calculations based on UN (1996) 
and OECD (1997d)
+ OECD (1999a)
+ OECD members: OECD (1999a)
Slovenia and Slovakia: OECD
+ OECD members: OECD (1999a)
Slovenia, Slovakia: UNESCO (1997)
Podkaminer (1998)
Turkey: Own calculations based on 
ILO (1996)
+ United Nations (1997)
+ United Nations (1996)
+ UNESCO (1997)
+ Dummy variable
+ Yahoo (1997)
Turkey: Istanbul
OECD (1997d)
OECD (1997d) 
UN (1996)
OECD (1997d)
Cha pter  5.
In w a r d  FD I in  Po rtug al: 
A Q u estio n n aire  Su r v e y
5.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
It was very clear from the previous chapter that inward foreign direct investment 
represented one of the driving forces of the Portuguese economy during the last forty 
years. It was also apparent, however, that existing empirical research was not sufficient to 
provide a clear picture of the characteristics and motivations of foreign firms operating in 
Portugal. The level of aggregation, largely because of data limitations, was a major 
restriction (Taveira, 1984, being the exception). Another was probably the limited use of 
techniques other than regression analysis (here the exception was Santos, 1997). In the 
future, econometric studies will benefit from the availability o f new and more reliable data, 
which at the moment remains restricted to Banco de Portugal (1998b). However, the use of 
different research strategies will remain necessary.
Another element that impinged on the researcher trying to investigate the FDI 
phenomenon in Portugal was the need to conduct the study at the firm level. In the 
previous chapter there were clear indications that different motivations coexist among 
foreign investors in Portugal. Only with data at the firm level can these differences be 
investigated. The motivations are likely to be associated with the industry and the country
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of origin (cf. chapter 3). Company characteristics and the time of the first investment may 
also be important given the political, economic and geo-strategic changes the country 
endured over the last forty years.
In methodological terms, these considerations seem to suggest the adoption of an inductive 
approach, “moving from the plane of observation of the empirical world to the 
construction of explanations and theories about what has been observed” (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991: p.33). However, FDI is a phenomenon widely researched (see chapter 3), 
with a well established body of literature despite the coexistence of competing models (see 
chapter 2). The results of previous research for Portugal (cf. sections 4.3. and 4.4) albeit 
contradictory, could not be ignored either. Therefore, purely inductive methods would be 
inappropriate, making a survey based investigation a better research strategy.
Survey analysis constitutes an intermediate methodology between extreme positivistic 
(deductive) and naturalistic (inductive) approaches (Gill and Johnson, 1991: p.75). It also 
corresponds to the option for an extensive rather than an intensive research design. 
Furthermore, the focus on taxonomic groups permits the identification of common 
attributes and patterns of behaviour that can be generalised for the entire population1 
(Knell, 1996: p .35). Despite this being obtained at the expense of an in-depth knowledge of 
individual subjects and the causal relationships between them, it suggests that survey 
analysis is the appropriate research technique for the investigation of the characteristics and 
determinants of inward FDI in Portugal. Replicability is another advantage because it 
facilitates external validation.
Although different techniques can be associated with survey analysis (see Knell, 1996: 
p .37), a self-administered postal questionnaire was in this case the best choice. “Research 
methodology is always a compromise between options, and choices are frequently 
determined by the availability of resources” (Gill and Johnson, 1991: p.2). Without data to 
stratify a small representative sample, interviews (either structured or not) were 
impracticable because of the costs and time involved.
Surveys are usually posited as being low in ecological validity. They are particularly 
susceptible to problems of inadequate memory, retrospective falsification, or language 
ambiguity (Carroll and Johnson, 1990: pp. 33-34). In the case of self-administered 
questionnaires, these problems may be amplified because the respondents may relax the
1 Albeit not for other populations.
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accuracy of the responses in order to hasten the completion of the questionnaire. Non­
responses are also more likely than in interviews. On the other hand, the eventual offer of 
anonymity may reduce the temptation to give the perceived ‘right’ answers rather than the 
true ones (Gill and Johnson, 1991: p .79).
5.2. M e t h o d
5 .2 .1. P o p u la tio n  an d  sam p le
The population for this study comprised the subsidiaries of foreign firms operating in 
Portugal in manufacturing (including the agro-industries) and commercial activities. A 
number of sources were used to identify the population: the National Institute of Statistics 
(INE), the Institute for Foreign Trade and Investment (ICEP), national chambers of 
industry and commerce operating in Portugal, and assorted publications by leading 
business newspapers and magazines.
The combination of these sources provided over 5,000 different entries, albeit not all 
relevant for the study, since many firms belonged to the services sector or had a very small 
participation of foreign capital. However, in many cases only the name and address existed, 
which made it difficult to eliminate all non-relevant firms. This was to generate several 
difficulties in the administration of the questionnaire (as discussed below), and made it 
impossible to know the exact size of the population.
The lack of detailed information for many subjects justifies that the sample was built on 
‘negative’ criteria. In order to guarantee foreign control, firms known to have less than 50 
percent of foreign capital were excluded. The same was done to firms known to have less 
than 10 employees. Given it was not possible to contact the whole population, the second 
best option was to concentrate on the bigger firms, believed to have a stronger impact on 
the local economy. The option for a workforce of 10 or more permitted to include all firms 
not classified as ‘micro’ businesses by Eurostat. These criteria generated a sample of 1,517 
firms, which was considered viable given the financial resources available2.
As it turned out, a number of firms that accepted to participate in the study had less than 
10 employees (see section 5.3). In a few cases the labour force had been reduced recently, 
but most were firms for which information on the number of employees was not available.
2 O f these 1517 firms, however, as many as 253 were excluded during the field work. Many had ceased 
operations in Portugal. Others had merged or changed their name, and had been courted twice; in others, the 
foreign stake had been sold to Portuguese investors.
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The decision was to include them in the analysis, but keeping in mind that the sample was 
deliberately biased towards bigger companies and as such was less representative when it 
came to very small foreign subsidiaries.
5 .2 .2 . Q u e stio n n a ire
The construction of the questionnaire was very much oriented by the need to keep it as 
simple and short as possible in order to maximise the participation rate. With no obvious 
gains for the participants from cooperating in the research, it would not be reasonable to 
expect them to spend too much of their time completing the questionnaire. The exclusive 
use of closed questions was considered important to fulfil that aim. The questionnaire was, 
nevertheless, longer than was ideal, very much because it was necessary to account for a 
wide variety of the firms in terms of industry, size, or the activities undertaken in Portugal.
To test the questionnaire, interviews were conducted at eleven firms in the vicinity of Porto 
during May 1998, representing different industries and countries of origin. Typically, the 
interviewees were asked to provide a historical summary of the firm and the group and to 
describe their present activities, their reasons for investing in Portugal, and the major 
difficulties faced. They were also asked to assess the economic environment, and the 
behaviour of clients, suppliers, competitors, and other public and private institutions. Next, 
they were invited to fill out a pilot questionnaire, generally in the presence of the 
interviewer.
One reason why interviews were preferred to the postal distribution of a pilot 
questionnaire was time restriction. As it happened, it was possible to do what was believed 
to be an efficient piloting of the questionnaire in just two weeks. The alternative solution 
would have certainly taken much longer, making it impossible to have the final version of 
the questionnaire distributed at the beginning of June. This timing was critical because 
managers tend to have their annual holidays in July or August. Another advantage of the 
interview-based pilot scheme was that it allowed the evaluation of whether the questions 
were clear and had not been misunderstood by the respondents. The interviews also 
provided valuable information in helping to understand the phenomenon of foreign direct 
investment in Portugal and the views of those responsible for foreign subsidiaries. This 
insight was very important in a questionnaire where all questions were closed, which 
implies the anticipation of all plausible answers.
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The piloting led to several changes. Some of the questions had to be rewritten and others 
were eliminated. A few alternative responses were added to some questions. The relevance 
of every question for the research project was weighted against the burden it would put on 
an already fairly long questionnaire. Questions requiring data difficult or very time 
consuming to obtain were rewritten or eliminated. Overall, the final version of the 
questionnaire (sec Appendix 5A) was slightly simpler and shorter than the original version.
5 .2 .3  F ie ld  w o rk
The questionnaire was mailed during the first week of June 1998 to the 1,517 companies 
that originally constituted the sample3. It was accompanied by a cover letter (addressed to 
the CEO) explaining the project and a pre-paid envelope addressed to the researcher. 
During July, August, and September, the biggest firms in the sample that had not yet 
replied were contacted by telephone. 260 companies were involved in this second phase, 
which entailed in most cases the questionnaire being re-sent by fax. A follow-up letter, with 
a second copy of the questionnaire and another pre-paid envelope, was sent in early 
September to those firms not contacted by telephone, and in early October to those that 
had not replied despite the telephone contact.
In total, 257 filled questionnaires were returned, representing a response rate of 20.3 per 
cent4. O f these, however, 19 could not be used in the analysis, either for not being correctly 
completed or because they corresponded to firms that, contrarily to the information 
previously available, did not meet all the criteria for sample selection. Another was dropped 
during the data analysis because several of the answers were not consistent with each other. 
As a result, the analysis was based on 237 answers, equivalent to 19 per cent of the adjusted 
sample which constitutes a fairly high response rate.
5.3. C h a r a c t e r is a t io n  o f  t h e  sa m p l e
A number of questions in the first part of the questionnaire permitted a characterisation of 
the sample. In terms of the main activity developed in Portugal, the official ‘code of 
economic activity’ (CAE) identified the industry in which the subsidiaries operated. 
Therefore, they were classified according to their operations in Portugal, irrespective of the
3 The version o f the questionnaire sent was the Portuguese translation. The English original was only sent on 
request (four firms did so).
4 From the total sample o f 1,264 valid potential respondents (cf. footnote 2).
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main activity of the parent company. In particular, purely commercial subsidiaries were 
classified as such, and not according to the parent company’s industry’ .
To simplify the analysis, the industries represented in the sample were divided into seven 
groups. The stress was on group homogeneity, but an effort was made to create as few 
groups as possible. The relative size of the groups was also taken into account. Table 5.1 
shows how the industries were grouped and Figure 5.1 the sample distnbution per industry.
T a b le  5.1: How in d u s tr ie s  w e r e  g ro u p e d
Group Name Industries included CAEa
1 Food and beverages Agriculture 01-05
Food processing and beverages 15-16
2 Textiles, clothing and footwear Textiles 17
Clothing 18
Footwear 19
3 Natural resources based Mining and quarrying 10-14
Lumber, wood and furniture 20,36
Cork and cork products 20
Pulp and paper 21
Clay, glass, cement 26
4 Chemicals and oil Oil products 23,25
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 24
5 Metal industries Primary metal industries 27
Fabricated metal products 28,36
6 Machinery and equipment Machinery, except electric 29
Electric and electronic machinery 30-33
Transportation equipment 34-35,36
7 Commerce Retailing and wholesale trade 50-52
Printing and publishing 22
a CAE Code o f Economic Activity
F ig u re  5.1 : D is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  s a m p le  p e r  in d u s try
5 Because this classification is not always accurate, all the suspected inaccuracies were checked by telephone.
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The representativeness of the sample can be asserted using data produced by the Ministry 
of Labour and Solidarity6, which are summarised in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. The participating 
firms represented 19 per cent of those registered with the Portuguese Ministry of Labour 
(Figure 5.2) but 54 per cent of the employment by foreign owned firms operating in 
Portugal at the end of 1997 (Figure 5.3)7. This reflects the strategy adopted for data 
collection, which concentrated on the bigger firms (see section 5.2.1).
F ig u r e  5.2: P e r c e n t a g e  o f  fir m s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  in t h e  s a m p l e , per  in d u s tr y
F ig u r e  5.3: R ep r e s e n ta t iv e n e s s  o f  the
SAMPLE -  PERCENTAGE OF LABOUR FORCE
4 6 7
79.4
85.7
100
The figures above also show that the sample was much less representative for commercial 
firms (24 per cent of the employment but only 8 per cent of the firms) and in textiles, 
clothing and footwear (27 and 20 per cent, respectively). This is probably due to the 
average size of firms in these industries, smaller than the average. In the manufacturing 
industries as a whole the sample was equivalent to 34 per cent of the firms and 63 per cent 
of the employment registered with the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity.
Most firms in the sample were very recent (Figure 5.4). Over two thirds were created or 
acquired after Portugal joined the (then) EEC, in 1986. This largely matches the evolution 
of FDI (see chapter 4). However, the most recent years may be expected to be over­
represented in the sample. Older firms still operating in Portugal are the ones that survived 
the changes in the Portuguese and international markets, the evolution of relative costs 
across the world, and the transformations in the structure, competitiveness and strategy of 
the parent companies. The most recent firms, on the other hand, were not yet submitted to 
the tests of time.
6 Mimsterio do Trabalho e da Solidaricdade, Quadros de Pessoal de 1997, unpublished.
7 Small discrepancies may exist between the two datasets — the Ministry o f Labour’s data and that o f the 
questionnaire - since the latter reports to the summer o f 1998 and the former to December 1997.
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F ig u re  5.4: D is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  s a m p le  F ig u re  5.5: D is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  sa m p le
PER YEAR OF INVESTMENT PER COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
A fter 1995 before 1960
76/a2%
In terms of country of origin (Figure 5.5), Germany alone accounted for 24 per cent of all 
firms in the sample. This importance of German investors is frequently ignored in 
Portugal, but it is confirmed by Bank of Portugal’s most recent data (Banco de Portugal, 
1998b). Germany was in 1996 only the fifth most important source country, with 10 per 
cent of the total stock of inward FDI. In the case of manufacturing, however, the figure 
was 23 per cent, the highest for any individual country (cf. chapter 4, figure 4.5 and table
4.4). In commerce, the German share was only 6 per cent, but this sector had a much lower 
weight in the sample than manufacturing.
France, Spain, the UK and the USA were the other countries with a significant 
representation in the sample. With the exception of Spain - the only country with a border 
with Portugal - these are the main foreign investors worldwide. Only Japanese firms, with a 
negligible presence in Portugal, were absent from the list. Unfortunately, direct comparison 
with Bank of Portugal’s data (Banco de Portugal, 1998b) was not possible for the reasons 
stated above.
Cross-referencing the country of origin and the year of investment (Table 5.2) revealed a 
more or less predictable pattern. Spanish subsidiaries were younger than the average, which 
shows how recent the phenomenon of economic integration in the Iberian peninsula is. 
Other recent investors in Portugal were the non-EU12 Kuropean countries (which 
included the three most recent EU members), which seem to have “discovered” Portugal 
in 1986. The older firms in the sample were those from the UK, Portugal’s main economic 
partner until 1974. But even in this case the median was only two years lower than in the 
overall sample, and two in five subsidiaries were set up in the 1990s.
Other Europe
Germany
S8/P4%
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T a b le  5.2: C o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in  i/s. Y e a r  o f  in v e s tm e n t
Country
Before
1975 1975-85 1986-90 1991-98 Total
Spain No. 3 2 10 14 29
% 10.3% 6.9% 34.5% 48.3% 100.0%
France No. 8 3 9 10 30
% 26.7% 10.0% 30.0% 33.3% 100.0%
Germany No. 13 5 18 22 58
% 22.4% 8.6% 31.0% 37.9% 100.0%
UK No. 6 2 4 8 20
% 30.0% 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0%
Other EU12 No. 8 4 8 8 28
% 28.6% 14.3% 28.6% 28.6% 100.0%
Other Europe No. 4 3 9 16 32
% 12.5% 9.4% 28.1% 50.0% 100.0%
Rest of the World No. 7 6 18 10 41
% 17.1% 14.6% 43.9% 24.4% 100.0%
Total No. 49 25 76 88 238
% 20.6% 10.5% 31.9% 37.0% 100.0%
Median
1990
1989
1989
1987
1988
1991
1988
1989
'fable 5.3 presents the industry distribution for different countries of origin. One 
immediate observation was the weight of machinery and equipment manufacturing in the 
investment by non-European, German, and French firms. This corresponded with those 
countries’ worldwide positions in the sector. Flowever, the inability of Portugal to attract 
Japanese investors was particularly apparent. Despite many of the biggest machinery and 
equipment producers in the world being [apanese, few of the non-European investors in 
the sample were from Japan (most were from the (JS). The fact that all the other dominant 
powers in those industries were well represented in the sample only made the absence 
more noticeable.
T a b le  5.3: c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in  by In d u s t r y
Country
Food and 
beverag.
Text,cloth  
footwear
Natural
resourc.
Chemic. 
and oil
Metal
industr.
Machin. 
+ equip.
Com­
merce Total
Spain No.
%
4
13.8%
6
20.7%
1
3.4%
4
13.8%
4
13.8%
10
34.5%
29
100.0%
France No. 5 3 5 3 3 7 4 30
% 16.7% 10.0% 16.7% 10.0% 10.0% 23.3% 13.3% 100.0%
Germany No. 1 11 4 8 4 16 14 58
% 1.7% 19.0% 6.9% 13.8% 6.9% 27.6% 24.1% 100.0%
UK No. 2 3 6 2 1 1 5 20
% 10.0% 15.0% 30.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 25.0% 100.0%
Other EU 12 No. 8 2 3 4 3 4 4 28
% 28.6% 7.1% 10.7% 14.3% 10.7% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0%
Other Europe No. 1 6 8 4 3 3 7 32
% 3.1% 18.8% 25.0% 12.5% 9.4% 9.4% 21.9% 100.0%
Rest of the World No. 2 2 1 6 2 15 13 41
% 4.9% 4.9% 2.4% 14.6% 4.9% 36.6% 31.7% 100.0%
Total No. 23 27 33 29 20 50 56 238
% 9.7% 11.3% 13.9% 12.2% 8.4% 21.0% 23.5% 100.0%
Among the remaining industries, textiles, clothing and footwear were particularly important 
for German and non EU12 European investors (of which Switzerland represented a
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substantial proportion). The percentage assumed by the food industries in the investment 
by ‘other EU12 countries’ was to a large extent due to Dutch firms. Finally, the high 
percentage of commercial subsidiaries among Spanish firms probably reflects geographic 
proximity. In many industries it is perfectly possible to supply efficiently the whole Iberian 
market from one single productive location (see chapter 6). However, non-European firms 
also included a high percentage of purely commercial subsidiaries, which seems 
contradictory.
In terms of turnover and number of employees the sample was quite diversified (Table
5.4). Turnover ranged from nil, corresponding to five firms that only started operations in 
1998, to 160 billion PTE (about US$900 million). Over half the firms in the sample had a 
turnover above 1.6 billion PTE (US$9 million), and one quarter had a turnover above 7 
billion PTE (some US$40 million). As for the number of employees, the sample reflected 
the small scale of firms operating in Portugal. The median was only 98 employees, and one 
quarter of the firms in the sample had a labour force of less than 30.
T a b le  5.4: T u r n o v e r  a n d  e m p l o y m e n t : d e s c r ip t iv e  s t a t is t ic s
Descriptive
Statistics
Turnover 1997
(million PTE)
Labour Force 
1997
Mean 7,884 303
Std deviation 19,369 793
Minimum 0 2
Maximum 160,000 7,455
Percentiles 25% 540 29
50% 1,664 98
75% 6,851 266
In general, the Portuguese subsidiaries contnbuted very little to the worldwide turnover of 
the parent company (Figure 5.6). O f those that provided this information (136 firms), 56 
per cent generated one per cent or less of the group’s worldwide turnover, and only 7 per 
cent more than one fifth. There was also the suspicion that firms with a small contribution 
were less likely to provide the information. That being the case, the true percentage of 
those representing less than one per cent of the group’s turnover could be even higher. The 
figures changed only slightly when analysed in terms of labour force, and reflect the relative 
size of Portugal in the world economy. In the case of Spanish subsidiaries, however, the 
picture was substantially different. 71 per cent contributed more than five per cent of the 
group’s turnover and 21 per cent more than one fifth. This suggests that the Portuguese 
subsidiaries may in many cases have been the only foreign venture of the parent firm.
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F ig u re  5.6: S u b s id ia ry ’s  c o n t r ib u t io n  t o  g r o u p ’s t u r n o v e r
Foreign subsidiaries established in Portugal showed a very strong export propensity. 
Predictably, the European Union was the main destination. For manufacturing firms, 
exports to the EU (including Spain) were equivalent to sales in the local market 
(respectively 44% and 45% of the subsidiaries’ turnover). Nevertheless, differences 
between industries were substantial (Table 5.5 and Figure 5.7).
T a b le  5.5: M a r k e t  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  s a le s  a c r o s s  in d u s tr ie s
Markets
Industry (N) Portuqal Spain
Other
EU15
Other
Europe
Rest of 
the World
Food and beverages (22) 49.1 6.0 35.1 .8 8.9
Textile, clothing, footwear (26) 13.8 3.3 62.4 16.3 4.2
Natural resources based (29) 57.8 8.5 22.9 4.2 6.6
Chemicals and oil (28) 70.1 4.9 21.3 .5 3.2
Metal industries (20) 49.1 12.0 30.0 3.7 5.3
Machinery and equipment (46) 34.2 10.5 42.0 2.7 10.6
All manufacturing (172) 45.0 7.7 36.0 4.5 6.9
Commerce (54) 84.4 1.9 9.3 1.3 3.1
Home
country
25.2
51.2
13.8 
6.9
17.5
16.9 
21.0
6.0
The textile, clothing and footwear segments were the most export oriented, selling only 14 
per cent of their production in Portugal. Exports to the parent country represented in this 
case over half the production. Machinery and equipment manufacturers were the other 
group of firms that exported much more than they sold in Portugal. But contrarily to 
textiles and clothing, only 17 per cent o f the output was sold in the home country. Access 
to the EU market seemed to be much more relevant for these industries. The 
manufacturing industries in the sample most oriented towards the Portuguese market were 
the chemicals and oil producers, whose exports represented only 29 per cent of the 
subsidiaries’ turnover.
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F ig u re  5.7: M a r k e t  d is t r ib u t io n  vs. in d u s t r y  F ig u re  5.8: M a r k e t  vs. c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in
In terms of country of origin (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.8), the most export oriented 
manufacturing firms were those from Germany. Only 29 per cent of their output was sold 
in Portugal, against 38 per cent that was exported to the home country. By contrast, the 
most local market oriented firms were those from the UK and from Spain. 1’his 
predominance of market oriented FDI was not easy to explain in the case of British firms. 
For Spanish subsidiaries, however, it seems to support a suspected low degree of 
internationalisation of the parent companies (see above). With little foreign experience, 
their ability to sell outside the Iberian peninsula may be limited.
T ab le  5 .6: M a r k e t  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  s a le s  a c r o s s  c o u n t r ie s
Markets
Country o f o rig in Portugal Spain
Other
EU15
Other
Europe
Rest of 
the World
Home
country
Spain (18) 60.4 22.4 9.2 .1 7.8 22.4
France (23) 55.7 11.3 30.1 .3 2.6 19.9
Germany (41) 29.2 4.9 59.7 2.9 3.3 38.4
UK (13) 64.0 7.6 24.2 1.6 2.6 15.3
Other EU12 (24) 45.1 3.2 41.8 1.9 7.9 19.7
Other Europe (25) 43.9 4.4 25.5 22.4 3.8 14.6
Rest of the World (28) 41.2 6.2 33.1 .8 18.8 5.0
A ll m anufacturing (172) 45.0 7.7 36.0 4.5 6.9 21.0
Note: Commercial subsidiaries not included.
It should be noted that, for most firms in the sample, the Spanish market was less 
important than their home market. The only exception were non-European firms, probably 
due to the geographic distance to the home country. What is interesting is that this fact 
suggests a surprisingly low level of integration of activities by MNCs in Portugal and Spain; 
at least for those with production capacity in Portugal.
The influence of size in the export propensity of manufacturing firms was another 
interesting element (Figure 5.9). Smaller subsidiaries tended to be more concentrated in the 
local market, while bigger ones sold much more in other EU markets than in Portugal. The
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trade-off between the local market and the EU market was highlighted by few sales outside 
the European Union by firms of all sizes. It was, nonetheless, even lower for the smallest 
firms in the sample.
F ig u re  5.9: M a r k e t  d is t r ib u t io n  v s . F ig u re  5.10: M a r k e t  d is tr ib u t io n  vs .
f ir m ’s  s iz e  f ir m ’s  a g e
The analysis of the export propensity of firms established during different periods of 
Portugal’s recent history was also revealing (Figure 5.10). The most export oriented 
subsidiaries were those created or acquired in the years immediately after Portugal joined 
the then EEC. The second group in terms of level of exports corresponded to the 
subsidiaries created between 1960 and 1974, the period that followed the creation of EFTA 
and which corresponded to a substantial liberalisation of Portugal’s international trade (see 
chapter 4).
Less expected was the fact that firms created between 1975 and 1986 were more export 
oriented than those created after 1990. The explanation may lay with the small relevance of 
the EU market for the most recent foreign subsidiaries, especially for those created and 
acquired in the first half of the decade. It seems, though, that the fall of inward FDI in 
recent years is particularly associated with export oriented, or efficiency seeking investment 
(cf. chapter 4), more so in the first half of the decade than in the second.
5.4. T h e  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s io n
5.4.1. Reasons to invest in Portugal
To analyse the determinants of investment in Portugal, the participants in the survey were 
presented with two inter-related questions. First, 32 potential determinants were proposed 
and the participants were asked to classify each one using a 5-point Likert scale where 1 
corresponded to irrelevant and 5 to very important (see Appendix 5A). Next, the
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participants were asked, out of the same 32 determinants, to single out the one they 
considered the most important reason for the firm to have invested in Portugal. Table 5.7 
summarises the results. Because the differences between manufacturing and commercial 
firms were substantial, separate rankings were produced.
T a b l e  5 .7 : W h y  in v e s t  in  P o r t u g a l
Table 5.7a Manufacturing firms Table 5.7b Commercial firms
Rank Reason Mean3
Main reason3 
N % Rank Reason
Main reasonb 
Mean1 N %
1 Reduction labour costs 3.49 41 26.6 1 Establish network 3.80 14 31.8
2 Increase group's turnover 3.09 11 7.1 2 Increase group's turnover 3.42 10 22.7
3 Economic stability 3.06 1 .7 3 Follow customers 3.34 3 6.7
4 Political stability 3.06 1 .7 4 Market growth 3.27 2 4.5
5 Quality of labour force 3.03 5 3.2 5 Political stability 3.11 0 .0
6 Reaction to competitors 2.59 1 .7 6 Economic stability 3.11 1 2.3
7 Market expected growth 2.54 8 5.2 7 Market diversification 2.84 2 4.5
8 Competition home market 2.50 2 1.3 8 Reaction to competitors 2.83 1 2.3
9 Transportation costs 2.49 2 1.3 9 Reduce depend, agents 2.67 1 2.3
10 Public incentives 2.43 8 5.2 10 Portugal’s image 2.59 1 2.3
11 Portugal’s image 2.42 0 .0 11 Market size 2.52 1 2.3
12 Local firm for sale 2.34 15 9.7 12 Competition home market 2.33 0 .0
13 Follow customers 2.32 13 8.4 13 Inefficiency local agents 2.20 0 .0
14 Establish sales network 2.31 11 7.1 14 International experience 2.17 0 .0
15 Market diversification 2.23 0 .0 15 Geographic proximity 2.04 0 .0
16 European Single Market 2.21 0 .0 16 European Single Market 2.00 0 .0
17 Local infrastructure 2.12 1 .7 17 Quality of labour force 1.98 0 .0
18 Quality of local cluster 2.11 3 1.9 18 Quality of local cluster 1.91 0 .0
19 EU market 2.10 4 2.6 19 Reduction of labour costs 1.89 1 2.3
20 Market size 2.01 2 1.3 20 Local firm for sale 1.87 4 9.1
21 Invitation 1.98 6 3.9 21 Complementarity locals 1.82 1 2.3
22 Cultural proximity 1.97 0 .0 22 Cultural proximity 1.80 1 2.3
23 Geographic proximity 1.95 4 2.6 23 Local infrastructure 1.77 0 .0
24 Complementarity locals 1.89 1 .7 24 EU market 1.73 0 .0
25 Reduce depend, agents 1.86 0 .0 25 Invitation 1.73 1 2.3
26 Access natural resources 1.84 8 5.2 26 Reduce depend suppliers 1.59 0 .0
27 International experience 1.70 1 .7 27 Inefficiency of suppliers 1.55 0 .0
28 Acquire technology 1.68 1 .7 28 Transportation costs 1.53 0 .0
29 Avoid barriers 1.67 2 1.3 29 Acquire technology 1.50 0 .0
30 Reduce depend suppliers 1.64 1 .7 30 Public incentives 1.40 0 .0
31 Inefficiency of agents 1.58 1 .7 31 Avoid barriers 1.40 0 .0
32 Inefficiency of suppliers 1.32 0 .0 32 Access natural resources 1.16 0 .0
“ Mean o f a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5  (very important).
6 Number o f respondents that chose it as the ‘most important reason to have invested in Portugal'.
In the case of manufacturing firms (Table 5.7a), five determinants were rated well above all 
the others. However, the reduction of labour costs was unquestionably the top answer - it 
recorded the highest mean in the 5-point scale and was chosen as the most important 
reason by more than a quarter of the respondents. The quality of the labour force was also 
among the top five determinants, but was chosen as the main reason by only 3 per cent of 
the participants. It seems that the location decision was largely a response to labour costs, 
the quality of the labour force being relevant but secondary.
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The second most important variable in terms of the overall mean was to increase the 
group’s turnover. It was also considered the top reason by seven per cent of the 
respondents. This should not be a surprise since it simply reinforces the argument that 
internationalisation is a special case of the growth of the firm (Buckley, 1993b). Economic 
and political stability were the other top determinants in 1 able 5.7a, but only two managers 
selected them as the main reason to invest in Portugal. This result is consistent with the 
findings of other survey-based studies (see chapter 3). For most managers, these were 
highly valued characteristics of the country, probably a precondition for the investment 
decision. But other determinants were more decisive to the location choice. Interestingly, 
there was a group of variables in the opposite position: their overall ratings were low but 
they were seen as the mam rationale by a substantial number of firms. These included the 
existence of a local firm for sale (10%), following customers (8%), to establish a 
distribution network (7%), and access to natural resources (5%). These are strong but 
specialist reasons -  they were very important for some firms but not generally important in 
the overall population.
As for purely commercial subsidiaries (Table 5.7b), the establishment of a distribution 
network was, not surprisingly, the main reason to invest in Portugal. Not only was its mean 
well above all the others, but it was singled out as the main reason by 32 per cent of the 
participants. It was followed by the need to increase the group’s turnover (chosen as the 
main reason in 23 per cent of the responses), to follow customers, and market growth. As 
above, economic and political stability were among the top reasons but were rarely chosen 
as the main reason to invest in Portugal. Another similarity with manufacturing firms was 
that the existence of a local firm for sale was the mam determinant of investment for 9 per 
cent of the commercial subsidiaries; but in overall terms its influence was small.
5.4.1.1. Factor analysis
Despite these preliminary conclusions, the analysis of the determinants of FDI in Portugal 
was seriously hampered by the high number of variables involved. This called for the use of 
data reduction techniques, such as factor analysis (Ilair et al., 1998: p. 90). Factor analysis 
permits a reduction in the number of dimensions to be used in further tests, simplifying the 
investigation. Normally, it entails the loss of some information, since the new factors do 
not fully represent the original variables. In this case, however, the aim was not to crcate 
new variables based on the factor loadings. Factor analysis was simply a tool to investigate 
the way the variables were grouped by the respondents.
100
The number of factors to extract was a difficult choice. Two common criteria are to select 
the factors with an eigenvalue above unity or to base the decision on the observation of the 
scree plot (I fair et al., 1998). These suggested nine and eight factors, respectively. I Iowever, 
factor cohesion was particularly critical for this study. If they were to represent the 
determinants of FDI in Portugal, the factors needed to be plausible within existing 
understanding. The representativeness of the factors extracted (total variance explained) 
was of secondary importance but not irrelevant. Taking all these elements into account, the 
decision was to extract ten factors, which accounted for more than two thirds of total 
variance. With fewer factors some individually relevant determinants would be combined, 
making the analysis confusing. With more factors the theoretical interpretation of some of 
the determinants would be difficult.
The results of this first model can be found in Appendix 5B. It turned out, however, that 
the behaviour of ‘transportation costs’ had little in common with any of the factors in the 
analysis. It presented a low communality and dispersed factor loadings irrespective of the 
number of factors extracted (see Appendix 5B). This does not necessarily mean that 
transportation costs were irrelevant. Table 5.7, above, showed that they were important for 
some firms, in particular in manufacturing. Nonetheless, the association with any of the 
factors (factor 2 in this case) was spurious and an alternative model, without transportation 
costs, was adopted (Appendix 5C).
This new model differed very little from the original one (cf. Appendices 5B and 5C). The 
ten factors were exactly the same that were obtained before, the only differences being the 
obvious absence of transportation costs and a slightly higher percentage of variance 
explained (69.8%). These factors constitute a theoretically consistent list of the 
determinants of foreign direct investment in Portugal (Table 5.8). They include locational 
determinants (stability, local market, labour conditions, proximity), internalisation 
determinants (upstream and downstream integration, market diversification) and strategy 
determinants (home conditions, passive expansion). However, before they could be used in 
a more detailed analysis, some adjustments were needed.
It was particularly interesting that public incentives were consistently associated with labour 
costs and skills. This suggests that public incentives have attracted essentially efficiency 
seeking FDI to Portugal and will be further exploited later. However, if  the aim is to 
investigate the relevance of labour conditions as a determinant of FDI the variable public 
incentives cannot be associated with labour quality and costs. A similar reasoning applies to
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the variable ‘to increase the group’s turnover’. Its association with the local market is easy 
to understand. It is only reasonable to assume that the host country’s market size and 
growth are important variables when (market) growth is a major motivation for 
internationalisation. But the turnover variable cannot be part of a proxy for the importance 
of the local market in attracting inward FDI. Both ‘public incentives’ and ‘to increase the 
group turnover’ were excluded from the subsequent analysis8.
T a b l e  5 .8 : F a c t o r s  ( d e t e r m in a n t s ) a s s o c ia t e d  w it h  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l
Factor Variables included Factor Variables included
Political and Political stability EU market Access to the EU market
economic Economic stability Reaction to European Single Market
stability International image Need to avoid barriers
Upstream Acquisition of technology Labour conditions Reduction of labour costs
integration Reaction to suppliers’ inefficiency Quality of labour force
Access to natural resources (Public incentives)
Reduce dependency on suppliers Geographic and Geographic proximity
Local cluster cultural proximity Cultural proximity
Local infrastructure Passive Invitation from a local
Downstream Reduce dependency on agents expansion Local firm for sale
integration Reaction to agents’ inefficiency Search complementarity with locals
Establishment distribution network Market Market diversification
Following customers diversification Acquisition international experience
Local market Market growth Home conditions Increased competition at home
Market size Reaction to competitors’ move
(Increase turnover)
The importance of the new determinants was assessed by computing the mean of the 
respective variables (cf. Table 5.8). Like the originals, these new variables had a minimum 
of 1 (when all the variables of the determinant had received the lowest rating in the Likert- 
scale) and a maximum of 5 (when all received the top rating). Table 5.9 presents the 
ranking of the ten determinants. The respective means are inside brackets on the first line 
o f the table.
T a b l e  5 .9 : R a n k  o f  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l : a l l  f ir m s  a n d  b y  in d u s t r y
Determinants of FDI 
Industry
Labour
condit.
Stabi­
lity
Compe­
tition
Local
market
Down­
stream
Market
Divers.
Passive
expan.
EU
market
Proxi­
mity
Up­
stream
All firms3 1(2.87)
2
(2.81)
3
(2.54)
4
(2.39)
5
(2.25)
6
(2.05)
7
(1.95)
8
(1.90)
9
(1.88)
10
(1.72)
Food, beverages (20) 1 4 7 2 3 6 5 10 9 8
Text, cloth, foot. (20) 1 2 3 5 10 9 8 4 7 6
Natural resources (19) 3 2 1 4 5 6 8 10 7 9
Chemicals and oil (23) 4 1 2 3 5 7 6 8 10 9
Metal industries (17) 1 3 2 4 7 9 5 8 6 10
Machinery/equip. (42) 1 2 3 5 9 6 8 4 7 10
A ll manufact. (141) 1 2 3 4 5 7 6 8 9 10
Commerce (39) 7 3 4 2 1 5 8 9 6 10
Inside brackets, in the first row, the mean of a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (very important).
8 If these two variables were excluded, the remaining variables would still be grouped exactly as they are 
presented in Table 5.8. The results associated with this third model can be found in Appendix 5D.
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As mentioned in the preliminary analysis, there were marked differences between 
commercial and manufacturing firms. For the former, downstream integration (the 
internalisation of the sales function - Buckley and Casson, 1976) - was the main motivation. 
It was followed by access to the local market, economic and political stability, and 
competitive conditions at home. Market diversification was also relatively important for 
purely commercial subsidiaries. For manufacturing FDI, labour conditions and economic 
and political stability were clearly the dominant determinants. Competition in the home 
country, access to the local market, and downstream integration were next in importance. 
This combination of determinants confirms the duality of motivations (efficiency seeking 
and market seeking) suggested in the previous chapter. The differences between industries, 
however, were more important than it is immediately apparent in Table 5.9.
Analysis of the determinants’ mean for each industry presents a clearer picture. Table 5.10 
(see over page) shows that labour conditions and stability were even more important for 
textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and equipment (the most export oriented 
industries) than for the other industries in the sample. Access to the KU market was also 
above average importance in these industries, being in both cases the fourth most 
important determinant. The local market, on the other hand, was much less important in 
these industries than in any other group of firms, and downstream integration was 
completely insignificant.
T a b l e  5 .1 0 : T h e  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l  b y  in d u s t r y : m e a n  v a l u e s
Determinants o f FDI Labour
condit.
Stabi­
lity
Compe­
tition
Local
market
Down­
stream
Market
Divers.
Passive
expan.
EU
market
Proxi­
mity
Up­
stream
Food, beverages 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1
Text, cloth, footwear 3.9 3.0 2.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.8
Natural resources 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.8
Chemicals and oil 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.8
Metal industries 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.4 2.2 1.7 2.0 1.3
Machinery/equip. 3.5 3.0 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7
A ll m anufacturing 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8
Commerce 1.8 2.9 2.5 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6
Note: Mean of a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5  (very important).
There was, nevertheless, an important difference between the two groups of firms. In the 
case of machinery and equipment, labour conditions and stability can almost be considered 
to be the only relevant determinants since there was a very big difference for the next two 
determinants (competition and the EU market). In textiles, clothing and footwear, 
however, competition was only slightly less important than stability, though well above the 
EU market. Both cases represent efficiency seeking FDI. However, the ‘push’ factors 
appear to be very different. Competitive conditions in the home country were critical in the
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decision of textiles, clothing and footwear producers to invest in Portugal, a politically and 
economically stable low cost location that is part of the European Union. Machinery and 
equipment manufacturing arc more global industries, in which competitive conditions 
operate at a different level.
Inevitable, industry level analysis hides differences in terms of the strategies of individual 
firms. These differences are due to firm specific characteristics, but also to the fact that the 
industries are not homogeneous. Figure 5.11 shows very clearly that most firms in textiles, 
clothing and footwear and in machinery and equipment fell in the fourth quadrant. This 
corresponds to an above average rating of labour conditions and a below average rating of 
the importance of the local market. In other words, their investment can be classified as 
efficiency seeking9.
F ig u re  5 .1 1 : L a b o u r  c o n d it io n s  vs. l o c a l  F ig u re  5 .1 2 : L a b o u r  c o n d it io n s  vs.
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When the local market variable was replaced with downstream integration (Figure 5.12), 
however, almost all firms in these export oriented industries fell into quadrant 4. This 
suggests that locational determinants were more important than internalisation. Even when 
the local market was an important determinant of FDI, to internalise the sales function was 
not a priority. As for the presence of firms from other industries in quadrant 4 of Figure 
5.11, it conveys that there were export oriented segments (or individual companies) in all 
industries. As an example, all firms in the oil and chemicals group in quadrant 4 in these 
conditions were manufacturers of plastic products.
The differences between textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and equipment 
mentioned above are farther illustrated in Figure 5.13. Almost all textiles, clothing and
9 The figures arc based on Model 3 (Appendix 5D) and use the factor loadings rather than the determinants’ 
means.
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footwear producers appear in quadrant 2. Most machinery and equipment manufacturers 
are represented in quadrant 4. The difference corresponds to the role of the home country 
competitive conditions to the decision to invest in Portugal. Figure 5.13 also shows that 
textiles, clothing and footwear represent a much more homogeneous group than machinery 
and equipment.
F ig u r e  5 .1 3 : L a b o u r  c o n d it io n s  vs. c o m p e t it io n
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The comparison of the determinants of investment in Portugal according to the country of 
origin is presented in Table 5.11. As could be expected, the largest differences were found 
in the assessment of cultural and geographic proximity. This was the second most 
important determinant for Spanish firms, only behind the conditions in the local market. It 
was also relevant for French and Italian firms (the latter included in ‘other EU12’), but 
irrelevant for all the other10. Also predictable was that access to the EU market was more 
important for firms from outside the Union.
T a b l e  5 .1 1 : R a n k  o f  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l  b y  c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in
Determinants of FDI 
Country
Labour
condit.
Stabi­
lity
Compe­
tition
Local
market
Down­
stream
Market
Divers.
Passive
expan.
EU
market
Proxi­
mity
Up­
stream
A ll firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Spain (21) 6 4 3 1 5 7 8 10 2 9
France (24) 3 1 2 5 6 8 7 10 4 9
Germany (48) 1 2 3 5 4 6 8 7 10 9
UK (16) 2= 2= 5 4 1 6 8 10 9 8
Other EU12 (19) 1 2 6 5 9 7 4 8 3 10
Other Europe (21) 1 3 2 4 7 8 5 6 10 9
Rest of the world (31) 2 1 3 4 6 8 8 5 10 9
According to Table 5.11, Spanish firms are essentially market seekers. This was the only 
source country for which local market was the main determinant. Labour conditions, on
10 Brazilian companies also ranked this determinant very high, but they were too few to exert a significant 
influence over their group’s mean.
105
the other hand, were of relatively little importance. UK investors differed from the rest of 
the sample in the role of downstream integration. The UK was until 1974 the main trading 
partner of Portugal. This position is now less relevant, but the results obtained suggest a 
deeper involvement of British firms in Portugal, which over the years may have internalised 
their operations, replacing exports with FDI. It should be noted, however, that the groups 
obtained using the firms’ country of origin were very heterogeneous in terms of their 
motivations. Much more so than in the case of industries, explaining why so few 
differences were found in Table 5.11. The only determinants that seem to be country 
specific are those with a geopolitical connection, namely proximity and access to the FU 
market11.
Not many differences in the determinants of FDI can be attributed to the size of the 
subsidiaries (Table 5.12). In fact, the differences found reflect different market orientations 
associated with size (cf. Figure 5.9). Smaller firms (less than 50 employees) were particularly 
concerned with the conditions in the local market and with the sales function (downstream 
integration). For bigger firms the main determinant of FDI in Portugal was labour 
conditions. Rather interestingly, the importance of the local market and downstream 
integration decreased linearly with the size of the firm, while labour conditions registered a 
linear increase with size (all statistically significant at 10%).
T a b le  5 .1 2 : R a n k  o f  d e te r m in a n ts  o f  in v e s tm e n t  in P o r t u g a l  f o r  f i r m s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s iz e s
Determinants of FDI 
Labour force
Labour
condit.
Stabi­
lity
Compe­
tition
Local
market
Down­
stream
Market
Divers.
Passive
expan.
EU
market
Proxi­
mity
Up­
stream
A ll firm s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Less than 20 (31) 9 3 4 2 1 5 8 7 6 10
21 to 50 (28) 5 2 1 3 4 6 7 9 10 8
51 to 100 (30) 1 2 3 4 7 10 6 5 9 8
101 to 200 (34) 1 2 3 4 6 5 7 9 8 10
201 to 500 (32) 1 2 3 4 7 5 6 9 8 10
More than 500 (25) 1 2 3 5 10 6 7 4 8 9
The differences in the determinants of FDI that could be associated with the year of 
investment were particularly interesting. Table 5.13 suggests that two periods in Portugal’s 
recent history saw efficiency seeking being replaced by market seeking as the main 
motivation for inward FDI. The first was the decade that followed the 1974 revolution, 
which was also associated with a worldwide economic crisis. The second was the period 
after 1995, which seems to consolidate the trend of the first half of the 1990s. The latter is
11 This was also the conclusion reached with cluster analysis. The dusters obtained were very heterogeneous 
in terms o f country o f origin. They were somewhat more coherent in terms of industries, but even in this case 
not sufficiently homogeneous to be useful for this research.
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particularly worrying since it confirms that the recent decrease of inward FDI in Portugal 
(see chapter 4) affected efficiency seeking FDI in particular. This is reinforced by the 
decreasing importance of competition as a determinant of FDI. Foreign investors seem to 
be searching for the solution to stronger competition in the domestic market in other 
locations.
T a b l e  5 .1 3 : R a n k  o f  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l  b y  y e a r  o f  f ir s t  in v e s t m e n t
Determinants of FDI 
Year o f investment
Labour
condit.
Stabi­
lity
Compe­
tition
Local
market
Down­
stream
Market
Divers.
Passive
expan.
EU
market
Proxi­
mity
Up­
stream
A ll firm s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Before 1960 (11) 3 1 2 5 4 9 7 10 6 8
1960 to 1974 (25) 1 2 3 4 6 5 7 8 9 10
1975 to 1985 (15) 4 1 3 2 5 6 10 8 7 9
1986 to 1990 (58) 1 2 3 4 5= 7 5= 8 9 10
1991 to 1995 (51) 2 1 4 3 5 6 7 8 9 10
After 1995 (20) 4 1 5 2 3 7 10 8 6 9
At face value, this trend is not necessarily negative for the Portuguese economy. Economic 
development and its resulting higher production costs tend to reduce a country’s ability to 
attract footloose efficiency seeking investments. However, this evolution (which in the 
previous chapter was described as transition from stage 3 to stage 4 of the IDP — see 
section 4.6) should result in a growing importance of internalisation variables over 
localisation. In terms of the determinants identified here, this would mean the growing 
importance of downstream and upstream integration, which was not the case.
5.4.2. Alternative locations
The decision to invest in a foreign country should normally involve the consideration of 
alternative locations. In the sample, however, only 42 per cent of the respondents (88 
firms) claimed to have analysed other locations before investing in Portugal. Most of these, 
however, considered more than one alternative. Eastern Europe and Spain were the most 
common alternatives considered (46 and 44 firms, respectively), followed by the most 
developed EU members (considered by 40 of the respondents). Ireland and Greece were 
considered by a much smaller number of the firms in the sample (Table 5.14).
In general, the European locations were positively correlated, which suggests they were 
frequently considered simultaneously. The exception was the correlation coefficient 
(Spearmans’s rho) between Spam and Eastern F'urope, which was negative and statistically 
significant at 10%. That is, Spam and Eastern Europe did not seem to be, in general, 
alternatives to each other. Finally, non I European locations were positively correlated with
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Eastern Europe and negatively with Spain. But the level of statistical significance of these 
relationships was rather low, impeding further speculation.
T a b l e  5 .1 4 : A l t e r n a t iv e  l o c a t io n s  f o r  in v e s t o r s  t h a t  c h o s e  P o r t u g a l
Strong
alternative Considered Total
Eastern Europe N 33 13 46
% 72% 28% 100%
Spain N 35 9 44
% 80% 20% 100%
Ireland N 10 8 18
% 56% 44% 100%
Greece N 6 9 15
% 40% 60% 100%
Other EU N 24 15 39
% 62% 38% 100%
Other locations N 13 12 25
% 52% 48% 100%
The differences in the ranking of the determinants of FDI between firms that considered 
alternative locations and those that only considered Portugal for their investment were less 
marked than anticipated (Table 5.15). Nevertheless, labour conditions and EU market were 
much more important for firms that considered alternative locations than for those that did 
not. The opposite was true for local market and downstream integration1". This suggests 
that efficiency seeking investment was more common among firms that considered 
alternative locations, and market-seeking among those that did not. But the two types of 
investment coexisted in both groups.
T a b l e  5 .1 5 : R a n k  o f  t h e  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  P o r t u g a l 3
Determinants o f FDI Labour Stabi­ Compe­ Local Down­ Market Passive EU Proxi­ Up­
condit. lity tition market stream Divers. expan. market mity stream
No alternative location 2 1 4 3 9 6 5 7 8 10
considered (2.58) (2.76) (2.51) (2.54) (1.74) (2.14) (2.50) (2.00) (1.96) (1.71)
Alternative location 1 2 3 4= 4= 6 7 8 9 10
considered (3.36) (2.93) (2.61) (2.21) (2.21) (1.99) (1.96) (1.92) (1-76) (1.75)
Spain considered 1 2 4 3 5 7 6 8 9 10
(3.04) (3.02) (2.51) (2.53) (2.21) (2.14) (2.19) (2.06) (1.74) (1.72)
Eastern Europe 1 2 3 5 4 6 9 7 10 8
considered (3.61) (3.16) (2.83) (2.29) (2.39) (2.22) (1.84) (2.11) (1.69) (1-92)
a Inside brackets, the mean of a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (very important).
Equally surprising was that only small differences were found in the determinants 
associated with firms that considered Spain as the alternative location and those that 
considered Eastern Europe (Table 5.15). The suspicion was that efficiency-seeking 
investment should be more common when Eastern Europe was the main alternative, and 
market-seeking investment dominant when the main alternative was Spain. I Iowever, the 
evidence to support this was weak. Firms that considered Eastern Europe the main
12 The ANOVA test showed all these differences to be statistically significant at 5%.
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alternative location did rate labour conditions higher and local market and downstream 
integration lower than those that considered Spain, but this is far from conclusive evidence.
5.4.3. Type of investment
Greenfield development was the most common mode of entry in the Portuguese market, 
adopted by 56 per cent of the firms in the sample (Appendix 5E). 1’his option was 
particularly popular among firms in textiles, clothing and footwear, machinery and 
equipment, and commerce. The former was especially relevant, since textiles, clothing and 
footwear are industries with a strong presence of local investors. It seems, nevertheless, 
that FDI in these industries contributed to increase the country’s production capacity in 
these traditional sectors, rather than replacing local producers. In terms of national 
differences, greenfield developments were especially favoured by Spanish firms, while 
French and UK firms were those more active in acquisitions, in particular of locally owned 
firms (Appendix 5E).
A different decision was the choice between joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Foreign investors in Portugal seemed to prefer the latter. Only 31 per cent of the firms in 
the sample reported entering the Portuguese market with a joint venture. The partners were 
predominantly from either the home country or a local investor (40% and 36%, 
respectively). In the case of Spanish firms, as many as three quarters of the partners in joint 
ventures were from the home country. All the remaining were Portuguese. German firms 
were the other investors to prefer partners from their home country (63%). On the other 
hand, non-European investors chose a Portuguese partner in 70 per cent of the joint 
ventures created.
It seems that the acquisition of minority partners was frequent among the firms in the 
sample. 78 per cent of the participant firms were, in 1997, wholly owned by the parent 
company, compared with just 69 per cent that reported having entered the country as a 
wholly owned subsidiary.
5.4.4. Public incentives
It was seen above that, as a determinant of FDI, public incentives were consistently 
associated with labour costs and skills. This was interpreted as evidence that they have 
attracted essentially efficiency seeking FDI - projects that exploited Portugal’s relatively low 
labour costs but reasonable labour skills. This idea was reinforced by the fact that public 
incentives were especially valued as a determinant o f investment by the export oriented
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industries: textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and equipment. On the other 
hand, in the sectors most oriented towards the local market (commerce and chemicals and 
oil), public incentives were completely insignificant. Furthermore, there was a positive 
linear relationship (statistically significant at 1%) between the importance of public 
incentives and firm size (no statistically significant differences were found when the firms 
were grouped by country of origin or year of investment).
These characteristics reflect very much the public policies towards FDI, particularly 
concerned with attracting big industrial projects with a stronger impact in employment and 
public opinion. The official website of ICEP, the institution responsible for promoting 
Portugal as a location of FDI, is very clear about what Portugal can offer to foreign 
investors. “Imagine a country with the lowest labour costs in Europe (...). Add to this a 
stable political environment (...) and low criminality” (ICEP, 2000).
As many as 38 per cent of the manufacturing firms in the sample that agreed to examine 
this topic in more detail reported having received public incentives to invest in Portugal13. 
Public support was especially high in machinery and equipment, where 55 per cent of the 
subsidiaries received some sort of public support. On the other hand, in the natural 
resources based industries only one in five firms was supported by the local authorities 
(Figure 5.14). Since foreign investment qualifies for support from the European Union’s 
structural funds, the high incidence of public support in the most recently created firms 
should be expected (Figure 5.15).
F ig u r e  5.14: %  o f  f ir m s  t h a t  r e c e iv e d  F ig u r e  5.15: %  o f  f ir m s  t h a t  r e c e iv e d
PUBLIC INCENTIVES, BY INDUSTRY PUBLIC INCENTIVES, BY YEAR OF INVESTMENT
13 The overall figure was 30 per cent, since only 6 per cent o f the commercial subsidiaries received some kind 
o f public incentives.
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Despite the number of projects that received public support, only 11 per cent of the 
respondents claimed that without public incentives they would not have invested in 
Portugal (Figure 5.16)14. 54 per cent would have invested less than they did, but in 35 per 
cent of the cases public support was no more than a bonus for the investors -  i.e. they 
claimed that the investment would have been exactly the same even without public 
incentives. This result seems to confirm UNCTAD’s (1998: p .104) suggestion that public 
incentives have a far greater impact on the location of FDI within a country than on the 
decision to invest in the country. Nevertheless, the opinion of the biggest firms (with more 
than 500 employees) was somewhat different. One third would have not invested in 
Portugal without incentives, and a further half would have invested on a smaller scale.
F ig u r e  5 .1 6 : Im p a c t o n  in v e s tm e n t  i f  p u b l ic  F ig u r e  5 .1 7 : A s s e s s m e n t o f  ‘ P u b l ic
INCENTIVES HAD NOT BEEN OFFERED INCENTIVES’ AS A DETERMINANT OF FD I
little importance fairly important
Public incentives (as de te rm inant o f investm ent)
Interestingly, there was a very strong correlation between having received incentives and 
considering public incentives a significant determinant of FDI (Figure 5.17). However, it 
was difficult to identify whether this represented a bias of the respondents - incentives were 
considered important because their firms benefited from them - or evidence that more 
public incentives would have attracted more foreign firms to Portugal. Unfortunately, the 
number of firms that received public incentives was not big enough to compare the impact 
of those incentives in different industries.
5.5. P r o b le m s  f a c e d  b y  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  o p e r a t i n g  in  P o r t u g a l
To investigate the problems faced by foreign investors in Portugal a strategy was adopted 
similar to the one used for the determinants of FDI. In this case, 34 potential problems 
were proposed (see Appendix 5A), the respondents being asked to rate them from 1
S am e investm ent
14 These figures did not consider commercial firms.
I l l
(irrelevant) to 5 (very important). They were then invited to single out the most important 
of the 34 proposed problems. Separate results for manufacturing and commercial firms are 
presented in Table 5.16.
T a b le  5 .1 6 : M ain  p ro b le m s  a f f e c t in g  in v e s tm e n t in P o r t u g a l
Table 5.16a Manufacturing firms Table 5.16b Commercial firms
Rank Problem Meana
Main problem13 
N % Rank Problem Mean8
Main problem1 
N %
1 Legal system/bureaucracy 3.20 15 9.7 1 Competition local market 3.39 3 6.5
2 Competition export markets 2.89 17 11.0 2 Legal system/bureaucracy 3.23 7 15.2
3 Availability skilled workers 2.76 18 11.6 3 Small local market 2.98 12 26.1
4 Competition local market 2.71 19 12.3 4 Tax regime 2.55 2 4.3
5 Tax regime 2.68 9 5.8 5 Stagnant local demand 2.49 2 4.3
6 Small local market 2.46 18 11.6 6 Limited product range 2.37 3 6.5
7 Attitude local workers 2.38 2 1.3 7 Firm’s HR restrictions 2.33 0 .0
8 Firm's HR restrictions 2.35 5 3.2 8 Limited capacity of agents 2.30 0 .0
9 Firm’s size 2.30 5 3.2 9 Firm’s size 2.20 2 4.3
10 Labour costs 2.29 6 3.9 10 Economic situation Portugal 2.15 3 6.5
11 Local infrastructure 2.28 1 .6 11 Availability skilled workers 2.13 2 4.3
12 Stagnant local demand 2.17 3 1.9 12 Divergence with partners 2.06 1 2.2
13 Changes Eastern Europe 2.17 3 1.9 13 Exchange rates 2.02 2 4.3
14 Insufficient public incentives 2.13 5 3.2 14 Inform, business opport. 2.02 2 4.3
15 Limited product range 2.07 3 1.9 15 Establishment of network 1.96 1 2.2
16 Related/support industries 2.07 4 2.6 16 Attitude local workers 1.89 0 .0
17 Stagnant export markets 2.04 3 1.9 17 Insufficient public incentives 1.87 0 .0
18 Portugal’s image 2.01 0 .0 18 Identification local partner 1.86 1 2.2
19 Exchange rates 1.98 1 .6 19 Local infrastructure 1.85 0 .0
20 Firm’s financial restrictions 1.97 4 2.6 20 Develop, local banking 1.85 0 .0
21 Develop, local banking 1.96 1 .6 21 European Single Market 1.85 1 2.2
22 Economic situation Portugal 1.92 1 .6 22 Portugal’s image 1.81 0 .0
23 Coordination/management 1.77 2 1.3 23 Labour costs 1.79 0 .0
24 European Single Market 1.77 1 .6 24 Changes Eastern Europe 1.77 0 .0
25 Limited capacity of agents 1.76 1 .6 25 Firm’s financial restrictions 1.75 1 2.2
26 Divergence with partners 1.73 1 .6 26 Cultural differences 1.75 0 .0
27 Cultural differences 1.71 2 1.3 27 Information on investment 1.72 2 4.3
28 Political/social situation 1.68 2 1.3 28 Coordination/management 1.72 0 .0
29 Establishment of network 1.63 0 .0 29 Related/support industries 1.68 0 .0
30 Information on investment 1.61 2 1.3 30 Competition export markets 1.67 0 .0
31 Reduction external tariffs 1.60 0 .0 31 Stagnant export markets 1.61 0 .0
32 Inform, business opport. 1.58 0 .0 32 Market knowledge 1.56 0 .0
33 Identification local partner 1.50 0 .0 33 Reduction external tariffs 1.51 0 .0
34 Market knowledge 1.44 1 .6 34 Political/social situation 1.43 0 .0
a Mean o f a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (very important).
6 Number of respondents that chose it as the ‘most important problem faced in Portugal'
In the case of commercial firms, two groups of variables topped the list of the main 
problems faced in Portugal: the characteristics of the local market and the legal and fiscal 
system. The five variables that could be included in these groups were picked as the main 
problem by more than half (56%) of the commercial subsidiaries that participated in the 
study. Curiously, these same variables were also near to the top of the concerns of 
manufacturing subsidiaries. But in this case all but the legal system were less important than 
competition in export markets (completely irrelevant for purely commercial firms) and the 
availability of skilled workers. Interestingly enough, labour costs were only tenth in this list
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and singled out as the main problem by just 4 per cent of the respondents. The availability 
of skilled workers, on the other hand, was third in the ranking and considered the mam 
problem by 12 per cent of the respondents.
As above (section 5.4) the number of variables represented a handicap to understanding 
and factor analysis was used to reduce the number of dimensions. In this case, however, 
the association between the variables was less strong than in section 5.4, which was 
reflected in the low communalitics associated with many of the variables. Furthermore, 
though there were many variables with factor loadings below .6 or even .5 (often adopted 
in factor analysis as elimination criteria -  Hair et al., 1998), the existence of almost a 
continuum of values (see Appendix 5F) made the use of these figures largely arbitrary. As 
such, the decision was to ignore the factor loadings and the communalities and concentrate 
on factor homogeneity. The latter was the only criterion used in the decision of whether to 
maintain or eliminate variables. Nonetheless, the overall impact of the decisions made was 
very limited. Despite the low factor loadings, the associations between variables were very 
stable. Very few changes were registered when a different number of factors was extracted 
or when observations were excluded, which is supportive of the results obtained.
Seven factors were finally extracted (Table 5.17). Because of the importance given to factor 
homogeneity, two variables were eliminated: “limited capacity of agents” and “firm’s 
human resources restrictions”. Both are obviously firm level variables, but were associated 
with location factors. The results obtained with the new model were, nevertheless, exactly 
the same as presented in Table 5.17 (cf. Appendices 5F and 5G).
T a b l e  5 .1 7 : P r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s  in  P o r t u g a l
Factor Variables included Factor Variables included
Investment Information on investment Market access Problems to establish network
conditions Insufficient public incentives and control Coordination and control
Informat, on business opportunities Problems to identify local partner
Development local banking industry Limited product range
Legal system and bureaucracy Limited market knowledge
Country risk Economic situation Cultural differences
Political and social situation Divergence with partners
Portugal’s international image Exports Competition in export markets
Tax regime competitiveness Stagnant export markets
Labour and Availability of skilled workers Reduction external tariffs
infrastructure Attitude of Portuguese workers Evolution of exchange rates
(Firm’s HR restrictions) European Single Market
Infrastructure Changes in Eastern Europe
Labour costs Characteristics Small local market
Related and support industries of local market Stagnant local demand
Firm's financial Firm’s financial restrictions Strong competition in local market
capacity and size Firm's size (Limited capacity of agents)
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Two groups of firm related problems were identified: those that result from the firm’s size 
and financial capacity, and those associated with market access and control. For country 
related problems, the five groups identified using factor analysis were: the investment 
conditions (including insufficient information and incentives, the banking and the legal 
system, and bureaucracy), country risk (which included the tax regime), labour and 
infrastructure, export competitiveness, and the size and dynamism of the local market.
As in the previous section, these problems were analysed by computing the mean of the 
respective variables. The results for the whole sample and by industry can be seen in Table 
5.18. When all the participants were considered, the characteristics of the local market was 
the main problem identified by foreign investors m Portugal, followed by labour and 
infrastructure. Market access and control, on the other hand, was in general of very limited 
importance. Only small differences existed in the means associated with the remaining 
variables.
T a b l e  5 .1 8 : R a n k  o f  p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  f o r e ig n  f ir m s : a l l  f ir m s  a n d  b y  in d u s t r y
Problems
Industry
Character, 
of local 
market
Labour 
and infra­
structure
Financial 
capacity 
and size
Investment
conditions
Country
risk
Export
competiti­
veness
Market 
access 
and control
All firms3 1
(2.51)
2
(2.21)
3
(2.08)
4
(2.06)
5
(2.05)
6
(1.98)
7
(1.72)
Food and beverages (18) 1 2 6 4 5 3 7
Text., cloth., footwear (19) 7 1 5 4 3 2 6
Natural resources (27) 2 3 1 5 4 6 7
Chemicals and oil (24) 1 6 3 2 4 5 7
Metal industries (18) 1 2 3 4 7 5 6
Machinery/Equipment (46) 2 1 6 5 3 4 7
A ll m a n u fac tu ring  (152) 1 2 3 6 4 5 7
Com m erce (45) 1 6 4 2 3 7 5
Inside brackets, the mean of a scale that ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (very important).
When analysing the data at the industry level, the differences seemed to be very much 
associated with market orientation. Being the most export oriented group, it was no 
surprise that textiles, clothing and footwear manufacturers were much more concerned 
with export competitiveness than the rest of the sample. On the other hand, and unlike all 
the other investors, they were completely indifferent to the characteristics of the local 
market. The latter actually constituted the main difference between the problems identified 
by textiles, clothing and footwear producers and machinery and equipment manufacturers, 
the other predominantly export oriented group of firms. It should be remembered, 
however, that market diversification was irrelevant as a determinant of FDI by textiles, 
clothing and footwear producers, but of some importance for machinery and equipment 
manufacturers (cf. T'able 5.9.)
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Market orientation, in this case towards the local market, is also the explanation of the 
strong similarities between firms in chemicals and oil and purely commercial subsidiaries. 
Investment conditions (legal framework, information, financing) were for these firms the 
second most important problem, second only to the characteristics of the local market. As 
expected, labour and infrastructure, and export competitiveness were at the bottom of their 
concerns.
When the firms were grouped by their country of origin, the differences in terms of the 
problems faced were surprisingly small (see 'fable 5.19). This seems to confirm that market 
orientation is the main element behind the firms’ perceptions of difficulties; market 
orientation is much more associated with industrial sector than country. Spanish firms, 
however, diverged slightly from the norm. Their evaluation of problems arising from 
financial capacity and size was especially surprising given that the average Spanish firm was 
more than three times smaller than the average firm in the whole sample15. Spanish firms 
were also more critical of the investment conditions in Portugal, which may be explained 
by the fact that many did not seem to have previous international experience prior to 
expanding to Portugal16.
T a b l e  5 .1 9 : R a n k  o f  p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  f o r e ig n  f ir m s  in  P o r t u g a l , b y  c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in
Problems 
Country of origin
Character, 
of local 
market
Labour 
and infra­
structure
Financial 
capacity 
and size
Investment
conditions
Country
risk
Export
competiti­
veness
Market 
access 
and control
A ll firm s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Spain (25) 1 2 7 3 4 6 5
France (27) 1 2 6 5 3 4 7
Germany (48) 2 1 3 4 5 6 7
UK (18) 1 5 2 6 4 3 7
Other EU12 (20) 1 3 2 4 5 6 7
Other Europe (26) 1 4 2 5 3 6 7
Rest of the world (33) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 .6 . E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t
The evaluation made by the participants of the investment in Portugal was largely positive, 
at least if compared with the expectations (see Figure 5.18). Only 8 per cent of the 
respondents considered the experience to be ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ than expected. This is 
even less than the 11 per cent that considered that, overall, the result of the investment in
15 Sample mean: 303 employees per firm; Spanish firms: 90 employees; non-EU12 European firms: 125; UK 
firms: 228; non-European firms: 600; all the other groups were very close to the sample’s mean.
16 The importance o f previous experience is reinforced by the fact that firms created after 1990 were 
especially critical o f the investment conditions in Portugal
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Portugal was ‘much better’ than expected. A further 41 per cent evaluated the investment 
as ‘better’ than expected.
F ig u r e  5 .1 8 : R e s p o n d e n t s ’ e v a l u a t io n  o f  in v e s t m e n t
m uch w orse
Interestingly, all firms that considered the experience in Portugal to be below expectations 
invested after 1986 (in particular between 1986 and 1995). However, a simple explanation 
may be that older underperformers could have already been abandoned by the parent firm. 
In any case, even among the most recent investors the number of respondents that 
considered the experience to be better or much better than expected outnumbered by four 
to one those evaluating it negatively. Spanish firms were the most positive about their 
experience in Portugal. In terms of industries, commerce, machinery and equipment, and 
chemicals and oil were the most positive groups.
It seems, however, that the participants’ overall evaluation of the investment was very 
much dependent on profitability and turnover (see Table 5.20). The creation of new 
business opportunities and international experience showed little correlation with the 
remaining evaluation items. Furthermore, and contrary to the other items, the answers 
associated with the latter were largely balanced between positive and negative opinions.
T a b l e  5 .2 0 : C o r r e l a t io n  o f  d if f e r e n t  e v a l u a t io n  it e m s
Correlation coefficient: 
Spearman's rho Overall
evaluation
Evaluation 
of turnover
Evaluation
of
profitability
Evaluation 
of new 
opportunities
Evaluation of 
international 
experience
Overall evaluation 1.000 .608 .616 .298 .254
Evaluation turnover .608 1.000 .576 .219 .176
Evaluation profitability .616 .576 1.000 .194 .145
Evaluation new opportunities .298 .219 .194 1.000 .431
Evaluation international experience .254 .176 .145 .431 1.000
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5 .7 . P r o d u c t i o n  i n  P o r t u g a l
The sample included 181 firms with production capacity in Portugal. In 67 per cent of the 
cases the technology used in Portugal was said to be similar to that used in the home 
country. But 28 per cent of the respondents said that it was more labour intensive. In the 
metal industries and in machinery and equipment as many as 47 and 39 per cent of the 
firms, respectively, used more labour intensive technologies in Portugal than in the home 
country. Only 5 per cent of the respondents said the technology used in Portugal was more 
capital intensive than in the home country, most of them associated with the natural 
resources based industries. Quite surprisingly, in textiles, clothing and footwear 81 per cent 
of the respondents reported using in Portugal technology similar to the one used at home. 
Subsidiaries of non-European firms were those that used relatively more labour intensive 
technologies in Portugal. The opposite was true for Spanish firms. As expected, the use of 
more labour intensive technologies tended to increase as the firms’ size increased, 
suggesting a stronger presence of efficiency seeking FDI.
Less than two thirds of the manufacturing firms in the sample provided information on the 
origin of the inputs used in Portugal (excluding labour). The results were, nevertheless, 
surprising. On average, only 42 per cent of the inputs were obtained locally. A further 11 
per cent came from Spam and another 36 per cent from other EU countries. In the case of 
textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and equipment, only one quarter of the 
inputs were acquired in Portugal (Figure 5.19). The home country was the main source of 
inputs in both cases, with respectively 38 and 32 per cent (Figure 5.20).
F ig u re  5 .1 9 : O r ig in  o f  in p u ts , by in d u s t r y  F ig u re  5 .2 0 : P e r c e n ta g e  o f  in p u ts  f ro m
THE HOME COUNTRY
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German firms seemed to be particular averse to buying their inputs locally (Figure 5.21), 
clearly preferring inputs imported from Germany (Figure 5.22). Given that 64 per cent of 
the German subsidiaries used inputs produced by the group in the home country, there is 
clear evidence of a strong integration of activities between the Portuguese subsidiary and 
the parent company.
F ig u re  5 .2 1 : O r ig in  o f  in p u ts  by F ig u re  5 .2 2 : P e r c e n ta g e  o f  in p u ts  f ro m
INVESTING COUNTRY THE HOME COUNTRY
However, many Portuguese subsidiaries of German firms seemed to be no more than 
production platforms, with most decisions being taken in the home country. Only 11 per 
cent undertook the conception and design of their products in Portugal, 51 per cent 
distributed their own production, and 44 per cent had after sales services in Portugal. Even 
the purchasing of inputs and the storage of the production was done by less than two 
thirds of German subsidiaries in Portugal (Table 5.21).
T a b l e  5 .2 1 : P e r c e n t a g e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r in g  f ir m s  d e v e l o p in g  
in  P o r t u g a l  t h e  f o l l o w in g  a c t iv it ie s , b y  c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in
Country
Conception  
and design Purchasing Storage
Distribution 
and sales
After sales 
services
Spain 62 92 92 92 92
France 37 63 79 75 67
Germany 11 62 67 51 44
UK 62 100 100 77 69
Other EU12 26 70 83 83 68
Other Europe 20 72 76 56 56
Rest of World 31 81 85 74 67
A ll f irm s 30 73 80 69 62
In terms of industries, firms in textiles, clothing and footwear present a very similar pattern 
to that of German firms, irrespective of their country of origin (Table 5.22). If anything, 
the predominance of assembly platform investment is much stronger. The distribution of 
the products was the responsibility of the Portuguese subsidiary in just 23 per cent of the
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the products was the responsibility of the Portuguese subsidiary in just 23 per cent of the 
cases, and after sales services existed in only 27 per cent. The predominance of off-shore 
production in this group of industries is not surprising, however, and is fully consistent 
with the determinants of investment identified above (section 5.4). Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that no more than 30 per cent of the subsidiaries in the whole sample undertook 
the conception and design of their own products. Spanish and UK firms were the only 
groups where this phase of the value chain was more likely to exist in Portugal than not (cf. 
Table 5.21).
T a b l e  5 .2 2 : P e r c e n t a g e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r in g  f ir m s  d e v e l o p in g  
in  P o r t u g a l  t h e  f o l l o w in g  a c t iv it ie s , b y  in d u s t r y
Industry
Conception 
and design Purchasing Storage
Distribution 
and sales
After sales 
services
Food and beverages 33 67 90 81 50
Textiles, clothing, footwear 19 42 54 23 27
Natural resources based 45 80 83 74 70
Chemicals and oil 21 83 92 83 71
Metal and metal products 44 78 83 83 83
Machinery and equipment 21 82 80 73 68
A ll f irm s 30 73 80 69 62
The case of machinery and equipment manufacturers was also worth of note. It was 
mentioned above that only 25 per cent of the inputs used by foreign subsidiaries in these 
industries were acquired in Portugal. As in the case of textiles, clothing and footwear, the 
home country was an important origin o f inputs (a further 32% of the total). In this case, 
however, as many as 90 per cent o f the respondents said they used components produced 
by the group outside Portugal in the production process. This compares with just 54 per 
cent for textiles, clothing and footwear, and 62 per cent in the whole sample (Figure 5.23). 
T his represents a high degree of integration of these firms’ international activities.
F ig u r e  5 .2 3 : %  f ir m s  u s in g  in p u t s  F ig u r e  5 .2 4 : %  o f  n o n - f in is h e d  g o o d s  in
p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  g r o u p  o u t s id e  P o r t u g a l  t h e  s u b s id ia r y ’s  o u t p u t
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More evidence of the segmentation of the production process in these industries and its 
distribution through different countries was that 38 per cent of the output in machinery 
and equipment was made of non-finished goods (Figure 5.24). The average for the whole 
sample was 23 per cent.
There was a direct association between the percentage of local inputs and the size of the 
subsidiary (Figure 5.25). Smaller firms used far more local inputs than larger ones. This 
relates in part to their respective market orientation (bigger firms were more export 
oriented) but also to the difficulties smaller firms face in acquiring inputs worldwide. 
Economies of scale in transportation is one reason. Another is that smaller subsidiaries are 
more likely to be part of groups less geographically diversified.
F ig u re  5 .2 5 : O r ig in  o f  in p u ts  by F ig u re  5 .2 6 : O r ig in  o f  in p u ts , by
FIRM’S SIZE YEAR INVESTMENT
201 - 500
Less expected was that the percentage of inputs acquired locally by older firms was much 
below average (Figure 5.26). This was difficult to understand. The distribution of older 
firms in terms of industry or country of origin, for example, were not a sufficient 
explanation. However, these older subsidiaries may be associated with the more mature 
MNEs, which can be expected to have well established global purchasing networks.
5 .8 .  C o n c l u s i o n
The results presented in this chapter suggest a number of interesting conclusions regarding 
foreign direct investment in Portugal. With the support of factor analysis, labour costs and 
skills, economic and political stability, and the characteristics of the local market were 
identified as the main locational determinants. The competitive conditions in the home 
country and the internalisation of downstream activities were other important reasons 
associated with FDI in Portugal.
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Differences across industries were, nevertheless, substantial. In particular, there was a 
strong cleavage between the most export oriented industries (textiles, clothing and 
footwear, and machinery and equipment) and the rest of the sample. In the case of the 
former, labour conditions and political and economic stability were even more important 
than in the overall sample. The EU market, largely irrelevant in the rest of the sample, also 
assumed an important role. Access to the local market, on the other hand, was secondary 
(but not irrelevant). Clearly, whilst market seeking was the dominant motivation to invest in 
Portugal in the other industries, for textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and 
equipment, the main reason was costs reduction. The data suggested that labour costs in 
particular was the variable foreign firms sought to minimise. Labour skills were also 
important, but apparently only complementary to the location decision. Interesting was the 
fact that public incentives were strongly associated with these two variables. In other 
words, firms that considered public incentives to have been important in their investment 
decision tended to be those attracted by the country’s labour conditions.
Unfortunately, the data did not permit an investigation of whether there was any positive 
evolution of the value added of this type of investment over time. There was, nevertheless, 
evidence that Portugal’s position as a location of FDI is eroding. The importance of the 
determinants associated with efficiency seeking investment decreased steadily in the 1990s. 
In the same period, Portugal registered a sharp decline in terms of inward FDI (sec 
previous chapter). It seems that the country is losing its attractiveness as an export 
platform but has so far been unable to attract alternative projects.
In the case of textiles, clothing and footwear there was strong evidence that Portuguese 
subsidiaries were no more than assembly platforms. Three quarters were not responsible 
for the distribution and sales of their products, 58 per cent did not control the acquisition 
of inputs, and in 46 per cent of the cases even the storage of the production was not done 
in Portugal. In this respect, machinery and equipment manufacturers seemed to be more 
integrated, and did not differ much from the rest of the sample. As for conception and 
design, it was present at only 19 per cent of the subsidiaries in textiles, clothing and 
footwear, but the corresponding figure for the whole sample was no more than 30 per 
cent. This rather small presence o f the first stages of the value chain in Portugal point more 
to the country’s limited R&D capacity than to the strategic options of foreign firms.
The country of origin of the investing firm was much less relevant than the industry to the 
determinants of FDI. Geographic and cultural proximity was, as expected, the only
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The country of origin of the investing firm was much less relevant than the industry to the 
determinants of FDI. Geographic and cultural proximity was, as expected, the only 
determinant clearly country-related. The surprise was probably that proximity seemed to 
induce market seeking investment, rather than efficiency seeking FDI. However, the 
explanation may lay simply on the fact that the countries more engaged in the latter, 
notably Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries, are all relatively ‘distant’ from 
Portugal.
Eastern Europe and Spain were, according to the participants in the study, the locations 
more likely to compete for foreign investments with Portugal. The two seemed to compete 
for different projects, but the evidence was not clear in terms of the expected differences 
despite hints that Spain was more commonly a competing location when market access was 
the main motivation, whilst Eastern Europe was more often considered in the case of 
efficiency seeking FDI. The fact that the investigation did not cover firms that did not 
invest in Portugal restricted the analysis.
As for the problems faced by foreign firms in Portugal, they were essentially associated 
with market orientation. Firms in the industries identified as export oriented were 
concerned especially with labour and infrastructure and with export competitiveness. The 
characteristics of the local market were the main problem for the other industries. Quite 
revealing was that the legal system (including bureaucracy) was, overall, the major obstacle 
to doing business in Portugal. It was ranked in the whole sample much above any other 
individual problem considered by the surveyed firms. This result was particularly ironic 
since the Portuguese authorities publicise the country as “a flexible economy with little 
bureaucracy and low taxes” (ICKP, 2000).
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A ppendix  5A.
Q u e s t io n n a ir e
F A C U L D A D E  DE E C O N O M IA
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO
L e e d s  U n iv e r s it y  
B u s in e s s  S c h o o l
Fo r eig n  D ir ec t  In vestm en t  
in Po rtug al
Responses to this questionnaire 
are absolutely confidential.
Thank you for your cooperation in this study!
Contact:
Francisco Barros Castro
Faculdade de Economia do Porto
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
4200 Porto
Tel: 02 5571100
Fax: 02 5505050
email: fcastro@fep.up.pt
Leeds and Porto, June 1998
This postal survey is part of a Doctoral project in International Business
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A b o u t  t h e  p e r s o n  c o m p l e t i n g  t h i s  f o r m
Name Position in the firm
Telephone Fax E-mail
W ould you like to receive a summary o f this study’s conclusions? Yes |__| No |_|
P a r t  I - In f o r m a t io n  o n  t h e  F ir m
1. N a m e __________________________________________  2 . Y e a r  o f  a c q u isit io n /in c o r p o r a t io n
Nationality
5 . C a p it a l  s t r u c t u r e At acquisition or
Foreign Investors Now set-up date
Parent firm (directly or indirectly) | | | | % 1111%
Other l - l - l - l  % l - l - l - l  %
Private Sector Portuguese Investors 1111% l - l - l - l  %
Public Sector Portuguese Investors l - l - l - l  % l - l - l - l  %
6 . L a b o u r  F o r c e Now 31 .Dez. 19 9 2 <a)
•  With the affiliate, in Portugal |__ |_|—1—1—1—1
•  With the Group, worldwide I I  1 1 1 <a) O r
3. M a in  a c t i v i t y ___________________________________________________________  CAE |__ |__ |__ |_
4. P a r e n t  c o m p a n y  (or main foreign investor):
N am e__________________________________________________  N ationality_____________________
Is the parent company the immediate investor or does it use an affiliate?
Immediate investor Uses affiliate => Name o f  affiliate
7 . L o c a l is a t io n  o i ; m a in  s it e s  d ir e c t l y  o r  in d ir e c t l y  o w n e d  in P o r t u g a l
Town
Type of 
Operation faj
Year of 
creation
Labour
force
Name i)T immediate investor 
(if not the firm itself but an affiliate)
[a| Mainly commercial; Mainly production activity; Both commercial and industrial activities; Services (except commercial activity); Holding, etc...
8 . T u r n o v e r  in  1 9 9 7
(a) W hat was the affiliate’ s turnover in 1997? |__ |__ |__ |.|__ |__ |__ | million PTE
(b) What percentage o f the turnover in Portugal corresponded to: 1997 5 years ago<a)
1. Production that took place in Portugal? % %
2. Exports to other Group firms? % %
3. Exports to unrelated companies? % %
(c) What percentage o f the 1997 turnover was spent in research and development:
-  by the affiliate, in Portugal? |__ |__ |__ | % -  by the Group, worldwide? |__ |__ |__ | %
(d) What was the contribution o f the Portuguese affiliate to the Group’s turnover in 1997:
-  In Europe |__ |__ |__ | % -  W orldwide |__ |__ |__ | %
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9 . M a r k e t  O rien tatio n
How important are/were for the firm each o f the following markets:
Now 5 years ago
1. Portugal l - l - l - l  % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
2. Spain 1 1 1 1 % l - l - l - l  %
3. Home country o f parent firm (if not Spain) 1 1 1 1 % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
4. Other European Union markets l - l - l - l  % l - l - l - l  %
5. Other European markets l - l - l - l  % l - l - l - l  %
6 . Other l - l - l - l  % 1__1__1__1 %
1 0  0  % 1 0  0  %
10. P e r f o r m a n c e  in P o r t u g a l
Does the parent company expect from the Portuguese operations a rate o f return different from that
o f the Group worldwide? Expects higher 
Profitability
Expects same 
profitability □
Expects lower 
profitability □
11. D o e s th e  P o r t u g u e se  f ir m  h a v e  it se l f  in v e st m e n t s in o t h e r  c o u n t r ie s
No Yes
-  in the European Union? □  □  => W here?___________________
-  outside the European Union? □  □  => W h ere?___________________
12. F u tu r e  Im p o r t a n c e  o f O pe r a tio n s in P o r t u g a l
What are your expectations for the contribution o f the Portuguese affiliate to the Group’s worldwide 
turnover in 5 years time as compared to today?
Much lower Lower About the same Higher Much higher
13. E v o lu t i o n  o f  t h e  G r o u p ’s O p e r a t io n s  in  P o r t u g a l  
When did the Group your firm belongs to started 
the following operations in Portugal: Year
1. Regular exports to Portugal
2. Establishment o f local office without juridical autonomy
3. Creation/Acquisition o f sales affiliate
4. Creation/Acquisition o f industrial affiliate
5. Regular exports from  Portugal
6 . Licensing, franchising, management contracts
7. Other
14. P a r e n t  f ir m ’s  in v e st m e n t s  w o r l d w id e
In which countries does the Group directly or indirectly own industrial units, apart from Portugal?
5. Hungary / Poland / Czech Rep.
6 . Other Eastern European countries
7. Other European countries
8 . Other
1. Spain
2. Ireland
3. Italy/Greece
4. Other European Union countries
15. M a in  C o m pe t it o r s  in th e  W o r ld  M a r k e  ts
What is the relevance o f the following as competitors o f the parent firm in the world markets:
[ 1 - ir re le va n t . . .  5 - very im portant]
1. Portuguese firms
2 . Other home country firms operating in Portugal 5
3. Other foreign firms operating in Portugal _
4. Other firms from the home country ■*)
5. Other European Union firms 5
6 . Firms from other European countries 1
7. Firms from North America or Japan 1
8 . Other 4
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P a r t  II - T h e  In v e s t m e n t  D e c is io n
1. R e a s o n s  t o  I n v e s t  in  P o r t u g a l
W hat was the influence o f each o f the following elements in the decision to invest in Portugal? 
[ 1 - irre levant... 5 very important]
1. Size o f the Portuguese market
2 . Expected growth o f the Portuguese market
3. To increase the Group’s turnover 4 s
4. To establish/acquire your own distribution network
5. Follow up o f customers in their entry into the Portuguese market
6 . Reaction to competitors’ move
7. Increased competition in the home market s
8 . Need to reduce dependency from sales agents
9. Need to reduce dependency from suppliers
10. Reaction to the inefficiency o f sales agents
11 . Reaction to the inefficiency o f suppliers
12. Need to reduce risk through market diversification
13. Reduction o f labour costs
14. Quality o f labour force
15. Transportation costs
16. Access to natural resources s
17. Need to avoid ta riff or non-tariff barriers
18. Quality o f local infrastructure
19. Quality/density o f the Portuguese cluster relevant to the firm
20. Acquisition o f technology / catch up with technological developments ' 5
2 1 . Search for complementarity with local partners o
2 2 . Acquisition o f international experience 5
23. Good opportunity to buy local firm 2
24. Invitation/suggestion o f Portuguese individual or firm 4 ;
25. Easier access to the European Union market
26. Reaction to the new conditions set by the European Single Market 5
27. Public incentives to foreign investment in Portugal ■j s
28. Cultural proximity between Portugal and the home country
29. Geographic proximity between Portugal and the home country
30. Economic stability in Portugal -
31. Political stability in Portugal ■) 4 S
32. International image o f Portugal
33. Other 5
•  Which o f the previous elements would you single out as the most important?
2 . D id  t h e  f ir m  c o n s id e r  a l t e r n a t iv e  l o c a  tio n s b e f o r e  in v e s t in g  in P o r t u g a l ?
No Yes 1. Spain
2. Ireland
3. Greece
4. Other European Union countries
5. Eastern European countries
6 . Other
11 - not considered', 2 - considered: 3- strong alternative|
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3 . T y p e  o f In v e st m e n t
W hat was the strategy chosen to invest in Portugal?
1. Total or partial acquisition o f existing Portuguese owned firm
2. Total or partial acquisition o f existing foreign owned firm
3. Greenfield development
4 . Other
4. If INVESTMENT BY ACQUISITION OF EXISTING FIRM
Did any pre-acquisition relationship exist with the acquired company?
No Yes 1. Agent o f parent firm
2. Customer o f parent firm
3. Supplier o f parent firm
4. Competitor o f  parent firm
5. Licensee o f  parent firm
6 . Other
5. IF JOINT-VENTURE INVESTMENT
(a) W hat was the home country o f the partners in the investment?
1. Portugal
2. Spain
3. Home country o f parent firm ( if  not Spain)
4. Other European Union countries
5. Other
(b) Did any pre-acquisition relationship exist with the partners in the joint-venture?
No Yes 1. Agent o f parent firm
2. Customer o f parent firm
3. Supplier to parent firm
4. Competitor o f parent firm
5. Licensee o f parent firm
6 . Common investments in other countries
7. Other
6 . P u b l ic  In c e n tiv e s to  In v e st m e n t
Did the firm receive any public incentives to invest in Portugal?
W ould the firm had invested in Portugal i f  public incentives 
had not been granted?
No Yes
1. No
2. Yes, but the investment would have been lower
3. The investment would have been the same
7 . A ff il ia t e ’ s A u t o n o m y
W hat is the level o f autonomy o f the affiliate in the following areas:
[1 - a ll decisions made by the paren t firm  ... 5 - a ll the decisions made in Portugal by the affiliate]
1. Quantities produced
2 . Product mix 2
3. Price 2
4. Purchasing policy 2
5. Marketing strategy '■)
6 . Human resources management 2 3 4
7. Training
8 . Financing
9. Research and Development 7>
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8 . P r o b l e m s  a f f e c t in g  t h e  r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  o p e r a t io n s  in  P o r t u g a l :
What might has been the relevance o f the following elements as problems affecting the recent 
development o f the firm’s operations in Portugal [ 1 - irre levant... 5 - very important]?
1. Size o f the firm
2 . Insufficiency o f the firm ’s financial resources 5
3. Insufficiency o f the firm ’s human resources 2
4. Difficulty to adapt/enlarge products’ range 2
5. Problems o f co-ordination and management control
6 . Problems to establish a distribution network in Portugal -■>
7. Problems to identify local partner 2
8 . Limited knowledge o f the Portuguese market -> 4
9. Small size o f the Portuguese market
10 . Stagnant demand in the Portuguese market
11. Strong competition in the Portuguese market 4. 5
12. Limited capacity o f the sales agents’ _ 4 s
13. Divergent strategies/opportunistic behaviour o f business partners
14. Cultural differences between Portugal and the home country 5
15. Underdevelopment o f related and support industries in Portugal
16. Availability and quality o f infrastructure
17. Availability o f skilled workers in Portugal
*> 5
18. Labour costs 4
19. Attitude o f Portuguese workers s
2 0 . Stagnant demand in the export markets s
2 1 . Strong competition in the export markets 4 s
22. Evolution o f  exchange rates 2 5
23. Lack o f information on business opportunities in Portugal 4 5
24. Lack o f information on investment conditions in Portugal _
25. Level o f development o f the Portuguese banking industry _ 3 5
26. Insufficient public incentives to foreign investors in Portugal 1 5
27. Reduction o f external tariffs by the European Union
28. Changes imposed by the European Single Market 2 5
29. Recent political and economic changes in Eastern Europe 2
30. Political and social situation in Portugal 2
31. Economic situation in Portugal 3 ■s
32. Tax regime in Portugal 2
33. Legal system in Portugal (including bureaucracy) s
34. International image o f Portugal
35. Other
•  Which o f the previous elements would you single out as the most important?
Note: If the company is purely commercial, or if it subcontracts all its production, 
please go straight to page 7, question 17._________________
9 . W a s  P o r t u g a l  t o e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  o f  t h e  p a r e n t  f i r m  e x c l u s i v e l y  
n o n c o m m e r c i a l ?  Yes No_______=> Which country was i t ? ___________________________
10 . P r o d u c t io n  in P o r t u g a l
(a) W hat are the main products/services produced by the affiliate in Portugal?
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(b) When production started in Portugal, were the products/services produced already the same?
What products/services were produced then?__________________Yes No
(c) About the production in Portugal: Yes No
1. The production represents an expansion on the Group’s range o f products/services?
2. The affiliate uses components produced by the Group in the home country?
3. The affiliate uses components produced by the Group in other countries?
(d )  W h a t p e rc e n ta g e  o f  the p ro ductio n  in P o rtu g a l is  the fo llo w in g :
-  C om ponen ts/  U n fin ish ed  goo ds |__ |__ |__ | %
-  F in a l g o o d s |__ |__ |__ | %
-  S e rv ic e s  |__ |__ |__ | %
11. O pe r a tio n s  Dev e lo ped  in P o r t u g a l  b y  th e  A ffilia te
Y e s  N o Y e s  No
1. Conception and design
2. Purchasing
3. Production
4. Storage
5. Distribution and sales
6 . A fter sales services
12. D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  G o o d s / s e r v ic e s  P r o d u c e d  in  P o r  t u g a l
(a) W hat percentage o f the products currently produced were developed in Portugal? |__ |__ |__ | %
(b) For the development o f products/services in Portugal, does the firm maintain some form o f 
cooperation with any o f the following:
[1 - no cooperation; 2 -  some cooperation; 3 - very important cooperation]
1. Customers 1
2 . Suppliers L
3. Competitors
4. State’ s research laboratories or Universities . *>'i
5. Other 9
1 3 . Im p a c t  u p o n  the P o r t u g u e s e  in d u s  t r ia l  s t r u c t u r e
How do you rate the impact o f  your firm upon the following elements
[ 1 - irrelevant... 5 - very important]:
1. Attraction o f new investments
2 . Technological spillover and development 2 5
3. Spillover o f new management techniques 2 5
4. Improvement o f labour qualifications -•)
5. Modernisation o f existing firms 2 5
6 . Creation o f new firms by form er employees 2
7. Development o f cooperative networks
14. I n p u t s
What is the percentage o f inputs (excluding labour) originating in: Now 5 years ago
1. Portugal 1— 1— 1— 1 % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
2. Spain 1— 1— 1— 1 % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
3. Parent firm ’s home country (if not Spain) 1— 1— 1— 1 % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
4. Other European Union countries |__|__ |__| % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
5. Other European countries l - l - l - l  % 1— 1— 1— 1 %
6 . Other I - I — 1— 1 % l - l - l - l  %
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15 . T e c h n o l o g y
How would you compare the technology used in Portugal by the affiliate with that used by the parent 
firm in the home country?
Identical More labour intensive More capital intensive
16 . S u b c o n t r a c t in g
Does the affiliate subcontract part or all the production to local producers?
W hat percentage? |__|__ |__ | %No Yes
Note: If the company does not sell its products in the Portuguese market, 
_________________ please go straight to question 19._________________
1 7 . P r e s e n c e  in  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  M a r k e t
What is the importance o f the following factors for the current position o f the affiliate in the
Portuguese market [1 - irrelevant ... 5 - very important]'.
1. Price 5
2 . Quality z 3
3. Range o f products/services offered z
4. Product/service innovation ■> 5
5. Distribution network s
6 . Technical support/after sales services
7. Marketing
8 . International image o f products/services 2 5
9. Ability to honour delivery deadlines 3 5
10. Fast reaction to new orders
11. Technological capacity ■s
18. Im p a c t  u p o n  t h e  P o r  t u g u e se  M a r k e t
What was the impact o f your firm ’s presence in the Portuguese market upon the following elements
[ 1 - irre le va n t... 5 - very important]:
1. Demand for the products/services the firm sells 5
2 . Price o f  the products/services in the market 'y
3. Quality o f competitors’ products/services 3
4. Range o f products/services available in the market s
5. Consumers demand fo r quality o f the products/services s
6 . Demand o f products/services related with those sold by the firm
19 . E v a l u a t io n
Regarding the parent firm’s expectations for the investment in Portugal, how do you evaluate the 
experience [ 1 - much worse than expected  ... 5 - much better than expected.]!
1. Overall evaluation 2 5
2 . T urnover
3. Profitability 5
4. Creation o f new business opportunities
5. International experience
2 0 . F in a l  C o m m e n t s
Are there any further comments that you think might be useful to help understanding or to 
complement the information in this questionnaire? ______________________________________________
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A ppendix  5B.
The d e te rm in a n ts  o f  FDI 
M o d e l 1 (a ll  v a r ia b l e s  i n c l u d e d )
T a b l e  5 .B 1: C o m m u n a l it ie s
Variables Initial Extraction Variables Initial Extraction
Market size 1.000 .644 Avoid barriers 1.000 .620
Market growth 1.000 .744 Local infrastructure 1.000 .635
Increase turnover 1.000 .645 Local cluster 1.000 .642
Establish network 1.000 .659 Acguiring technology 1.000 .628
Follow customers 1.000 .645 Complementarity locals 1.000 .715
Reaction to competitors 1.000 .649 International experience 1.000 .595
Competition at home 1.000 .676 Local firm on sale 1.000 .573
Reduce depend, agents 1.000 .777 Invitation 1.000 .687
Reduce depend, suppliers 1.000 .722 EU market 1.000 .727
Inefficiency agents 1.000 .718 European Sinqle Market 1.000 .667
Inefficiency suppliers 1.000 .687 Public incentives 1.000 .657
Market diversification 1.000 .631 Cultural proximity 1.000 .694
Reduction labour costs 1.000 .769 Geographic proximity 1.000 .801
Quality of labour 1.000 .781 Economic stability 1.000 .866
Transportation costs 1.000 .461 Political stability 1.000 .881
Access natural resources 1.000 .624 International image 1.000 .734
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
T a b l e  5 .B 2 : T o t a l  v a r ia n c e  e x p l a in e d
Compo
Nent
Initial Eigenvalues Extract. Sums Squar. Loadings Rotat. Sums Squar. Loadings
Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive %
1 6.288 19.650 19.650 6.288 19.650 19.650 3.043 9.511 9.511
2 3.741 11.690 31.339 3.741 11.690 31.339 2.942 9.194 18.705
3 2.719 8.496 39.835 2.719 8.496 39.835 2.564 8.012 26.717
4 1.716 5.363 45.198 1.716 5.363 45.198 2.349 7.342 34.059
5 1.613 5.040 50.237 1.613 5.040 50.237 2.097 6.553 40.612
6 1.530 4.783 55.020 1.530 4.783 55.020 1.951 6.096 46.708
7 1.273 3.977 58.998 1.273 3.977 58.998 1.862 5.819 52.527
8 1.079 3.373 62.371 1.079 3.373 62.371 1.797 5.616 58.143
9 1.049 3.277 65.648 1.049 3.277 65.648 1.700 5.312 63.455
10 .945 2.954 68.602 .945 2.954 68.602 1.647 5.148 68.602
11 .895 2.797 71.399
12 .844 2.638 74.037
13 .725 2.266 76.303
14 .707 2.211 78.514
15 .673 2.102 80.616
16 .602 1.883 82.499
17 .573 1.790 84.289
18 .548 1.714 86.003
19 .511 1.597 87.600
20 .485 1.516 89.116
21 .462 1.444 90.560
22 .435 1.359 91.919
23 .399 1.247 93.166
24 .324 1.011 94.177
25 .314 .980 95.158
26 .304 .949 96.107
27 .274 .856 96.963
28 .258 .805 97.768
29 .239 .747 98.514
30 .204 .636 99.151
31 .186 .583 99.733
32 .009 .267 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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T a b l e  5 .B 3: F a c t o r s ’ l o a d in g s , r o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t  m a t r ix
Com ponent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Political stability .906 -.039 .013 .067 .069 .095 .045 .082 .171 .055
Economic stability .878 -.035 .000 .113 .078 .126 .163 .078 .156 .038
International image .774 .123 .096 .050 .067 .161 .236 -.077 -.029 .125
Acquiring technology .068 .696 .066 .143 .004 .113 -.005 .103 .058 .295
Access natural resources -.136 .692 .019 -.108 .097 -.025 .251 .137 .098 -.111
Inefficiency suppliers .013 .675 .247 -.005 .099 .084 -.054 .153 .355 -.023
Local cluster .359 .586 .043 .193 .172 -.114 -.096 .099 -.254 .072
Reduce depend, suppliers -.121 .579 .286 -.040 .088 .222 -.090 .014 .446 .152
Local infrastructure .481 .507 -.061 .032 .203 .133 -.034 .056 -.148 .236
Transportation costs .262 .372 -.159 .167 .241 .289 .178 .093 -.096 -.097
Reduce depend, agents .022 .177 .837 .031 .073 -.116 -.041 -.045 .078 .123
Inefficiency agents .023 .175 .807 .012 .045 -.103 .041 .108 .034 .092
Establish network .007 -.018 .608 .455 -.024 -.123 .209 -.086 .125 .009
Follow customers .053 -.174 .596 .466 -.068 .003 -.065 .079 .146 -.059
Market growth .136 .059 .156 .818 .022 -.136 .067 .067 .020 .012
Market size .084 .097 .196 .723 .073 -.217 -.056 .074 .005 .075
Increase turnover .017 .038 -.201 .595 -.053 .024 .283 -.026 .182 .363
EU market .019 .076 -.020 .047 .820 .173 .020 .000 .107 .067
ESM .219 .152 .148 .020 .673 .153 .263 .108 -.075 .107
Avoid barriers .104 .191 -.005 -.042 .628 -.001 -.139 .209 .337 -.001
Reduction labour costs .106 .104 -.207 -.267 .024 .773 -.029 -.113 -.007 .143
Quality of labour .324 .209 -.113 -.087 .179 .749 .024 -.026 .037 .123
Public incentives .104 -.093 -.015 -.162 .311 .592 .161 .327 -.091 -.148
Geographic proximity .187 .051 .103 .050 -.013 .009 .861 -.004 -.015 .088
Cultural proximity .162 .013 -.052 .091 .120 .070 .761 .142 .183 .071
Invitation .098 .042 .058 .064 .336 -.046 -.001 .737 .091 -.045
Local firm on sale .006 .213 -.068 -.032 -.124 -.019 .106 .650 -.110 .244
Complementarity locals -.012 .331 .132 .226 .128 .143 .067 .631 .303 -.064
Market diversification .255 .097 .156 .188 .052 -.067 .113 -.061 .685 .066
International experience .045 .098 .083 .027 .268 -.043 .152 .232 .596 .264
Competition at home .117 .103 .039 .003 .148 .022 .181 -.060 .125 .759
Reaction to competitors .132 .069 .219 .214 -.017 .112 -.043 .209 .085 .684
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 14 iterations.
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A ppendix  5C.
The d e te rm in a n ts  o f  FDI
M o d e l  2 (EXCLUDING TRANSPORTATION COSTS)
F ig u r e  5 .C 1 : S c r e e  p l o t
Component Number
T a b l e  5 .C 1 : T o t a l  v a r ia n c e  e x p l a in e d
Compo
nent
Initial Eigenvalues Extract. Sums Squar. Loadings Rotat. Sums Squar. Loadings
Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive %
1 6.111 19.713 19.713 6.111 19.713 19.713 2.990 9.646 9.646
2 3.649 11.772 31.486 3.649 11.772 31.486 2.898 9.348 18.994
3 2.718 8.769 40.255 2.718 8.769 40.255 2.552 8.232 27.226
4 1.716 5.535 45.790 1.716 5.535 45.790 2.298 7.414 34.640
5 1.605 5.178 50.969 1.605 5.178 50.969 2.044 6.594 41.234
6 1.507 4.861 55.830 1.507 4.861 55.830 1.899 6.126 47.360
7 1.264 4.077 59.907 1.264 4.077 59.907 1.842 5.942 53.302
8 1.067 3.442 63.349 1.067 3.442 63.349 1.799 5.805 59.107
9 1.047 3.377 66.726 1.047 3.377 66.726 1.656 5.342 64.448
10 .941 3.035 69.761 .941 3.035 69.761 1.647 5.313 69.761
11 .873 2.818 72.579
12 .736 2.374 74.953
13 .725 2.338 77.292
14 .689 2.224 79.516
15 .625 2.016 81.531
16 .591 1.907 83.438
17 .555 1.789 85.228
18 .538 1.737 86.965
19 .510 1.646 88.610
20 .472 1.523 90.133
21 .435 1.403 91.536
22 .400 1.291 92.827
23 .337 1.088 93.915
24 .321 1.037 94.952
25 .304 .980 95.932
26 .276 .892 96.824
27 .268 .865 97.689
28 .239 .772 98.460
29 .204 .658 99.119
30 .187 .603 99.722
31 .009 .278 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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T a b le  5 .C 2 : K M O  an d  B a r t l e t t ’s T e s t
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .770
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square
df
Sig.
2319.916
465
.000
T a b le  5 .C 3 : F a c t o r s ’ lo a d in g s , r o t a t e d  co m p o n e n t m a tr ix
Com ponent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Political stability .906 -.036 .012 .075 .069 .099 .043 .082 .165 .048
Economic stability .879 -.043 .004 .108 .075 .120 .158 .081 .160 .044
International image .782 .108 .097 .033 .069 .140 .230 -.067 -.031 .138
Acquiring technology .071 .712 .048 .167 .011 .128 .012 .097 .025 .265
Inefficiency suppliers .016 .701 .230 .018 .103 .099 -.041 .149 .324 -.051
Access natural resources -.116 .669 .017 -.152 .097 -.074 .242 .160 .094 -.073
Reduce depend, suppliers -.116 .616 .271 -.024 .095 .236 -.078 .009 .414 .127
Local cluster .357 .591 .019 .237 .182 -.091 -.074 .092 -.286 .028
Local infrastructure .483 .511 -.079 .064 .211 .151 -.021 .054 -.176 .201
Reduce depend, agents .026 .189 .840 .017 .074 -.118 -.050 -.041 .067 .127
Inefficiency agents .021 .191 .806 .016 .045 -.087 .038 .107 .021 .078
Establish network .017 -.025 .618 .409 -.024 -.161 .203 -.074 .138 .051
Follow customers .049 -.160 .600 .465 -.071 .006 -.059 .074 .153 -.056
Market growth .128 .056 .155 .830 .018 -.129 .085 .060 .030 .011
Market size .071 .102 .193 .752 .068 -.190 -.038 .064 .008 .056
Increase turnover .028 .028 -.193 .554 -.051 -.015 .284 -.016 .193 .404
EU market .023 .074 -.023 .045 .822 .166 .022 .007 .109 .066
ESM .220 .163 .132 .047 .682 .170 .277 .105 -.092 .073
Avoid barriers .110 .185 .001 -.060 .622 -.014 -.151 .223 .340 .015
Reduction labour costs .107 .116 -.220 -.244 .027 .788 -.016 -.120 -.017 .117
Quality of labour .330 .201 -.118 -.092 .176 .738 .029 -.022 .039 .126
Public incentives .102 -.087 -.029 -.136 .312 .606 .176 .321 -.093 -.175
Geographic proximity .188 .043 .105 .041 -.014 .005 .862 -.004 -.011 .090
Cultural proximity .159 .022 -.057 .105 .120 .086 .771 .135 .181 .052
Invitation .100 .029 .065 .050 .326 -.055 -.011 .748 .098 -.029
Local firm on sale .007 .218 -.074 -.024 -.119 -.016 .109 .647 -.131 .232
Complementarity locals -.009 .330 .131 .218 .119 .135 .070 .635 .304 -.055
Market diversification .263 .116 .162 .165 .052 -.082 .106 -.056 .681 .085
International experience .039 .135 .083 .049 .266 -.009 .154 .223 .579 .237
Competition at home .122 .105 .052 -.023 .147 .020 .163 -.051 .119 .773
Reaction to competitors .139 .073 .230 .186 -.017 .101 -.056 .217 .079 .703
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 13 iterations.
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A ppen d ix  5D.
T he  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  F D I, M o d e l  3
(EXCLUDING TRANSPORTATION COSTS, INCREASE CROUP TURNOVER AND PUBLIC INCENTIVES)
F ig u r e  5 .D1: S c r e e  p l o t
Component Number
T a b l e  5 .D 1 : T o t a l  v a r ia n c e  e x p l a in e d
Initial Eigenvalues Extract. Sums Squar. Loadings Rotat. Sums Squar. Loadings
Compo
Nent Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive %
1 5.877 20.265 20.265 5.877 20.265 20.265 2.972 10.249 10.249
2 3.470 11.964 32.230 3.470 11.964 32.230 2.798 9.647 19.896
3 2.611 9.005 41.234 2.611 9.005 41.234 2.645 9.122 29.018
4 1.693 5.836 47.071 1.693 5.836 47.071 2.018 6.960 35.978
5 1.484 5.117 52.187 1.484 5.117 52.187 1.947 6.715 42.693
6 1.443 4.977 57.165 1.443 4.977 57.165 1.801 6.210 48.903
7 1.183 4.079 61.244 1.183 4.079 61.244 1.694 5.841 54.744
8 1.039 3.584 64.828 1.039 3.584 64.828 1.669 5.754 60.498
9 1.028 3.544 68.373 1.028 3.544 68.373 1.657 5.715 66.213
10 .873 3.011 71.384 .873 3.011 71.384 1.499 5.170 71.384
11 .802 2.766 74.150
12 .745 2.569 76.718
13 .698 2.406 79.124
14 .645 2.225 81.349
15 .593 2.044 83.393
16 .564 1.946 85.339
17 .528 1.822 87.161
18 .484 1.670 88.830
19 .466 1.607 90.438
20 .428 1.475 91.913
21 .385 1.327 93.240
22 .329 1.134 94.374
23 .321 1.106 95.481
24 .295 1.017 96.498
25 .279 .963 97.461
26 .252 .870 98.331
27 .204 .704 99.035
28 .193 .666 99.700
29 .009 .300 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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T a b le  5.D2: KMO an d  B a r t l e t t ’s t e s t
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .766
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square
Df
Sig.
2191.120
406
.000
T a b le  5.D3: F a c t o r s ’ lo a d in g s , r o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t m a tr ix
Com ponent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Political stability .904 -.014 .001 .084 .071 .052 .160 .083 .075 .044
Economic stability .885 -.015 -.007 .103 .079 .163 .159 .080 .065 .043
International image .791 .119 .127 -.014 .073 .203 -.063 .153 -.040 .128
Acquiring technology .050 .722 .036 .159 .013 .071 .081 .132 .086 .227
Access natural resources -.117 .662 .052 -.204 .099 .225 .128 -.091 .155 -.085
Inefficiency suppliers -.003 .652 .261 .010 .076 -.082 .331 .200 .155 -.037
Local cluster .326 .633 .011 .252 .183 -.073 -.231 -.129 .063 .056
Local infrastructure .461 .553 -.111 .057 .196 .008 -.122 .153 .027 .175
Reduce depend, suppliers -.126 .546 .314 -.044 .080 -.094 .398 .344 .046 .116
Reduce depend, agents .015 .176 .841 .015 .078 -.073 .066 -.100 -.039 .127
Inefficiency agents -.005 .178 .779 .056 .049 .023 .039 -.055 .096 .095
Establish network .056 -.047 .698 .301 -.020 .162 .093 -.180 -.032 .035
Follow customers .058 -.180 .594 .466 -.067 -.048 .144 .000 .083 -.046
Market growth .122 .067 .166 .831 -.007 .110 .055 -.128 .042 .043
Market size .027 .099 .170 .825 .039 -.004 .055 -.143 .036 .122
EU market .043 .089 -.032 .015 .822 .061 .128 .106 -.001 .028
ESM .209 .128 .168 .041 .703 .270 -.126 .202 .166 .047
Avoid barriers .111 .178 .010 -.067 .612 -.205 .376 -.060 .192 .059
Geographic proximity .187 .042 .109 .018 -.006 .874 -.013 .002 .005 .075
Cultural proximity .168 .049 -.088 .076 .121 .786 .207 .018 .092 .037
Market diversification .282 .094 .216 .098 .031 .089 .673 -.108 -.067 .095
International experience .010 .116 .045 .104 .248 .210 .630 .028 .178 .233
Reduction labour costs .113 .064 -.235 -.229 .064 .016 -.059 .835 -.056 .073
Quality of labour .347 .170 -.128 -.108 .198 .025 .016 .727 .016 .121
Invitation .088 .011 .062 .089 .337 -.024 .122 -.044 .754 -.040
Local firm on sale .024 .200 -.030 -.073 -.111 .064 -.132 -.050 .701 .246
Complementarity locals -.010 .331 .091 .211 .139 .152 .325 .119 .588 -.132
Competition at home .091 .095 .038 .014 .110 .153 .137 .087 -.060 .818
Reaction to competitors .146 .088 .223 .162 -.024 -.054 .099 .077 .200 .694
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 14 iterations.
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A ppendix  5E.
T y p e  o f  in v e s t m e n t  fo r  
DIFFERENT CROUPS OF FIRMS
T a b l e  5 .E 1 : T y p e  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  d if f e r e n t  in d u s t r ie s
Industry
Acquisition 
Portuguese firm
Acquisition 
foreign firm
Greenfield
development Total
Food and beverages No. 10 4 9 23
% 43.5% 17.4% 39.1% 100.0%
Textile, clothing No. 6 1 20 27
and footwear % 22.2% 3.7% 74.1% 100.0%
Natural resources No. 13 5 14 32
based industries % 40.6% 15.6% 43.8% 100.0%
Chemicals and oil No. 11 5 10 26
% 42.3% 19.2% 38.5% 100.0%
Metal industries No. 11 6 17
% 64.7% 35.3% 100.0%
Machinery and No. 13 2 32 47
equipment % 27.7% 4.3% 68.1% 100.0%
Commerce No. 13 5 33 53
% 25.5% 9.8% 64.7% 100.0%
Total No. 77 22 125 224
% 34.5% 9.9% 55.6% 100.0%
T a b l e  5 .E 2 : T y p e  o f  in v e s t m e n t  b y  c o u n t r y  o f  o r ig in
Industry
Acquisition 
Portuguese firm
Acquisition 
foreign firm
Greenfield
development Total
Spain No. 7 1 9 27
% 25.9% 3.7% 70.4% 100.0%
France No. 14 4 12 30
% 46.7% 13.3% 40.0% 100.0%
Germany No. 15 6 32 53
% 28.3% 11.3% 60.4% 100.0%
UK No. 9 2 9 20
% 45.0% 10.0% 45.0% 100.0%
Other EU12 No. 9 3 13 25
% 36.0% 12.0% 52.0% 100.0%
Other Europe No. 9 3 19 31
% 29.0% 9.7% 61.3% 100.0%
Rest of the World No. 14 3 20 37
% 37.8% 8.1% 54.1% 100.0%
Total No. 77 22 124 223
% 34.5% 9.9% 55.6% 100.0%
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A ppendix  5F.
P r o b le m s  f a c e d  b y  f o r e ig n  f ir m s  in  P o r tu g a l : m o d e l  1
T a b l e  5 .F 1 : C o m m u n a l it ie s
Variables Initial Extraction Variables Initial Extraction
Firm's size 1.000 .518 Labour costs 1.000 .569
Firm’s financial restrictions 1.000 .647 Attitude Portuquese workers 1.000 .592
Firm's HR restrictions 1.000 .525 Staqnant export markets 1.000 .578
Limited product range 1.000 .360 Competition export markets 1.000 .622
Coordination/management 1.000 .478 Exchanqe rates 1.000 .377
Network problems 1.000 .675 Information business opport. 1.000 .612
Identifying local partner 1.000 .458 Information on investment 1.000 .754
Limited market knowledge 1.000 .435 Development local bankinq 1.000 .486
Small local market 1.000 .704 Insufficient public incentives 1.000 .685
Stagnant local demand 1.000 .753 Reduction external tariffs 1.000 .558
Competition local market 1.000 .636 European Sinqle Market 1.000 .479
Limited capacity of agents 1.000 .575 Chanqes Eastern Europe 1.000 .394
Divergence with partners 1.000 .317 Political and social situation 1.000 .688
Cultural differences 1.000 .391 Economic situation 1.000 .784
Related/support industries 1.000 .569 Tax reqime 1.000 .578
Infrastructure 1.000 .415 Leqal system/bureaucracy 1.000 .483
Availability skilled workers 1.000 .668 Portugal’s internat. image 1.000 .551
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
T a b l e  5 .F 2 : F a c t o r s ’ l o a d in g s , r o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t  m a t r ix
Com ponent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Problems with distribution network .761 .085 -.069 .038 -.029 .266 .106
Coordination and management .602 .125 .240 .097 .066 -.055 .162
Identification of local partner .600 .125 .076 .012 .055 .181 -.202
Limited market knowledge .569 .145 .170 -.077 .100 .211 -.037
Limited product ranqe .521 .046 .129 -.035 .064 .199 .158
Cultural differences .504 .072 .178 .258 .062 -.171 -.030
Divergence with partners .358 .154 -.133 .194 .164 .248 .146
Information on investment .195 .790 .106 .055 .146 .008 .237
Insufficient public incentives -.003 .772 -.009 .065 .216 .041 .190
Information business opportunities .311 .679 .166 .093 .063 .113 .030
Development local bankinq .309 .572 .089 .174 .037 -.147 .039
Leqal system/bureaucracy .075 .506 .273 .256 .020 .125 -.256
Availability skilled workers .061 .006 .803 .058 .024 -.036 .122
Attitude of Portuquese workers .208 .079 .693 .228 .038 -.009 .089
Firm's HR restrictions .267 .146 .597 -.022 -.025 .129 .242
Infrastructure .002 .231 .546 .114 .153 .138 -.093
Labour costs .008 .162 .531 .258 .380 -.108 .195
Related and support industries .326 -.001 .460 .046 .248 .037 -.432
Economic situation .016 .020 .128 .866 .026 .123 .027
Political and social situation .157 .120 .070 .789 .095 -.108 -.018
Portugal's international image .097 .264 .227 .624 .064 .062 .153
Tax regime -.102 .472 .174 .516 .091 .083 -.181
Competition export markets -.039 .017 .125 -.120 .766 -.033 -.049
Stagnant export markets .135 .000 .155 -.052 .700 .092 .186
Reduction external tariffs .109 .318 -.167 .280 .581 .032 -.015
European Single Market .061 .226 -.131 .344 .455 .147 .246
Exchange rates .020 .313 .109 .235 .447 .009 -.109
Changes in Eastern Europe -.019 .122 .192 .234 .435 -.119 .290
Small local market .076 .002 .197 -.038 -.048 .807 -.065
Staqnant local demand .282 -.062 .145 .019 .077 .795 -.108
Competition local market .206 .123 -.174 .088 -.023 .718 .157
Limited capacity of aqents .503 .079 -.094 .097 .175 .503 .113
Firm's financial restrictions .186 .181 .257 .025 .124 -.042 .704
Firm's size .115 .048 .278 .065 .333 .177 .528
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.
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A ppendix  5G.
P r o b le m s  f a c e d  b y  f o r e ig n  f ir m s  in  P o r t u g a l : m o d e l  2
(EXCLUDING FIRM’S HR RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITED CAPACITY OF AGENTS)
T a b l e  5 .G 1 : C o m m u n a l it ie s
Variables Initial Extraction Variables Initial Extraction
Firm's size 1.000 .537 Attitude Portuguese workers 1.000 .607
Firm's financial restrictions 1.000 .645 Stagnant export markets 1.000 .606
Limited product range 1.000 .421 Competition export markets 1.000 .660
Coordination/management 1.000 .492 Exchange rates 1.000 .366
Network problems 1.000 .636 Information business opport. 1.000 .628
Identifying local partner 1.000 .436 Information on investment 1.000 .766
Limited market knowledge 1.000 .445 Development local banking 1.000 .484
Small local market 1.000 .735 Insufficient public incentives 1.000 .685
Stagnant local demand 1.000 .759 Reduction external tariffs 1.000 .563
Competition local market 1.000 .633 European Single Market 1.000 .468
Divergence with partners 1.000 .325 Changes Eastern Europe 1.000 .391
Cultural differences 1.000 .402 Political and social situation 1.000 .680
Related/support industries 1.000 .557 Economic situation 1.000 .794
Infrastructure 1.000 .446 Tax regime 1.000 .579
Availability skilled workers 1.000 .647 Legal system/bureaucracy 1.000 .478
Labour costs 1.000 .594 Portugal’s internat. image 1.000 .550
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
T a b l e  5 .G 2 : T o t a l  v a r ia n c e  e x p l a in e d
Compo
nent
Initial Eigenvalues Extract. Sums Squar. Loadings Rotat. Sums Squar. Loadings
Total
% of 
variance
c u m u la ­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive % Total
% of 
variance
cumula­
tive %
1 6.799 21.248 21.248 6.799 21.248 21.248 3.086 9.643 9.643
2 2.968 9.276 30.524 2.968 9.276 30.524 3.000 9.376 19.018
3 2.065 6.452 36.976 2.065 6.452 36.976 2.770 8.656 27.674
4 1.945 6.078 43.053 1.945 6.078 43.053 2.668 8.336 36.011
5 1.651 5.160 48.214 1.651 5.160 48.214 2.382 7.443 43.454
6 1.343 4.198 52.412 1.343 4.198 52.412 2.332 7.289 50.742
7 1.241 3.877 56.288 1.241 3.877 56.288 1.775 5.546 56.288
8 1.176 3.675 59.964
9 1.071 3.346 63.309
10 .984 3.075 66.384
11 .968 3.024 69.408
12 .903 2.821 72.230
13 .831 2.597 74.827
14 .808 2.524 77.351
15 .713 2.227 79.577
16 .647 2.023 81.601
17 .592 1.851 83.452
18 .578 1.807 85.259
19 .537 1.677 86.936
20 .475 1.486 88.422
21 .459 1.433 89.855
22 .429 1.341 91.195
23 .406 1.268 92.464
24 .376 1.174 93.637
25 .357 1.115 94.753
26 .337 1.052 95.805
27 .298 .932 96.737
28 .268 .838 97.575
29 .227 .710 98.286
30 .208 .650 98.936
31 .179 .560 99.496
32 .161 .504 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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F ig u r e  5 .G 1 : S c r e e  P lo t
Component Number
T a b l e  5.G3: KMO a n d  B a r t l e t t ’s  T e s t
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .770
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square
Df
Sig.
2319.916
465
.000
T a b l e  5 .G 4 : F a c t o r s ’ l o a d in g s , r o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t  m a t r ix
Com ponent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Information on investment .805 .181 .061 .096 .106 .004 .247
Insufficient public incentives .780 -.008 .077 -.015 .199 .029 .175
Information business opportunities .679 .320 .092 .181 .029 .131 .074
Development local bankinq .558 .329 .188 .064 .044 -.150 .022
Legal system/bureaucracy .471 .114 .273 .278 .056 .097 -.279
Problems with distribution network .111 .733 .031 -.090 -.041 .256 .103
Coordination and manaqement .109 .632 .115 .164 .079 -.045 .180
Identification of local partner .144 .576 .006 .082 .063 .178 -.201
Limited product ranqe .017 .571 -.009 .040 .092 .224 .184
Limited market knowledqe .163 .561 -.088 .161 -.118 .237 -.002
Cultural differences .061 .521 .252 .179 .055 -.168 .003
Divergence with partners .158 .352 .209 -.177 .180 .232 .123
Economic situation .002 .030 .871 .119 .021 .128 .048
Political and social situation .111 .156 .786 .088 .079 -.105 .006
Portugal’s international imaqe .253 .115 .632 .206 .053 .050 .161
Tax regime .446 -.081 .529 .193 .110 .054 -.200
Availability skilled workers .009 .084 .053 .775 -.011 -.028 .189
Attitude of Portuguese workers .077 .235 .219 .684 -.005 .011 .175
Infrastructure .240 .012 .099 .582 .111 .164 -.007
Labour costs .188 -.003 .239 .561 .312 -.108 .280
Related and support industries -.013 .341 .037 .507 .247 .060 -.343
Competition export markets -.001 -.011 -.103 .128 .794 -.046 -.008
Stagnant export markets -.008 .158 -.038 .135 .697 .094 .259
Reduction external tariffs .339 .072 .287 -.149 .581 .023 -.012
Exchange rates .309 .022 .237 .145 .435 .014 -.058
European Single Market .264 .012 .343 -.131 .425 .138 .254
Changes in Eastern Europe .147 -.037 .223 .206 .391 -.141 .321
Small local market -.001 .094 -.026 .164 -.039 .835 -.022
Stagnant local demand -.052 .278 .023 .135 .080 .806 -.061
Competition local market .124 .208 .113 -.240 .008 .701 .117
Firm's financial restrictions .188 .208 .037 .162 .084 -.044 .728
Firm's size .078 .105 .056 .256 .268 .169 .592
Ch a p te r  6.
T he In ter n a tio n a lisa tio n  
of P ortug uese  
M a n u fa c tu r in g  F irm s
6.1. In t r o d u c t io n
The rcccnt evolution of outward FDI flows was discussed in chapter 4. The picture 
presented was one of a very recent phenomenon. Only in the 1990s, and in particular in 
the second half, Portuguese investment abroad became relevant. But growth has been 
exponential and the enthusiasm was transmitted to the Portuguese authorities which made 
the internationalisation of domestically owned firms a political objective. It is interesting 
that these transformations happened at a time when foreign firms seem to be less inclined 
to invest in Portugal (see chapter 4). The result was a peculiar behaviour of the Portuguese 
IDP (section 4.6). It emulates the pattern of evolution of the most developed countries, 
suggesting that Portugal is joining the group of latecomers in foreign investment (together 
with Austria, Spain, and others). However, the Portuguese IDP conceals a loss of 
competitiveness in terms of the country’s ability to attract foreign investment (see chapter 
5). In this context, the investigation of the internationalisation of the Portuguese firms may 
yield important information. It is important, for example, to identify whether the growth
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of outward FDI results from a new strength of national firms or it represents “escape 
investment”, a response to an hypothetical reduced attractiveness of the domestic location.
The internationalisation process of the new Portuguese MNCs may also be important for 
international business theory. Foreign investors from newly industrialised countries like 
Portugal can be expected to be in many respects distinct from those from more developed 
nations. First, they are smaller than the long established MNCs they will compete with. 
Second, they tend to possess fewer ownership advantages, which are also likely to be very 
dependent on the characteristics of the home country (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b). 
Third, as pioneers in their home countries in terms of internationalisation, they face 
explicit and implicit costs that do not affect firms from more developed nations. Following 
Dunning (1993a: p-64), it is not argued that the different characteristics, motivations and 
problems suspected to be typical of MNCs from newly industrialised small countries 
require a new paradigm or even new theories. But they certainly challenge existing theories 
in their emphasis and scope.
6.2. M e t h o d o l o g y
The first problem that faces any researcher involved in studies of internationalisation is the 
definition of the concept itself. Welch and Luostarinen (1988: p.84) proposed a broad 
definition of internationalisation as “the process of increasing involvement in international 
operations”. Given this definition, the internationalisation of an increasing number of 
Portuguese firms represents no surprise. After all, Portugal is a very open economy 
integrated within the biggest trading block in the world. However, most Portuguese firms 
do no more than exporting through agents, often with little or no knowledge at all of the 
market conditions for their products. Sales and production subsidiaries are rare (Simoes, 
1997).
The aim of this project - to study the motivations and strategies of the nascent Portuguese 
MNCs - suggests, however, a restrictive definition of internationalisation. The choice was 
to limit the analysis to companies that possessed a productive foreign subsidiary, or 
manifested a clear intention to create one in the near future. It was hoped that this solution 
would concentrate the research on those firms with a more mature internationalisation 
process, believed to be more relevant for the objectives of the study. As in the previous 
chapter, services firms were not considered because of their rather distinct characteristics 
(Buckley et al., 1992; Coviello and Munro, 1997). This may represent a limitation of the
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study. Contrary to other countries (Dunning, 1993a), the services sector was the first to 
internationalise in Portugal and accounted for 90 per cent of outward FDI flows between 
1996 and 1999 (see chapter 4). Flowever, this investment was concentrated in 
telecommunications, real estate and financial services, which were likely to provide few 
clues of the evolution of the country’s competitiveness.
For the same reasons presented in chapter 5, a survey analysis was considered the best 
methodological approach to this study of outward FDI in Portugal. In this case, however, 
the small size of the population (see next) permitted the adoption of a different technique. 
The survey was supported by semi-structured interviews and secondary data1. Despite 
being more resources intensive than a questionnaire based survey, this solution resulted in 
a better knowledge of the subjects being analysed as well as more flexibility. The latter was 
especially important due to the limited a priori knowledge o f the subjects. In other words, 
interviews are more inductive than a questionnaire based survey (Gill and Johnson, 1991), 
making them in this case more suitable for the problem being analysed.
6.2.1. Population and sample
The population was identified from a mix of official (such as ICEP, FIEP and IAPMEI2) 
and non-official sources (industry associations and business journals and newspapers). 
Only 27 manufacturing companies could be identified as having at the time 
(Spring/Summer 1998) production capacity outside Portugal or clear projects to do so in 
the near future. All were contacted by telephone and 18 accepted to participate in the 
study. In all but three cases the interviewees were members of the Board of Directors. A 
brief characterisation of the sample is provided in Table 6.1 (see over page).
Due to unavoidable time restrictions, only one interview was conducted at each firm. 
Interviews took place in September 1998 with only one exception, where the interview was 
conducted in January 1999. They were recorded on tape when permitted by the 
interviewee. All interviews were conducted by the same researcher, which guaranteed 
homogeneity of treatment between different companies, both during the interviews and in 
terms of reporting.
1 Mainly, the companies’ annual reports and assorted journal and newspaper news.
2 ICEP — Institute fo r  International Trade and Investment-, FIEP - Fund fo r  the Internationalisation o f  the Portuguese 
Economy, a venture capital fund led by the Portuguese government with involvement o f several financial 
institutions; IAPMEI - Institute fo r the Promotion o f  Small and Medium Si^e Manufacturing Companies.
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T a b l e 6 .1 : T h e s a m p l e
Destination Turnover 1998 Employees Invest
Company Industry Industrial invest. Main exports Portugal Total Portugal Total ment
Arjal Metal parts None Italy, Spain 4 4 475 475 none
Autosil Electric batteries France Spain, Germany, Italy 5 19 270 925 6.5
Cabelte/
Cabelauto
Power, telecom 
and car cables
Brazil Spain, other EU 19 19(a) 380 490 10
Cimpor Cement Spain,
Mozambique, 
Morocco, Brazil, 
Tunisia
European Union 120 186 2,400 4,800 480
Cin Paint Spain, Mozambique Angola 18 28 745 1,080 2
Colep Metal and plastic 
containers
Spain, Poland UK, France, Eastern 
Europe
12 15 720 80 (b>
Dan Cake Cookies and 
pastries
Hungary Germany, UK, The 
Netherlands
7 580 610
Efacec Electric and
electronic
equipment
Macao, China, 
Argentina, 
Malaysia, Algeria
Far-East Asia, Latin 
America, Persian Gulf, 
Southern Africa, India
30 48 2,650 <1(0
Faiart Ceramics Argentina Spain, Germany, Italy, 
USA, Scandinavia
4 5 910 1,100 2
Neoplastica Rigid plastic film Netherlands, Spain, 
Austria, Brazil
Other European 
Union, Argentina
5 6.5 100 190 4
Quintas & 
Quintas
Ropes and nets Brazil European Union, 
United States
4 5.5 614
Renova Tissue paper None Spain 16 16<d> 750 770 little
Riopele Textiles None EU, West Africa 19 19(e) 2,800 2,800 little
Simoldes Plastic parts Brazil, Argentina, 
France
Spain 12 18™ 385 870(,) 10(,>
Sodecia Metal parts, seats Brazil Spain 2.5 7
Sunviauto Seats Brazil, France European Union 5.5 5.5(9) 350 445 1<h)
Tavol Metal parts Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico
European Union 7.5 9
Vista Alegre Ceramics Brazil Germany, Spain, EU 17 17® 2,900 3,100
Note: Turnover and investment in billion PTE.
(a| Investment in Brazil only concluded in 1998.
(b| Poland: 1 billion PTE
|c| Most foreign investment did not involve financial transfers 
^  Includes 3 billion PTE o f exports to Spain.
|e) 70% are exports.
1,1 Excludes French subsidiary.
(9) Investment in Brazil only concluded in 1998.
(h) Sunviauto's share: 50%.
01 50% are exports: Production in Brazil only started in 1999.
Typically, the interviewees were invited to make a brief description of the company’s 
history and to provide basic figures on the firm. This allowed the cross checking of 
information with previously collected data, thus testing the reliability of the different 
sources. Next, the internationalisation process was discussed in more detail. The topics 
proposed were the reasons for the choices made and the alternatives considered, what 
operations existed in each host country, and how every step affected the whole 
organisation in Portugal. The interviewees were then required to assess the company’s 
competitive advantages and to describe other present or past international links of the 
company or its top managers.
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6.3. T h e  in t e r n a t io n a l is a t io n  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  m a n u f a c t u r in g  f ir m s ’
The eighteen companies analysed presented very distinct internationalisation processes. 
They covered a wide range of industries and had different motivations and choices of 
mode of entry. The regularities are stronger when it comes to the timing of the 
internationalisation process and the location of foreign production subsidiaries.
6 .3 .1. In d u strie s
Empirical evidence compiled by Dunning (1993a, pp. 28-40) suggests that, worldwide, the 
industries that are favoured by MNEs are: (i) capital-intensive processing industries, often 
producing natural-resources intensive products, but also differentiated consumer goods 
with high income elasticity; (ii) technology and human capital intensive industries; (in) 
industries that can benefit from large economies of scale. The relative importance of these 
industries will, naturally, vary across countries due to their idiosyncrasies; different natural 
and created endowments, different stages of development and different industrial 
traditions will result in distinct structures of outward FDI.
Portugal is not only a recent exporter of capital, as it is traditionally specialised in labour- 
intensive industries with little product differentiation, such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear (Castro, 1993). Henceforth, the industrial structure of outward I'DI could be 
expected to be quite different from that of more developed economies, home to most 
MNCs. However, the data collected suggested an industry distribution of Portuguese 
manufacturing outward investment not very different from that of more developed small 
countries (see Table 6.1, above). Traditional labour intensive sectors were largely absent; 
only one firm in the sample operated in these sectors, and its management admitted that 
productive direct investment remained no more than a project4. In contrast, capital 
intensive industries with significant economies of scale were dominant. The use of highly 
skilled labour seemed to be the rule, and a majority of the industries represented can be 
considered to be technology intensive.
3 An earlier version o f this section was the basis for a referred article: “Outward FDI in Manufacturing from 
Portugal: Internationalisation strategies from a new foreign investor”, presented at the 25'h Annual Conference 
o f  the European International Business Academy (Manchester, UK, December 1999). I would like to thank the 
referees and the participants in the conference for their comments and suggestions.
4 The population also included a footwear producer that invested in Cape Verde, and a clothing 
manufacturer with projects for Tunisia. Unfortunately, the management o f both firms refused to take part in 
the study.
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This characteristic of the Portuguese outward FDI is, however, only in part a surprise. 
Dunning (1981b: p.9) predicted that firms from countries in stage 3 of the IDP may 
“invest abroad in those sectors in which (...) their comparative location advantages arc 
weakest”. In Portugal, capital and technology intensive industries that required a highly 
skilled labour force may fall into this category. However, Dunning (1981b: p.9) also 
predicted that these “enterprises invest abroad in those sectors for which their comparative 
ownership advantages are strongest”. And it is not clear why firms in these sectors should 
have stronger ownership advantages than those in sectors where domestic investors have a 
longer tradition.
More than the characteristics o f the industry in terms of factor intensity or technological 
level, the internationalisation of the Portuguese firms seemed to be associated with the 
stage of maturity of the respective domestic markets. Over half the companies in the 
sample were domestic leaders in fully mature domestic markets. In itself this is evidence of 
strong ownership advantages. Even more so because in a small country the leader is likely 
to concentrate management and financial resources and to have a big market share (which 
explains why most industries were represented by only one firm).
Apparent exceptions to this were the auto-components producers, who comprised one 
third of the firms in the sample. However, auto-components is not exactly an industry, but 
an amalgamation o f industries. Electric batteries, metal parts, plastics components, power 
cables and textiles are the segments represented in this sample. Auto-components 
producers have, nevertheless, several common characteristics. In particular, they share the 
final clients - the car assemblers - so they are all constrained by similar industry and market 
characteristics. In this global industry, Portuguese companies tend to play a secondary role, 
even in the domestic market. This combination of factors seems to have contributed to the 
internationalisation of rather small firms.
6.3 .2 . L o c a tio n
The study of the location of foreign investment at the firm level has been strongly 
influenced by the works of the “Uppsala School” (e.g. fohanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). These authors suggest a path of foreign expansion 
marked by the firm’s own past experience, the size of potential markets, and, most 
importantly, the firm’s psychic distance to each potential host country (cf. chapter 2). 
Psychic distance depends on factors such as differences in language, culture, political
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systems, level of education, or level of industrial development. But in the case of 
production establishments Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975, p.29) argued that “it is 
hard to observe any correlation with psychic distance”. Cultural proximity is strongly 
associated with geographic proximity. This, normally, represents low transport costs, which 
encourage trade but discourage investment in production capacity.
The case studies presented here, however, suggested otherwise (see Table 6.2). Psychic 
distance seemed to be a very strong determinant of the location of the first foreign 
productive venture. In the sample, Brazil and Spain were the most popular destinations 
(respectively 47 and 20 per cent in terms of first choices). A revealing fact was that when 
asked why was Brazil the destination o f the first foreign investment, a frequent answer was 
that Angola or Mozambique were first considered but political instability, small domestic 
markets (despite their potential for growth), and a very unskilled workforce discouraged 
investment. This reference to the PALOP5 was also common among the other firms in the 
sample. For those that invested in Brazil, the explanation tended to be complemented with 
references to language and cultural proximity6.
T a b l e  6 .2 : L o c a t io n  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t io n  e s t a b l is h m e n t s
Company 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Autosil France France
Cabelte/Cabelauto Brazil
Cimpor Spain Mozamb. Morocco Brazil Tunisia
Cin Spain Spain Spain
Colep Spain Poland
Dan Cake Hungary
Efacec Macao China Argentina
Faiart Argentina
Neoplastica Netherlands Spain Austria Brazil
Quintas & Quintas Brazil
Simoldes Brazil France
Sodecia Brazil Brazil
Sunviauto Brazil
Tavol Brazil Argentina
Vista Alegre Brazil
Companies that expanded to Spain cited geographic and cultural proximity as the most 
important determinants. In this case, the language is not the same, but it is close enough to 
be understood by most Portuguese speakers. There are also strong similarities (stronger
5 The Portuguese acronym for Portuguese-speaking African Countries. It comprises Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea- 
Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe.
6 Neoplastica represents a notable exception. It was the only company in the sample to consider expansion 
to Brazil as “very risky, because you will be dealing with a very different culture” . Neoplastica expanded first 
to Europe, where its owners and top managers studied and lived for long period o f their lives.
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than with Brazil) in terms of political system, level of education, and level of industrial 
development. But geography seems to be unquestionably relevant. “The whole Iberian 
Peninsula is our natural market”7 was the expression used by at least 5 of the managers 
interviewed and sometimes printed in the Annual Reports.
Nevertheless, it seems that, as suggested by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975, p.29), 
geographic proximity was negatively affecting the number of Portuguese firms creating 
production establishments in Spain. Although with different levels of engagement, all 18 
firms in the sample exported to Spain. For most, Spam was the first foreign market. 
Hence, the fact that only 22 per cent of the firms in the sample established their first 
productive foreign investment in Spain seems to be an underestimate of the importance of 
the Spanish market for the Portuguese firms. The data suggest that only when economies 
of scale are strong and economic resistance to transport is high does it make economic 
sense to supply the Spanish market from Spanish plants, very much as suggested by 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975, p.29).
There is however a strategic element to be considered. It was pointed out during some of 
the interviews that the acquisition of an existing firm in Spain was not simply to acquire 
production capacity or to reduce transport costs. Often more important was that it also 
permitted the acquisition of market share and the elimination of a competitor, or the 
prevention of competitors from expanding. In the presence of increasingly integrated 
economies and growing international awareness by the Portuguese firms, these strategic 
moves can be expected to be more frequent.
One fact that must be discussed is why other European countries have such a small 
presence in the sample. The explanation may be a combination of location advantages and 
weak ownership advantages. In the European Union, which accounts for some 80 per cent 
of the country’s international trade, Portugal remains the lowest cost location. In labour- 
intensive industries, exports and sub-contracting have been growing in recent years, 
resulting in stronger comparative advantages. One of the ceramics producers interviewed 
stated that expansion in Europe (including Eastern Europe) had been considered but 
abandoned due to relative costs: “European retailers are sub-contracting their production 
in Portugal more then ever before (including to our firm). We must infer that it does not 
make economic sense for us to produce anywhere else in Europe”.
All the citations are translations from Portuguese.
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On the other hand, the economic, social and political changes registered in Portugal in 
recent years (cf. chapter 4) arc too recent to permit the full development of local firms. 
Ownership advantages are still very much dependent on locational factors. This prevents 
Portuguese firms from engaging in expansionary strategies in the more mature European 
economies. Evidence comes again from the reactions when the interviewees were asked 
about alternative locations. Europe was immediately ruled out by a substantial number of 
managers with the argument that it is impossible to compete in markets dominated by long 
established firms from the more developed European countries8.
Another interesting fact was that, despite the importance given to cultural proximity, all 
companies that expanded cither to Spain or to Brazil confessed to problems in 
understanding the local markets and business culture. “Spain is a completely different 
market”, “you do not sell in Spain the same way you sell in Portugal”, were frequent 
comments. The interviewees seemed to agree that consumer behaviour and business 
practices are in Spam quite distinct. Markets also tend to be less concentrated than in 
Portugal, with obvious implications in terms of strategic behaviour. Similar observations 
were made for Brazil (“in Brazil, everything is different”), along with references to the 
problems generated by red tape and economic structures still trying to adapt to the end of 
hyper-inflation.
I his suggests two comments, first, psychic distance may influence the location choice, but 
it is no guarantee of problem-free investments. In fact, proximity (geographic and/or 
cultural) may induce companies into overlooking the differences between host and home 
countries. The risks involved are well documented by O’Cirady and Lane (1996) for 
Canadian investment in the US. They concluded that “although cultural differences were 
perceived by the executives to be important, (...) it was the recognition of those 
differences, prior to entry, that differentiated performance” (p. 401). In our sample, the 
failure to recognise those differences explains the collapse of Cin and Renova’s first 
attempts in the Spanish markets, as the respective managers admitted themselves. 
Unfortunately, expansion to Brazil is too recent to be assessed in this respect.
A second comment concerns people’s assessment o f cultural differences. As referred 
above, it is surprising how frequently cultural proximity with the host country was 
mentioned, but at the same time there were complaints about the difficulties posed by
8 The managers interviewed tended to refer explicitly to German firms. French, British, Dutch, and Italian
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different market structures, different consumer behaviour, different business practices, 
awkward attitudes by business partners or civil servants. This can only be explained 
because, regardless of its complexity, perceived cultural proximity is very much influenced 
by one single factor - language. A strong correlation between language and culture 
proximity is unquestionable, not least because language similarity is almost always 
associated with historic ties. Moreover, being able to understand and speak the language 
makes it easier to grasp alien cultures and reduces the risk o f misunderstandings9. 
However, when the same language is spoken, or when languages are close enough to be 
mutually understandable, a sense of familiarity is generated and cultural proximity tends to 
be overstated10. The risk is an erroneous sense of “being at home”, reduced vigilance, and 
an increasing chance of cultural clash.
Among the few companies in the sample which did not start their internationalisation in 
Brazil or Spain, Efacec was probably the most interesting case. This producer of power 
generation and distribution equipment started its international expansion in the Far-East. 
Efacec’s management explained the choice as being based on market conditions. This was 
the fastest growing area in the world at a time (1989) when Latin America and Africa 
offered very risky environments. The European market, completely dominated by MNCs 
several hundred times bigger than Efacec, was not considered". However, Efacec had 
privileged contacts in the Far-East - the agents of its former (foreign) owners. 
Furthermore, Macao (which was returned to China in December 1999, after four centuries 
of Portuguese administration) was the place chosen to establish the regional headquarters 
and the first production subsidiary.
6.3.3. T im in g
It is logical to expect that older firms start internationalisation earlier. That seemed to 
happen with the four cases studied by (ohanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), even if the 
more recent firms internationalised their activities faster - younger firms can learn from the 
experience of older firms. They are also pressed to internationalise from the earlier stages 
of their existence by their internationalised (domestic or foreign) competitors. These
firms were also used as examples, but much less frequently.
’ ITiat “it is necessary to understand what is said in the shop floor” was one manager’s explanation for ruling 
out expansion to Eastern Europe. The company invested in Brazil.
10 “Brazilian people like the Portuguese”; “It is easier for a Portuguese firm to understand the Brazilian way 
o f life” were some o f the comments recorded during the interviews.
11 Efacec’s assumed strategy is to avoid any direct conflict with the world leaders.
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factors, nevertheless, should guarantee a more or less homogeneous distribution of 
international investment over time. However, firms’ internationalisation is influenced by 
the international political and economic conditions. There will be few new subsidiaries in 
periods of high protectionism (e.g. the 1930s) or economic crisis (the 1970s); the opposite 
will happen in periods of economic expansion and liberalisation (e.g. the 1960s). This 
contrast is quite clear in Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul’s (1975) sample.
The home country’s level of economic development is another variable to be considered. 
The international expansion of companies from developed countries can be expected to be 
essentially dependent on the firm’s characteristics and strategy. However, firms from less 
developed countries are more dependent on national factors. To start with, their 
ownership advantages tend to be connected to the characteristics of the home country 
(Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b). Second, less developed countries normally do not have a 
tradition of outward investment, which increases the risks and potential costs of venturing 
abroad for the forerunners.
Our sample makes the relevance of this last element very clear (see Table 6.2). Bearing in 
mind the analysis is concentrated on production establishments, a striking feature is that all 
the firms in the sample started expanding abroad in the present decade, especially the 
second half. This coincidence in time made many in the country argue that the whole 
process is simply a “fashion”. This includes two of the managers interviewed, whose firms 
were among the first to venture abroad. Although the “band wagon” effect is a recognised 
internationalisation force (Aharoni, 1966, p.9), it is a limited explanation. The Investment 
Development Path (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b) provides a more relevant justification.
The IDP suggests that, after several years as recipients of FDI, countries are likely to see 
the domestic firms developing the necessary ownership advantages to internationalise. This 
will eventually make the country a net foreign investor, first in terms of flows and later in 
terms of stocks. Portugal reached that transitional stage in the middle 1990s (chapter 4). 
That is, the wave of outward FDI was the result of economic development and the 
consequent maturity of markets, industries and firms12. What must be stressed is that the 
influence of these changes is in the case of Portugal amplified by the small size of the 
domestic markets. In these conditions, market maturity and industry consolidation tend to 
happen rather quickly. If they are to retain the growth rates of previous years, firms from
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small countries are forced to internationalise sooner than those with big domestic markets 
(Agmon and Kindleberger, 1977). In our sample, this applies to a substantial number of 
the industries represented.
The opinions of the managers interviewed support this interpretation. International 
investment was frequently explained as “natural on the face of market conditions” or “the 
obvious step following the position reached in the domestic market”. In the same line is 
the argument that international expansion was a way of making use of “managerial 
overcapacity”. The stability of operations in Portugal reduced the need for this intangible 
asset, leaving firms to find new uses for the capacity created during the years of domestic 
growth.
Another element that was particularly important in our research was the role of economic 
and political conditions in potential host countries. We saw above that Portuguese 
managers seem to have a strong preference for Portuguese-speaking countries. Together 
with the apparently weak ownership advantages of the firms studied, this largely restricts 
investment opportunities. This is even more true in the face of the economic and political 
instability that traditionally afflicts Brazil and most of the PALOP. It should be 
remembered that the 1970s flow of investment to Angola and Mozambique was not 
transferred to other locations when interrupted by these countries’ independence.
On the face of it, the coincidence between the recent growth o f outward FDI and the 
economic stabilisation of Brazil after 1996 assumes particular relevance. Almost all firms in 
the sample that chose a destination other than Brazil started their expansion before that 
year. All firms that expanded to Brazil did so after 199613. This dependency highlights the 
weakness of the Portuguese industrial structure and that of the firms in the sample as well. 
The automotive components producers are a case in point. They tend to explain their 
expansion by their clients’ decisions to invest in Brazil (see next). Nevertheless, the car 
manufacturers have long been expanding to other markets. It seems that few Portuguese 
suppliers were able (possessed the ownership-advantages?) to follow their clients to other, 
more distant, locations. The few that managed to do so (Tavol, Simoldes) expanded first 
to Brazil.
12 Membership o f the European Union may have made a substantial contribution to the remarkable speed at 
which economic structures adjusted and developed.
13 The very recent emergence o f Brazil as a destination of Portuguese FDI explains, for example, that Simoes 
(1997: p .72) reported a very different map of the location of the subsidiaries o f Portuguese firms from the 
one obtained here.
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6.3.4. Motivation
There was a general belief in the sample that internationalisation was critical for a 
company’s long term survival. All the interviewees seemed to worry about the limited 
potential in the domestic market and the need to gain weight to face suppliers, clients, and 
competitors. There were, nevertheless, different patterns o f motivations among these 
firms. It was possible to distinguish five groups, not all equally homogeneous (see Table 
6.3).
T a b l e  6 .3 : M a in  m o t iv a t io n s  t o  in v e s t  a b r o a d
Saturation of domestic market Autosil Efacec
- market-seeking investment? Cimpor Faiart
- strategic asset-seeking investment? Cin Vista Alegre
Colep
Following the clients Arjal Sodecia
Cabelte/Cabelauto Sunviauto
Simoldes Tavol
Defensive investment Dan Cake Riopele
Renova
Efficiency-seeking investment Quintas & Quintas
Strategic-asset seeking investment Neoplastica Cimpor (?)
Autosil (?) Cin (?)
One group is formed by those firms that started internationalisation in response to the 
saturation of the domestic market. This group of ‘leaders in mature markets’ includes 
Autosil, Cimpor, Cin, Colep, Efacec, and Vista Alegre. With the exception of the last, 
these are the companies that seemed to have a surplus of management capacity after years 
of expansion and consolidation in the domestic market. Despite their position in the 
domestic markets, these companies are fairly small in international terms, which 
represented in itself a powerful motivation for international expansion: the need to 
improve the relative position vis-a-vis competitors, clients, and suppliers. That is, these 
firms’ internationalisation was as much motivated by market expansion as by strategic 
asset-seeking. It is interesting, however, that despite their relatively small size few of these 
firms relied on networks (Vahlne and Nordstrom, 1988) for their internationalisation (the 
exception being Colep). This contrasts sharply with the results of previous studies on the 
internationalisation o f SMEs (see, for example: Coviello and McAuley, 1999; Chen and 
Chen, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1997).
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For Efacec, internationalisation is just another vector of the company’s growth strategy. 
For many years, Efacec was restricted to the domestic market14. In this period, its 
management anticipated the maturity of the domestic market for the company’s traditional 
products by diversifying to related but less mature businesses. When the restrictions to 
internationalisation disappeared, at the end of 1987, product diversification was 
complemented with market diversification. The first division to be expanded abroad was 
power equipment, the most competitive of the mature businesses, but diversification to 
less mature products is now part of the strategy for foreign markets as well.
Contrary to Efacec, Cimpor, Cin, and Vista Alegre stuck to their core businesses 
(respectively, cement, paint, and ceramics), but expanded internationally through 
acquisitions. Cimpor has now over 50 per cent of its production capacity outside Portugal, 
largely in developing countries (cf. Table 6.3). The similarity with Eifacec is that the 
strategic solutions adopted at home were also applied in the foreign markets. That is, being 
located in a foreign country is almost the only element that distinguishes international 
activities. Cin is another good example. Its leadership in the Portuguese market is still 
recent, and requires further consolidation. It has been doing so with a mix of organic 
growth and acquisitions. After acquiring the third biggest Spanish producer of paint, Cin 
transposed to Spain the mixed strategy adopted in Portugal.
A different case is Autosil. This producer of electric batteries was in the early 1990s the 
leader in the Portuguese market for replacement equipment for automobiles, with only a 
small presence in the segment of new equipment and in industrial batteries. The strategy 
initially drawn was to expand the main business through exports, to be supported with a 
small plant in France. However, the opportunity, in 1994, to buy a company in France (at 
the time 3.5 times bigger than Autosil) radically changed Autosil’s future. Three quarters of 
the group’s turnover is now produced in France, while the new equipment segment 
represents an important percentage of the sales. The initially planned greenfield investment 
in France has been adapted to produce industrial batteries.
Chance also played a decisive role in Colep’s internationalisation strategy. As Autosil in its 
main investment in France, Colep (a producer o f metal and plastic containers) had a largely 
passive role in its expansion to Spain. The suggestion came from one of Colep’s clients, 
who had decided to sell its Spanish subsidiary. Colep has now a more pro-active attitude,
14 Until 1987 Efacec was a subsidiary o f the Belgian group ACEC, which did not allow the company to sell
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which has resulted in a recent investment in Poland. But its clients still maintain a relevant 
role, with the guarantee of contracts since the very early stages of the project.
A second group of companies that can be identified in the sample comprises the car parts 
manufacturers1’. As referred to above, this is a highly heterogeneous lot, united by the 
share of the downstream activities of their value chains. Their strategies are intrinsically 
dependent on the global trends of the automobile industry, which they do not control, and 
they are subjected to a fiercely competitive environment. These are the firms for which 
international expansion is more critical in terms of medium/long term survival. The car 
industry is going through a process of global concentration (Simison, 1999), and the firms’ 
ownership advantages, including dimension, will be crucial. It must be noted that before 
considering production abroad, most of the car parts manufacturers already exported a 
very high percentage of their production to other European countries (essentially France, 
Spain and Germany). By and large, the interviewees attributed their competitive advantage 
to technical ability. But data collected by ICEP (cited in Coutinho, 1998) suggests that low 
Portuguese labour costs have to be considered. The importance of Portugal’s specific 
competitive advantages seems to be supported by the growth of exports also registered by 
foreign firms established in Portugal. However, despite the general market success, only 
Simoldes created a productive subsidiary in Europe. Symptomatic is that Simoldes’s 
investment in France does not seem to be financially motivated. Simoldes’s management 
explained that the aim was simply to make the company more visible to its clients, and to 
demonstrate its technological and financial capacity. As with many other firms in the 
sample, Simoldes still has to fight Portugal’s image as a low-tech country largely dependent 
on cheap unskilled labour.
The trouble with the Portuguese car parts manufacturers is that they are very small 
compared to the big multinationals that dominate the industry. It was a general belief 
among this group of firms that they were unable to defy the German or French 
competitors “in their backyard”. This seems to include other EU countries, but also non- 
EU Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, the opening of Brazil to FDI was 
momentous. When the car manufacturers started to invest in Brazil, the Portuguese 
suppliers seemed to be well positioned to follow them. Psychic distance - as assessed by
or produce outside Portugal.
15 Autosil was excluded from this group because its main market prior to internationalisation - replacement 
car batteries - is very much a final product, oriented towards individual consumers, not car assemblers.
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the Portuguese companies but also by their clients - and the role of language similarity (see 
above) seem to have played a very important role. Unlike other firms in the sample (see 
above), the importance of the firms’ network relationships in these expansionary 
investments seem to have been relevant (see section 2.4.1). The industry’s structure is 
certainly a relevant clement in explaining the role of networks in the internationalisation of 
the Portuguese car-manufacturers. Most of these internationalisation processes are still too 
recent to be evaluated. It is also too soon to know if  the experience in Brazil will facilitate 
expansion to other countries, but there are already positive signs. Simoldes has a joint 
venture in Argentina, while Tavol is expanding to Argentina and Mexico16. Not 
surprisingly, Simoldes and Tavol are the only companies in the group that sell directly to 
the car assemblers. All the others are subcontracted by the direct suppliers, normally big 
MNCs themselves.
Defensive investment seems to be the best description of the internationalisation of Dan 
Cake, Renova and lliopele (cookies and pastries, tissue paper, and textiles, respectively). 
The move was largely a response to the erosion of their traditional markets, under attack 
from cheaper imports (the main competitors are Spanish for the first two, from the Far 
E)ast in the case of the latter). As could be expected, this group includes some of the 
companies in the sample with less successful internationalisation strategies. The problems 
faced in the domestic markets absorbed important - and scarce - managerial and financial 
resources. Renova is the exception. It met with serious problems in its first approach to 
the Spanish market, but it seems to have been able to correct it with the adoption of a new 
market strategy.
Faiart, Neoplastica and Quintas & Quintas are the last three cases to be discussed. Quintas 
& Quintas is the only firm in the sample which had a clear objective of reducing labour 
costs. Portugal is one of the last producers of ropes in Europe, and the sector’s cost 
competitiveness is still eroding. Quintas & Quintas management believes the solution to be 
the progressive delocalisation to Brazil, a source of raw materials with much lower labour 
costs than Portugal, and the development o f more value added products for the plant in 
Portugal. Brazil’s market was, nevertheless, a secondary motivation in the investment 
decision. The country’s population is 17 times that of Portugal, and Petrobras (the main oil 
producer and distributor) is one of the world’s biggest consumers of the most value added
16 In both cases the companies are following their main client in Europe, respectively Renault and General 
Motors.
156
products manufactured by Quintas & Quintas. This includes anchorage cables for oil 
platforms, the firm’s newest and most promising product.
I'aiart’s motivation was very similar to that of the companies in the first group identified - 
market expansion in a mature industry. The difference for that group is that Faiart is not 
market leader in Portugal. A medium size ceramics producer, it preferred foreign 
expansion to acquisitions in Portugal, where it would have to face some of its bigger 
domestic competitors. Neoplastica’s is also an original case. It is one of the few Portuguese 
companies that expanded to Europe before considering other locations. Equally atypical 
was that its first foreign investment, in the Netherlands, had a very strong emphasis on the 
marketing function. The creation of productive facilities was essentially for visibility. As 
Simoldes realised several years later, having a plant “in the heart of Europe” (sic) is the 
most efficient way of overcoming the barrier that Portugal’s image often represents. 
Neoplastica’s expansion is a clear example of strategic-asset seeking investment (Dunning, 
1993a), even if  an intangible one - marketing capacity.
6.3.5. Constraints
“The first foreign investment decision is to a large extent a trip to the unknown. It is an 
innovation and development o f a new dimension” (Aharoni, 1966). For that very reason, it 
is management intensive (Buckley, 1989, p. 105), which may be a serious liability, in 
particular for small firms (a classification that applies to most of the firms in the sample), 
hirst, small firms rarely have specialist managers to face the new conditions. Second, 
limited management time and personalised decision making processes limit their ability to 
evaluate all the possible investment alternatives both in terms of location and of mode of 
entry. This may lead to sub-optimal decisions. Third, smaller firms are normally family 
owned and run. Reluctance to loosen up family control is normally a restriction on the 
expansion o f management skills and to the very growth of the firm.
Shortage of capital is another factor that may affect foreign investment by smaller firms. 
Access to the capital markets is much more difficult than for big firms, while self-financing 
is limited by the size of the firm. When they do receive financial support, smaller firms are 
often made to pay a premium, the cost o f being less known to the markets and potentially 
more vulnerable to competitors. Nevertheless, Buckley (1989) argues that financial 
constraints tend to be secondary to managerial constraints.
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This was clearly supported by our sample. Capital constrains were considered much less 
important than skilled management shortages by almost all the managers interviewed17. 
There was, nevertheless, a close association between the two: when financial restrictions 
were considered relevant, management constraints were normally assessed as very 
restrictive. In general, those firms classified above as “defensive” in their motivation to 
internationalise were more severely affected by financial restrictions. The same can be said 
o f those auto components manufacturers which had less stable relationships with their 
customers. Not surprisingly, there seems to be a strong negative correlation between 
success in the domestic market and the impact of capital constraints on the 
internationalisation of the firm. This does not mean, however, that financial restrictions 
were irrelevant to the other firms in the sample. Two examples seem to be the entry 
strategies of Vista Alegre, assumedly on a less than optimal scale, and Efacec, based on 
minority participation (see below).
The shortage of skilled management seems to have been far more important in the sample. 
However, the bigger firms, identified above as “leaders in mature domestic markets” 
(Autosil, Cimpor, Cin, Colep, Efacec, but also Neoplastica and Simoldes) represent 
exceptions. In fact, excess management capacity was among the motivations for 
internationalisation (see above). For the remaining firms, however, internationalisation 
created a management problem. International expansion stretched the often already 
overloaded management function. Many had grown very fast in the three or four years 
before international expansion, and few have fully adjusted their management teams to the 
new conditions. A recurrent complaint in the interviews was that internationalisation had 
either diverted management’s attention from the domestic market or was not being 
followed as efficiently as it ought to be because of the management’s concentration on 
domestic affairs.
Part of the problem is that many companies are reluctant to hire locals for top 
management positions in the foreign subsidiaries. This may represent weaknesses that can 
be associated with earlier stages o f internationalisation. Facking international experience, 
new MNCs may find it too expensive and risky to recruit locally. These costs include the 
time needed to efficiently identify and evaluate potential candidates and to monitor their
1 It must be borne in mind that the firms in the sample are those that managed to gain the funds necessary 
to internationalise. That is, the sample is naturally biased against those firms that could not overcome 
financial restrictions to their expansion.
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performance. On the other hand, there seems to be a shortage of experienced managers in 
Portugal, even more so when the position involves working as an expatriate. Companies 
like Simoldes chose to provide in house training for recent graduates, apparently more 
keen to work abroad. But this is necessarily slow and time consuming for the other 
members of the management team.
Other restrictions to international expansion were identified from the sample, but were 
almost always ranked much lower than the two mentioned above. Most were in fact a 
consequence of managerial and/or capital constraints: difficulties in obtaining information 
on potential destinations or on potential targets for acquisition; deficient support by 
government institutions; the almost non existence of true venture capital in Portugal. 
Another important constraint often mentioned was the prevailing image of Portugal as a 
poor backward country dependent on low labour costs. This was normally dealt with by 
inviting potential partners, potential customers, and government officials to visit the plants 
in Portugal and to witness the changes that the country has made in recent years. This 
represents a hidden cost that does not affect companies from countries long established as 
outward investors (and with a longer industrial tradition). The costs were well 
demonstrated by the investments Neoplastica and Simoldes were “forced” to make in the 
Netherlands and France, respectively. It may also represent a substantive cost in terms of 
missed opportunities for the Portuguese economy.
6.3.6. Mode of entry
The choice o f the mode of entry is the subject of a vast body of research. O f particular 
influence have been the studies at the University of Uppsala (e.g. Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; 
Vahlne and Nordstrom, 1988). They suggest that internationalisation is an incremental 
process, firm s fight restrictions in terms of resources (e.g. capital or management) and 
knowledge with progressive exposure to international markets. Flence, the first 
internationalisation move can be expected to be exports through agents, which will 
successively evolve to the creation of sales subsidiaries and production subsidiaries. Each 
new step represents a deeper commitment and is associated with a better knowledge of 
foreign markets. It is also suggested that firms with international experience may be able to 
jump stages. The knowledge acquired in one country may facilitate the involvement in 
other locations.
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This internationalisation path is only partially found in our sample (see Table 6.4). All firms 
contacted seem to have started exporting through agents, although in some cases exports 
were not very significant due to the resistance to transport of largely standardised 
products. This was normally followed by the creation of sales subsidiaries in the most 
important markets, often through the acquisition o f the agents or in association with 
themIK. However, this picture holds essentially for Europe and Asia. In the case of 
expansion to Brazil, the internationalisation path is much less linear.
Despite this being the most popular destination in the sample, none of the companies 
analysed had a sales subsidiary in Brazil before the creation of the production subsidiary. 
Most had never exported to that country at all. Three reasons explain this. First, exports 
were, and still are, discouraged by geographic distance and a punitive tax system. Second, 
Brazil’s economic instability until 1996 made the country unattractive. Third, psychic 
proximity - being able to speak the local language, and a strong sense of common heritage 
and cultural proximity - may have permitted firms the jumping of stages in the 
internationalisation process.
T a b l e  6 .4 : M o d e  o f  e n t r y  in  f o r e ig n  m a r k e t s
Company <1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Autosil Exp CS PS
Arjal Exp
Cabelte/Cabelauto Exp PS
Cimpor Exp PS
Cin Exp CS PS
Colep Exp PS
Dan Cake Exp PS
Efacec Exp/CS PS
Faiart Exp PS
Neoplastica Exp CS/PS
Quintas & Quintas Exp CS PS
Renova Exp CS
Riopele Exp CS
Simoldes Exp CSPS
Sodecia Exp PS
Sunviauto Exp CS/PS
Tavol Exp PS
Vista Alegre Exp CS PS
Exp: Regular exports CS: Commercial subsidiary PS: Productive subsid iary
18 A number o f  these acquisitions were forced by the need to avoid the agents’ closure due to bankruptcy or 
personal problems. In at least two cases this represented the firm’s first foreign venture, which reflects rather 
passive internationalisation processes in these earlier stages.
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It is important to highlight the fact that only one example of licensing (Efacec) was 
registered in the sample1’, which reflects the characteristics of the firms involved and their 
motivations to internationalise. As discussed above, many internationalisation processes 
were defensive reactions to the concentration forces in the industry or to the penetration 
of imports. In these conditions, internationalisation was not a means to maximise 
ownership-advantages, but simply a way to avoid their degradation or eventually to create 
them-0. Neither is licensing a solution when ownership-advantages are based on intangible 
assets, such as management capacity, as was the case with other firms in the sample. In 
fact, even Efacec is not a pure case of licensing. Its licensees are joint-ventures with local 
partners (usually the main customer), and are seen by Efacec’s management as subsidiaries. 
Although the company’s stake rarely exceeds one third of the joint venture’s capital, 
Efacec’s management argue that control is exerted through the firm’s role as supplier of 
the technology.
Efacec’s mode of entry seems to support the internalisation model (Buckley and Casson, 
1981), even if  with adjustments21. Efacec follows an explicit strategy of progressive 
involvement in each foreign market that always starts with exports through agents and 
evolves to the establishment of sales subsidiaries in the most promising markets. In this 
strategy, licensing seems to be an intermediate solution between the sales subsidiary and 
the production subsidiary. The choice of minority joint ventures as licensees allows the 
investing firm to obtain a certain degree of control with a minimum of capital 
requirement” . Efacec’s management argue that a local partner is absolutely necessary in an 
industry where the major clients are normally government controlled utilities. But the 
strategy adopted also suggests a limited financial capacity, unable to sustain the high fixed 
costs associated with a majority stake in a production subsidiary.
Another characteristic of the sample was that acquisitions were preferred to greenfield 
developments (see 'l’able 6.5). However, this seems to be determined more by industry 
characteristics than by the firm’s choice, first, the sample includes a substantial number of
19 ITiis is not very different from Simoes (1997), who found none. Efacec was part o f the sample, but its 
foreign involvement was not considered to be licensing.
20 Which stresses the intrinsic dynamic nature o f the concept o f  ownership advantages (Buckley, 1990; 
Dunning and Rugman, 1985).
21 Buckley and Casson’s (1981) reference to licensing and FDI seems to imply only production. 
Consequently, the model does not distinguish between exports through agents and through a sales 
subsidiary.
22 In fact, F.faccc rarely transfers capital to the subsidiaries. Its shares normally result from technology 
transfers.
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firms operating in mature industries, where overcapacity is frequent. Second, it is biased by 
the conditions in Brazil. Several years of hyper-inflation created an industrial structure 
completely oriented towards the financial function, where production, stock management, 
and sales were almost irrelevant. Most of these companies could not adjust fast enough to 
the new economic conditions, and in just two years many were facing bankruptcy. Several 
managers in the sample claimed to be studying the possibility of a greenfield investment 
when they came across the opportunity to buy an existing firm in favourable conditions, 
even after paying off the huge debts (which most did immediately). In at least one case the 
initial project was not even to invest in production capacity but to create a sales subsidiary. 
It was abandoned when an existing company with a reasonably efficient plant turned up 
for sale.
A different aspect of the mode of entry is the choice between joint ventures and wholly 
owned subsidiaries. The former was only chosen by four companies23 (see Table 6.5), and 
capital restrictions were always the main reason given by their managers. The Portuguese 
firms provided the technology, while local partners were expected not only to provide 
capital but also to supply information on labour markets, bureaucracy and the product 
markets. That is, a local partner was a short cut to avoid the time consuming task of 
acquiring the necessary information to invest and market in a foreign country.
T a b l e  6 .5 : T y p e  o f  in v e s t m e n t  in  p r o d u c t iv e  e s t a b l is h m e n t s
C o m p a n y 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Autosil Acq. GF
Cabelte/Cabelauto GF
Cimpor Acq. Acq. Acq. Acq. Acq.
Cin Acq. Acq. Acq.
Colep Acq. GF
Dan Cake Acq.
Efacec GF GF/JVm Acq./JVm
Faiart Acq.
Neoplastica GF GF Acq. GF
Quintas & Quintas Acq.
Simoldes Acq./JVe<!>) GF
Sodecia Acq. GF
Sunviauto GF/JVe
Tavol GF GF
Vista Alegre Acq.
GF: Greenfield Investment Acq.: Acquisition JVm: Joint Venture (minority participation)
(a)
100% ownership since 1998 Jve: Joint venture (equal partnership)
23 A  fifth - Arjal - aborted its internationalisation program.
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The small size of the firms involved may explain the limited number of joint ventures 
registered in the sample. That was the suggestion of Buckley et al. (1988), who found a 
similar result for a sample of small UK firms. Buckley (1989, p. 107) claims that “whilst 
such operations |joint-ventures and licensing] economise on capital outlay, they tend to be 
management-intensive and this may choke off the ability of small firms to enter into the 
more complex forms of such arrangements”.
One last point is the frequent claim in the sample that internationalisation started well 
before exports took place. This belief is particularly common among those firms that have 
or had as clients big MNCs established in Portugal (e.g. the auto-components segment) 
and is also reported by Simoes (1997, p. 139). In fact, sales to the subsidiaries of leading 
MNCs can be compared with exports, given that these supply contracts are normally 
obtained in purely international markets. Even the advantage of being a local firm is 
frequently just theoretical, since the competitors are often Portuguese subsidiaries of 
foreign firms.
Ihe suspicion is that this “extra-light form of internationalisation” will be common in 
countries long established as hosts of FDI. Its importance may even be growing with the 
increased relevance of business networks in the world economy (Buckley and Casson, 
1998). The case of Simoldes is paradigmatic. Its present success is based on the position 
acquired as direct supplier to Renault. This was gained before exports were significant, 
w’hen Simoldes’s produced essentially for Renault’s assembly plant in Portugal. Most auto­
components producers in the sample claimed that if  they are internationally competitive 
today it is because, to become suppliers of MNCs in Portugal, they were forced long ago 
to improve quality and to develop products and technology.
Autosil and Cin argued that their internationalisation began well before their products 
started crossing the Portuguese border. The argument presented by both firms is that they 
always had to face the competition from multinationals in the domestic market. In other 
words, they had to become internationally competitive before they compiled the capital 
and management resources necessary to sell their products across borders. In both cases 
the claim was that the benchmarking they were able (and forced) to make against those 
foreign competitors was a major determinant o f the development of the competitiveness 
(ownership advantages) that later allowed them to enter foreign markets.
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6.3.7. Government policies
The attitude of the Portuguese authorities towards the internationalisation of the local 
firms has always been very positive. In a 1996 speech, the prime minister Antonio Guterres 
(cited in Simoes, 1997: p .37) claimed, for example, that “it is necessary to strengthen our 
own economic groups and to facilitate their presence in international markets. (...) The 
conditions must be created for their effective internationalisation, supporting the 
acquisition o f distribution networks and other forms of international expansion”. The 
following year the Portuguese government defined the basis for a “new internationalisation 
policy” (Presidencia do Conselho de Ministros, 1997). In the introduction to the document 
it could be read: “ [i]nternationalisation represents a strategic vector of Portugal’s economic 
development. (...). The Portuguese firms, facing new and mounting competitive pressures, 
need to build and acquire a new international initiative and a permanent presence in the 
most dynamic international markets and decision centres”24.
The “new economic policy” suggested a passive role for the government in this new 
process. The government’s task was defined as being to develop the necessary 
infrastructure and to create a stable macroeconomic environment in order to facilitate the 
internationalisation strategies o f individual firms However, a new set of mechanisms to 
actively support the internationalisation of domestic firms were created and existing ones 
restructured. In particular, the activity of ICEP was reorganised, a new venture capital 
fund for internationalisation was created (FIEP), and internationalisation was made a 
priority in the context of the existing (EU financed) structural funds (Presidencia do 
Conselho de Ministros, 1997). A more active ‘economic diplomacy’ was also put in 
practice, with the ministry o f the economy organising business trips to “strategic 
countries” led by the minister himself and to include Portuguese entrepreneurs with a 
potential interest in the country.
The institutional approach to the internationalisation of local firms suffered, however, an 
interesting strategic adjustment. In 1995/1996, when the phenomenon was still a novelty, 
the official view was that the Portuguese firms should expand commercially to more 
developed countries and invest in production capacity in the PALOP and other ACP 
countries (ICEP, cited in Simoes, 1997: p .37). I lowever, the document defining the “new 
internationalisation policy” (Presidencia do Conselho de Ministros, 1997) mentioned
24 All citations in Portuguese in the original.
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explicitly the need to “abandon the frequently artificial distinction between productive and 
commercial projects” (p.7) in the promotion of the internationalisation of domestic firms.
More important was, probably, the evolution in terms of the geographic priorities. Brazil, 
in particular, went from being totally ignored in the official approach to internationalisation 
in 1995/96 to an intermediary position in the list of priority markets and regions in the 
“new internationalisation policy”. The mention of Brazil was in the latter preceded by 
references to the European Union (with an emphasis in Spam), the new democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the United States/NAFTA (Presidencia do Conselho de 
Ministros, 1997: p.5). By 1999* however, Brazil was considered by the Minister for the 
Economy “the new priority of the Portuguese external policy” (Pina Moura, 1999).
What was not clear from this evolution was whether it corresponded to a dogmatic 
adjustment of the government’s strategy or it was evidence of a reactive attitude of the 
Portuguese authorities to internationalisation. The latter was the opinion of Bessa (2000). 
Fie claimed that the government has long been simply following the investors in the 
definition of Portugal’s geostrategic priorities. The evolution of the references to the 
PALOP and to Eastern Europe in official sources in recent years seems to be further 
evidence of this passive behaviour.
The opinion of the interviewees regarding the efficiency of government policies was 
mixed. In general, they considered that the existence of public funds to support 
internationalisation strategies was important. I Iowever, all were keen to say that their firm’s 
internationalisation was not dependent on these funds. Public financial support was 
welcomed and did contribute to reduce the risk of the investments made abroad, but the 
internationalisation processes would apparently have been very much the same even 
without those funds. The claim was that the funds available for internationalisation were 
too small to have a significant impact upon the overall internationalisation of Portuguese 
firms25.
Nevertheless, the managers interviewed normally (but not always) agreed that other forms 
o f public support had a positive even if  indirect effect on the internationalisation of 
domestic firms. The support that all firms in the sample seemed to have received (with 
more or less extent) in the context of programs of quality certification, training of the
25 Two managers considered that they should not exist at all. They claimed that private financing was more 
efficient because it forced a rational use o f capital and avoided the adoption o f very risky projects.
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labour force, or the modernisation of productive equipment, on the one hand, increased 
their local and international competitiveness and, on the other hand, freed valuable 
financial resources that were used in the internationalisation process.
One important institutional element in the internationalisation of the Portuguese firms 
seems to be ICEP delegations abroad. In the opinion of many of the interviewees ICEP 
delegations played an important role in their firms’ expansion, although several considered 
they could often do more. ICEP delegations have often helped to identify potential 
partners or services providers (e.g. local lawyers) and to obtain information on the local 
business environment. In general, the opinions on ICEP’s efforts were rather positive and 
were considered to have improved in recent years. However, there were several complaints 
about the way some of the delegations worked. It was a general opinion that the 
delegations were too dependent on the personal commitment and proficiency of the 
respective directors and that not all the local directors were sufficiently motivated for the 
tasks they were given. This latter cnticism was even more acute in the case of the 
Portuguese embassies, accused o f being “too political, with no interest in business 
whatsoever”. A substantial number of the managers interviewed compared the attitude of 
the Portuguese diplomatic representations with that of Spanish diplomats, apparently 
much more aware of local business conditions and ready to lobby in favour of Spanish 
owned firms. US embassies were also frequently pointed as being very good role models.
6.3.8. Summary
The results presented above can be summarised in a few points:
/. Most Portuguese nascent MNCs operate in capital-intensive industries. Internationalisation in 
traditional labour-intensive industries is incipient.
This is a partial surprise given the specialisation of the Portuguese economy in labour- 
intensive industries. It seems that the success the latter enjoy as passive exporters 
discourages international expansion. As for the former, internationalisation may be a way 
to overcome relatively weak location advantages.
2. I ijjiciency-seeking FDI is still rare in Portugal.
Portugal seems to maintain a cost-advantage in the European context, which is supported 
by the sustained success o f traditional exporters (Portuguese or foreign owned). So far, few
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Portuguese firms found it necessary to move operations to lower costs locations. There 
was only one case of an efficiency-seeking investment in the sample, in Brazil.
3. The concept o f asset-seeking investment must be broadened.
There was only one company in the sample clearly engaged in strategic-asset seeking 
investment. However, in other cases, it proved very difficult to distinguish this from 
market-seeking FDI. Internationalisation was often presented by the managers interviewed 
as a question of survival for their companies. That is, market expansion provided an 
important strategic asset - size. At least for those firms that expanded to more developed 
countries, there seems to be an unavoidable element of strategic asset-seeking in their 
market oriented investments.
4. Portuguese firm s are increasingly engaging in market-seeking investment in less developed or adjacent 
territories.
As predicted by Dunning (1981a, 1981b, 1986b), the most common destination of market- 
seeking investment are countries less developed than Portugal or neighbouring territories, 
notably Brazil and Spain. However, the firms involved are small in international terms. As 
argued above, it is never clear whether they are seeking to maximise their existing 
resources, or they seek in new markets the size on which they will build their competitive 
advantages in the future.
5. Psychic distance, and language in particular, proved to be a major location determinant o f FDI.
It is strongly suggested by the statements made in the interviews that, more than any other 
element, language determines psychic distance, furthermore, language and cultural 
distance were critical determinants in the location of foreign subsidiaries. With very few 
exceptions, the managers interviewed had a very strong preference for Portuguese­
speaking countries. Spain and Spanish-speaking Fatin America, in that order, were next in 
this ranking.
6. Political and economic stability are critical location determinants o f FDI. Once a certain ‘level o f 
stability' is attained they cease being deterrents to FDI (Tu and Schive, 1995).
Although assessed as relevant location determinants in the sample, political and economic 
instability only overshadowed psychic distance or market size when risk was very high. 
Before the stabilisation program of 1996, economic and political risk were indeed 
deterrents to foreign investment in Brazil. The same can be said of present instability in
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Angola, another much favoured location. Brazil is now perceived has a much more stable 
location, but the interviewees seemed to agree that risk remains high. Despite that, they 
now prefer Brazil to less risky alternatives.
7. I xibour skills are relevant as location determinants o f  FDI.
The attractiveness of Brazil is very much influenced by its huge potential market (see 
number 4), but also by its long industrial tradition. This is attested to by acquisitions in the 
sample, and the good assessment made of the subsidiaries’ production capacity. By 
contrast, Mozambique is still attracting little manufacturing FDI despite its recent 
economic and political stability. The explanation seems to be in part its small domestic 
market, but also the very low skills of the labour force.
8. Inward FDI had an important role in the development o f the ownership-advantages o f Portuguese firms.
Several firms in the sample highlighted the role of foreign firms operating in Portugal in 
the development of their international competitiveness. Foreign subsidiaries can force the 
Portuguese firms to develop new capacities and strengths when they buy their products, 
but also when they compete with them for the Portuguese market.
9. Portugal seems to be following an investment path similar to the one proposed by Dunning (1981a, 
1981b, 1986b).
The simultaneous internationalisation of a substantial number of Portuguese firms seems 
to coincide with the maturity of domestic markets and industries. This is consistent with 
Portugal being in stage 3 of the IDP (chapter 4). The relevance of the IDP is further 
supported by point number 8.
10. The major constraint to internationalisation faced by small firms is the shortage o f skilled management 
(Buckley, 1989).
Most companies in the sample agreed that a shortage of management skills was the major 
obstacle to internationalisation. Nevertheless, this opinion was not shared by a small 
number of (bigger) firms which saw internationalisation as the way of making use of the 
management overcapacity created during the years of rapid domestic growth.
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11. Psychic proximity (language?) allows firms to ‘jump stages’ in the internationalisation process, in 
particular when geographic distance is relevant.
Very few of the companies in the sample that invested in Brazil had ever exported to the 
country. Distance and tariff barriers seem to have been an effective deterrent. I lowever, 
this does not seem to have affected their ability to invest in production subsidiaries. In the 
case of European and Asian countries, however, firms seemed to follow a more traditional 
internationalisation path.
12. Licensing andjoint-ventures are not popular among small firms new to internationalisation.
There was only one case of licensing in the sample, and just four firms were involved in 
joint-ventures. That both are management intensive deals (Buckley, 1989) may be the 
explanation. Nevertheless, for smaller firms, licensing seems to be an entry mode that 
represents an intermediary stage between the establishment of commercial and productive 
subsidiaries (Buckley and Casson, 1981).
6.4. C o n c l u s io n
A first interesting conclusion was that Portugal’s nascent MNEs were not associated with 
the country’s traditional industrial structure. Labour intensive industries, which dominate 
Portuguese exports, seem to be largely absent from the internationalisation process that is 
gaining momentum among Portuguese manufacturing firms. This probably explains why 
efficiency-seeking investment is still rare. The first Portuguese companies to expand 
production abroad operate in capital intensive industries with small mature domestic 
markets. Especially in the case of the market leaders, this came to represent a threat to 
their very survival because o f the difficulties associated with an efficient use of the 
resources available to the firm. Internationalisation was, before anything else, the solution 
to reach a critical scale in terms of the ability to compete with foreign firms, both abroad 
and at home.
The current internationalisation process needs consolidation. Several elements revealed 
that the firms involved still possess few ownership advantages. First, the number of 
countries chosen as a destination of FDI was very small. Two thirds of the firms expanded 
either to Brazil or to Spain. Second, psychic distance, and language in particular, assumed a 
powerful role in the choice of those locations. The managers interviewed manifested in 
general a very strong preference for Portuguese-speaking countries, followed by areas
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where Spanish is the official language. Third their was in the sample a recurrent shortage of 
management skills, especially among smaller firms. The risks of this constraint on the 
internationalisation process cannot be underestimated. These firms are likely to rely upon 
less than optimal decision-making processes, ignoring more profitable alternatives and/or 
not assessing all the costs and risks associated with their decisions.
That Brazil concentrated such a high percentage of the investments represents an 
additional threat. This is a country prone to economic and political instability. Despite 
recent successes, the definitive stabilisation of the country is still not guaranteed. In the 
event of a very negative evolution of the Brazilian economy, no matter how unlikely it 
seems today, the whole process of internationalisation of the Portuguese economy could 
suffer severely. Many of the firms in the sample invested in Brazil a substantial percentage 
of their resources. A failure of their Brazilian subsidiaries could put the whole company at 
risk. Furthermore, one o f the implications of the limitations described in the previous 
paragraph is that investments in Brazil might not be easily transferable to other countries. 
Regardless of the differences, this brings to mind the scenario of the failure of the first 
process of internationalisation of Portuguese firms, in the first half of the 1970s (see 
chapter 4).
As for other results, an important conclusion was that psychic proximity does help firms to 
‘jump stages’ in the internationalisation process. Contrary to Furope or even Asia, 
investment in production establishments in Brazil was in most cases the first form of 
involvement in the country. It is true that geographic distance and high tariffs often 
reduced the alternatives to: (A) ignore the Brazilian market; or (B) establish a production 
subsidiary. Nonetheless, psychic distance facilitates entry in foreign markets when exports 
or sales subsidiaries are not efficient solutions or arc not possible at all.
Another result regards the concept of strategic-asset seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993a). The 
study clearly suggested it must be broadly interpreted when analysing investment by 
relatively small firms. For big MNEs, market oriented FDI enables the firm to maximise 
the use of propnetary assets, such as technology, international brands or management 
skills. However, smaller firms, and in particular those from small countries, possessing few 
ownership advantages often internationalise from a vulnerable position. Frequently, 
international expansion is the means to gain the size necessary to be competitive, both
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abroad and at home. Despite being market oriented in essence, these investments fit better 
the concept of strategic-asset seeking than that of market-seeking.
Finally, the sample provided support for the interaction between inward and outward FDI, 
and between these and the level of economic development of the country (the investment 
development path, Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b). The importance of foreign firms in the 
development of the ownership-advantages of Portuguese firms was clearly assumed by a 
very high percentage of those interviewed. Foreign subsidiaries represented that role not 
only when they were clients but also when they were the main competitors of local firms. 
In both cases Portuguese firms were forced to upgrade products, technology, and 
production and management processes. When the stagnation of demand due to the 
maturity of domestic markets was matched with this ‘forced’ development of 
internationally competitive Portuguese firms, the recipe for foreign expansion was assured. 
A more direct relationship was revealed by three of the eighteen firms interviewed, which 
were created as subsidiaries of foreign companies.
Chapter  7.
Co n c lu sio n : FD I a n d  the  
Co m p e tit iv e n e s s  of  P ortugal
7.1. In t r o d u c t io n
I laving failed to accompany successive industrial revolutions, Portugal has long been one 
of the poorest countries in Europe. At the end of World War II (in which Portugal did not 
participate) much of the country did not have electricity, running water or paved roads. 
About half the working population were engaged in agriculture and only 24 per cent in the 
manufacturing industries (Rosas, 1994a: p. 25). Furthermore, agriculture recorded very low 
levels of productivity due to the persistence of ancient practices and much of the 
manufacturing industries were artisans or very low technology, small plants (Rosas, 1994b, 
1994c).
In the 1950s, the Portuguese authorities encouraged a push towards industrialisation. 
However, with severe restrictions to investment - both foreign and domestic - and a very 
limited local market, the adopted model of import substitution was doomed to failure. It 
was only after 1960 that industrialisation did take off in Portugal. The creation of EFTA, 
o f which Portugal was a founding member despite its political regime, was the trigger for 
these transformations. Portugal was guaranteed free access to the markets of the other 
EFTA countries in exchange for opening its markets to imports of manufactured products 
(agriculture and services remained highly protected). At the same time, restrictions to
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domestic investment were progressively eliminated and almost all manufacturing industries 
were opened to foreign direct investment.
The results o f the new policies were impressive. In the less than fifteen years between 1960 
and 1973, Portuguese GDP per capita grew from one third to half that of the most 
developed European countries (Gonsalves, 1998: p. 96). However, the exploitation of 
comparative advantages between Portugal and its much richer trading partners may have 
led to an overspecialisation of the Portuguese economy in labour intensive industries. If 
the exploitation of low Portuguese labour costs was inevitable and probably desirable, the 
excessive opening o f Portuguese markets at the early stages of development of domestic 
manufacturing industry may have frustrated the subsequent diversification into higher 
value added segments (Lopes, 1996: p. 113).
The following ten years represented a new period of divergence between Portugal and the 
most developed European countries. The oil shock of December 1973 and the world 
recession that followed, severely hit a now much more open Portuguese economy. At the 
same time the internal situation deteriorated. The democratic revolution, in April 1974, was 
followed by almost two years of social and political instability with an inevitably negative 
impact upon the economy. Moreover, the economic order established during the 48 years 
o f dictatorship was greatly transformed by new labour laws, nationalisation, and the 
independence of the African colonies. As a result of these internal and external factors, the 
balance of payments rapidly deteriorated, inflation soared, and external debt reached 
unsustainable levels. In 1978, and again in 1984, the Portuguese government was forced to 
seek IMF support and to put into practice highly restrictive economic policies.
It was not until 1985 that relative GDP per capita returned to 1971 levels (Gonsalves, 
1998: p.97). The economy was finally stabilised and Portugal managed to join the 
European Union in the following year. A new period of economic growth began, 
supported by the EU structural funds and other transfers, a booming world economy, and 
a national consensus on much needed economic reforms, including privatisation. 
However, a new economic recession in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s highlighted 
the persistence of several weaknesses in the Portuguese economy. Nevertheless, growth 
and convergence resumed in 1995, and by 1998 Portugal’s GDP per capita - measured at 
PPP - was 68 per cent o f that of the most developed European countries, the highest level 
this century (own calculations based on OECD, 1999a).
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7.2. F o r e ig n  d ir e c t  in v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  e c o n o m y
Foreign direct investment has always played an important role in the Portuguese economy. 
All the short spells of industrialisation registered in Portugal’s history were associated with 
important inflows of foreign capitals (Matos, 1973). The picture suffered a radical change 
in the late 1920s when a new autocratic regime was installed after a popular military coup. 
Officially the new authorities welcomed foreign capital, but in practice new legislation 
severely restricted inward investment. Until the end of the 1950s, the weight of FDI in the 
Portuguese economy was insignificant (Fopes, 1996: p. 167).
The opening of the Portuguese economy in the 1960s was accompanied by a new policy 
towards FDI. The reaction of foreign investors was swift. Inward FDI was twenty times 
higher during the 1960s than in the previous decade, and may have represented as much as 
30 per cent o f GFCF in manufacturing and 20 per cent in commerce (Fopes: 1996: p. 169). 
Much of this investment was directed towards labour intensive industries, particularly 
clothing and footwear). But FDI was also important in the development of new industries 
(e.g. electric equipment, pulp and chemicals), effectively diversifying local industrial 
structures (Simoes, 1985: p. 358; Gonsalves e Guimaraes, 1996: p. 10).
The 1974 revolution left foreign owned firms untouched. Nonetheless, the political, social 
and economic transformations o f the second half of the 1970s had a negative impact upon 
FDI flows. The authorities tried to counter the loss of confidence of foreign investors with 
new legislation that established a clear legal framework for FDI (Simoes, 1985: p. 342) and 
by direct negotiation with potential big investors. The results started to appear in 1979, 
with inward FDI rising steadily over the following years. With the prospect of EU 
membership, the levels of the previous decade were soon overtaken, reaching a peak of 4.1 
per cent of GDP in 1990, four years after Portugal actually became an EU member. But 
the 1990s were to be a period of decline for inward FDI in Portugal, which in 1999 
reached its lowest level since the 1950s (see chapter 4). The slowdown of the privatisation 
program (in place since 1988), the completion of MNEs’ preparations for the European 
Single Market, economic recession in Europe, and the opening of the Eastern bloc may all 
have contributed to this decline.
In the 1990s, however, a new factor made its appearance in the Portuguese economy. 
During that decade, outward FDI flows grew at an astonishing rate, reaching 2.8 per cent 
of GDP in 1998 (they decreased slightly in 1999, to 2.1%). The main destinations were
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Brazil and Spain (about half the FDI outflows between 1996 and 1998). This new trend 
was most impressive since outward FDI had not been above 0.1 per cent of GDP before, 
except briefly between 1970 and 1974. Following a decade of strong economic growth, a 
number of Portuguese firms started to expand abroad in the early 1970s. The then African 
colonies were the main destination, but there were also investments by financial firms in 
countries with large Portuguese communities (Simoes, 1985: p. 341). In any case, even in 
this period outward FDI flows averaged no more than 0.2 per cent of GDP (with a 
maximum of 0.3 per cent, in 1973).
7.3. T h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  in w a r d  FDI i n  P o r t u g a l
Previous work on the determinants of FDI in Portugal (Matos, 1973; Carriere and Reix, 
1989; Taveira, 1984; Simoes, 1985; Saraiva, 1993; Santos, 1997) suggested a dichotomy of 
motivations. Investment in export oriented industries aimed to exploit Portugal’s low 
labour costs and privileged access to some of the most developed markets in Europe. 
However, the dominant motivation seemed to be access to the local market. When 
aggregate data was analysed, the relevance of labour costs was eclipsed by market related 
variables. The importance of natural resources in attracting FDI received limited support.
As a preliminary for a more thorough investigation of the motivations of foreign investors 
in Portugal, the dichotomy between efficiency seeking and market seeking FDI was tested 
using regression analysis o f more recent data than in previous studies. Two complementary 
models were investigated: a longitudinal study of FDI in Portugal, and a cross section of 
several ‘peripheral’ European countries. Despite the limitations associated with the use of 
aggregated data, the results were encouragingly consistent.
Very much as in previous studies, the size and growth of the domestic market were the 
variables most strongly associated with inward FDI into Portugal. However, relative labour 
costs were also found to be statistically significant (and negatively signed), which did not 
happen in any of the previous studies using aggregated data (e.g. Taveira, 1984). This 
difference suggests that the weight of efficiency seeking FDI may have increased in 
Portugal over the last fifteen years.
The comparison across ‘peripheral’ locations, both members and non-members of the EU, 
supported the former results. Although GDP growth was not found in this case to be 
significant, the size of the domestic market was the determinant most strongly associated
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with inward FDI in the twelve countries considered. Labour costs were also strongly 
significant, as were labour skills (which could not be tested in the longitudinal study). The 
signs were, as expected, respectively negative and positive. These three variables were the 
elements that investors were most likely to consider when analysing alternative locations 
for European investments. In none of them is Portugal’s position very reassuring: 
Portugal’s domestic market is relatively small, its relative labour costs are rising, and foreign 
and domestic investors frequently complain about a shortage of skilled workers.
Geopolitics also seem to be unfavourable to Portugal. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
geopolitical centre of Europe moved towards the North and East of the continent, making 
Portugal more peripheral. A measure of distance to the ‘European core’ (proxied by the 
average time to fly from each country’s capital to Frankfurt and Paris) was found to be 
significantly associated with FDI in the countries investigated. And Portugal was one of 
the most “distant” countries in the sample1. The Portuguese authorities expect that the 
early adoption of the Euro and the experience of fourteen years of EU membership may 
attenuate the geographic (and historical) clement. However, the evolution of inward FDI 
in very recent years was not very encouraging.
To complement this analysis, a more thorough investigation of foreign direct investment in 
Portugal was devised. Using a postal questionnaire the managers of foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Portugal were asked about the characteristics of their firms and the 
motivations and problems associated with the investment. The results confirmed most of 
the previous knowledge, but provided a much more detailed picture of inward FDI in 
Portugal, impossible to obtain with secondary data.
The respondents’ evaluations of a number of potential reasons to invest in Portugal 
permitted the identification of ten determinants of FDI, all referenced in the literature: 
labour conditions, political and economic stability, competition in the home country, 
access to the local market, downstream integration, market diversification, passive 
expansion, access to the EU market, geographic and cultural proximity, and upstream 
integration. This list of determinants represents a combination of location variables, 
internalisation determinants and push factors. However, when only manufacturing firms 
were considered there was a substantial cleavage between the first four determinants and
1 A dummy variable for the 1990s was introduced in the longitudinal study for Portugal as a proxy for the 
impact o f  the geopolitical changes. It was negatively signed, but with a significance level o f only 15 per cent, 
which is fairly low even considering the presence o f  multicollineanty.
176
the others. In the case of purely commercial subsidiaries, downstream integration (the 
internalisation of the sales function), access to the local market and stability seemed to 
dominate.
Not surprisingly, a first conclusion was the confirmation of the coexistence in Portugal of 
market seeking and efficiency seeking investment. Natural resources seemed to have a very 
limited influence. However, much more interesting was the investigation of investment 
conditions in different industries. As could be expected, the determinants associated with 
the most export oriented industries (textiles, clothing and footwear, and machinery and 
equipment) were substantially different from the others. In particular, labour conditions 
and stability were even more important than in the rest of the sample, and access to the 
EU market (largely irrelevant for the other industries) was the fourth most important 
determinant. On the other hand, access to the local market was much less important than 
in the rest of the sample, and downstream integration completely irrelevant.
Despite these similanties, it was possible to confirm Simdes’s (1985) distinction between 
“traditional” and “modern” labour intensive industries. Both groups saw Portugal as a 
stable low cost location with easy access to the EU markets. I lowever, in textiles, clothing 
and footwear, competition in the home country was also a major motivation. There was 
also strong evidence that, more than in any other industry, many of these foreign 
subsidiaries were little more than specialised assembly platforms. Three quarters were not 
responsible for the distribution and sale of their products, less than half were responsible 
for the acquisition of their own inputs, and only 54 per cent sent their production directly 
to the final clients. The dominant market orientation in these industries was also typical of 
cost reduction investment to overcome rising costs at home: 51 per cent of the output was 
sold in the home country and only 14 per cent in Portugal. This compares with, 
respectively, 17 and 34 per cent for machinery and equipment manufacturers, and 21 and 
45 per cent in the whole sample.
As for the remaining industries, market access seemed to be dominant as a motivation for 
FDI. But exports were also important for a number of firms. On average, the local market 
represented 49 per cent of the sales in food and beverages and in the metal industries, and 
58 per cent in the natural resources based industries. The highest figure was obtained in 
the chemicals and oil industries, which sold 70 per cent of their output locally. In fact, all 
industries seemed to have export oriented segments (e.g. fabricated plastic goods in the
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chemicals and oil industries) or at least individual firms. For that very reason, an attempt to 
aggregate the subjects using cluster analysis produced fairly poor results, since the clusters 
showed little homogeneity in terms of the industries represented in each cluster.
This heterogeneity of the clusters was even more clear in terms of the country of origin of 
the subsidiaries. That explains why the determinants of FDI were very similar when the 
different source countries were compared. One notable exception were Spanish firms 
which were the only group to be primarily attracted by the local market and by geographic 
and cultural proximity". Spanish investors were also distinct in the low importance given to 
the local labour conditions in their decision to invest in Portugal. As expected, firms from 
outside the European Union ranked access to the EU market well above the average, as 
did C jerman firms, though to a much lesser extent. German firms were the most export 
oriented in the sample, selling only 29 per cent of their output in Portugal (against 38 per 
cent in the home country).
In terms of the year of investment, export propensity seemed to be especially associated 
with firms established or acquired in two periods of Portugal's recent history: 1960 to 1974 
and 1986 to 1990. The determinants of FDI associated with these periods reinforced this. 
Unlike the other periods considered, labour conditions was the main determinant. Access 
to the local market was also less important than in the rest of the sample. Surprisingly, 
foreign subsidiaries established between 1975 and 1985 showed a stronger export 
propensity than those established in the 1990s. However, the rank of the determinants for 
both groups reflected the predominance of market orientation. Finally, there was a positive 
linear relationship between the size of the firm and export propensity. As before, that was 
reflected in the determinants of FDI. The bigger the firm, the more importance was given 
to labour conditions and the less to access to the EU market and downstream integration.
The Portuguese legal system and bureaucracy were almost unanimously considered the 
main problem faced by foreign firms established in the country. Other problems were 
determined by the firms’ market orientations. In the export oriented industries, labour and 
infrastructure (in particular the availability of skilled workers), and the country’s export 
competitiveness were the main concerns. In the other industries, firms were more worried 
about the characteristics of the local market. The differences between the two groups of 
export oriented industries mentioned above were also reflected in the evaluation of the
2 Brazilian, Italian and French investors were the other groups to attribute a significant role to proximity.
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problems. The characteristics o f the local market were one of the concerns for machinery 
and equipment manufacturers, but completely ignored by textiles, clothing and footwear 
producers.
Eastern Europe and Spain were for the respondents to the questionnaire the main 
alternatives to Portugal as locations for FDI though, interestingly, they did seem to 
compete with Portugal for different projects. I lowever, few differences could be found in 
the determinants associated with firms that considered either alternative location before 
deciding to invest in Portugal. In any case, it must be acknowledged that this analysis was 
seriously limited by the fact that firms that decided not to invest in Portugal after 
considering several alternative locations were not included in this research project.
7.4. O u t w a r d  FDI i n  P o r t u g a l
Few studies have been published on the internationalisation of Portuguese firms. Simoes 
(1997) constitutes a notable exception3. The picture presented was of a substantial number 
o f firms involved in international activities but few adopting forms of internationalisation 
other than exporting through agents. Foreign direct investment was rare (cf. chapter 4). 
Even in the case of services, which represented a high percentage of Portuguese outward 
FDI in recent years, most of the investment was the result of a very small number of 
firms. This research project concentrated on manufacturing FDI. With the aim of 
investigating the most advanced processes of internationalisation by Portuguese nascent 
MNEs, the focus was put on firms with productive capacity abroad, or at least clear plans 
to do so in the near future. 27 Portuguese owned firms were identified in these conditions, 
o f which 18 agreed to participate in an interview based study.
A first result was that few of the firms identified operated in the labour intensive industries 
that traditionally dominate the Portuguese industrial structure and exports4. It seems that 
the success enjoyed as (largely passive) exporters has been a disincentive to adopt other 
internationalisation strategies. As a result, efficiency seeking FDI was rare in the sample. A 
much more common motivation was the search for new markets. A substantial number of 
the firms in the sample were domestic leaders in mature markets, often in capital intensive 
industries. The small domestic market was seen as an impediment to the efficient use of 
the resources available to the firm, representing a threat to the very survival of the firm.
3 Sec also Simoes (1996, 1998).
4 Cf. Castro (1993).
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Internationalisation was in these conditions the solution to reach an economically efficient 
scale, necessary to compete successfully with foreign firms both at home and abroad.
An important implication o f this was that the concept of asset seeking FDI (Dunning, 
1993a) should be broadened. Despite being market oriented in nature, the investments 
described above corresponded to the acquisition of a critical asset: size. In other words, 
small firms, and especially those from small countries, may internationalise with very few 
ownership advantages, their primary aim being to obtain the means to retain their 
competitiveness in the domestic market. This implies that small countries may be involved 
in outward FDI at a relatively early stage of their economic development.
Brazil and Spain hosted most of the Portuguese productive investment abroad. As 
expected, this represents expansion to less developed or neighbouring territories (Dunning, 
1981a, 1981b, 1986b), as well as psychic proximity (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). However, it seemed that psychic distance was much more 
influenced by language than by any other factor usually associated with cultural distance. 
Nevertheless, this sense of proximity permitted the jumping of stages in the 
internationalisation process. Few of the firms in the sample that are now producing in 
Brazil had ever exported to the country before. By contrast, geographic proximity may 
reduce the attractiveness of FDI as an internationalisation strategy. It represents low 
transportation costs, which can become particularly relevant in the liberal trade 
environment of the European Union.
The timing of investment was very much linked to location. The internationalisation of a 
growing number o f Portuguese firms may be associated with Portugal’s level of economic 
development (see next section). However, the economic stabilisation of Brazil in 1996 and 
the subsequent opening to FDI was in this case equally decisive. Almost all firms in the 
sample that chose a destination other than Brazil (only a minority) started their expansion 
before 1996. All firms that expanded to Brazil did so after 1996. Given the strong 
preference for Portuguese speaking countries implicit in the interviews (probably evidence 
of limited ownership advantages), it is legitimate to assume that the evolution of 
Portuguese outward I'D I would have been very different had the economic conditions in 
Brazil been different. Moreover, the importance that Brazil assumes in total FDI outflows 
represents a risk for the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy. Although a
1 8 0
deterioration of the situation in Brazil seems unlikely at the moment, the country’s long 
term stability is still far from assured
Another important result of this research regarded the role of political and economic 
stability. This was considered a potential deterrent to FDI by the interviewees. Brazil 
before the stabilisation program, Mozambique during the civil war, or Angola nowadays5 
are but three examples. However, once a certain level o f stability is attained any direct 
relationship between FDI and instability seems to disappear. This was suggested by Tu and 
Schive (1995), and is supported by the volume of FDI Brazil received in recent years. In 
the opinion of the managers interviewed Brazil remains a risky location. It seemed, 
nevertheless, that psychic proximity compensated the relative instability of Brazil when 
compared with alternative locations, such as Mexico, Eastern Europe or North Africa.
Finally, most companies in the sample considered that a shortage of management skills was 
the major obstacle to internationalisation, more so than, for example, financial restrictions. 
This limitation was especially felt by the smaller firms, which seemed to face many 
difficulties in recruiting experienced managers (cf. Buckley, 1989). Moreover, Portuguese 
managers seem to be reluctant to work as expatriates, which may not be independent of 
the apparent shortage of skilled managers even to work locally. Interestingly, many 
companies considered the image of Portugal abroad to be an important constraint to their 
international expansion. Most seemed to overcome it simply by inviting potential clients or 
business partners to visit Portugal and their factories. Nevertheless, it represents 
nevertheless a serious burden to these nascent MNEs in terms of extra costs and the 
potential loss of investment and business opportunities.
7.5. T h e  c o m p e t it iv e n e s s  o f  P o r t u g a l
The notion of national competitiveness has been the subject of serious dispute at least 
since the publication of Michael Porter’s (1990) The Competitive Advantage o f  Nations. It is 
not in the scope of this project to engage in a theoretical discussion of the concept of 
competitiveness*’. However, there is an empirical interest in the connection between 
national competitiveness and foreign direct investment. Porter (1990) had a dualistic view 
of FDI. Outward FDI was seen as the desirable outcome of the competitiveness of
1 I he interviewees often compared with Angola and Mozambique when analysing their location decisions, 
which constitutes further evidence o f  the importance o f  psychic distance.
6 For a thorough survey and analysis see Freire de Sousa (1999).
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domestic firms. By competing internationally, local firms can expand their competitive 
advantages. I'his bolsters local clusters, reinforcing the competitiveness of the home 
country. Inward FDI, by contrast, was seen as a threat to national competitiveness. It was 
presented as a vehicle at the disposal of foreign firms to ‘infiltrate’ the local cluster and 
transfer to their own home base the advantages developed in the context of the “national 
diamond”.
Rugman and Verbeke (1993), among others, showed the limitations of this interpretation. 
In some circumstances Porter’s view of inward FDI may be true. However, it must be 
admitted that in many more cases foreign firms can contribute to the development of the 
local diamond. Several examples of this positive role were obtained during the interviews 
described in chapter 6. Cin and Autosil considered the rivalry imposed by foreign owned 
firms of major importance to their own development. All the car components 
manufacturers in the sample were linked to Renault’s assembly plant, which created a new 
market for car parts in the early 1980s. Three of the firms (Arjal, Dan Cake and Efacec) 
were created as subsidiaries of foreign companies. Unquestionably, FDI contributed 
decisively to the development o f whole new industries (Simoes, 1985, Bessa, 2000).
The level of development of the country being analysed is not irrelevant in this discussion. 
If only the most developed countries are considered, Porter’s view of inward FDI is much 
more likely to hold. The latter are the countries with the most developed local clusters and 
better endowed with created assets. FDI allows foreign firms to become part of these 
clusters, benefiting from location advantages that may not exist in the home country. The 
examples given for Portugal, however, evidenced a country with few and thin local 
clusters, in need of foreign investment to bring in capabilities that were not locally 
available. This represents clearly a very different situation. The concept of the investment 
development path (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986b) permits a better understanding of the 
difference between these two realities.
Using the IDP, the former can be put in different terms. Firms from all sorts of countries 
have in the acquisition of strategic assets a major motivation to invest in the most 
developed economies (stages 4 and 5 of the IDP)7. Porter’s (1990) negative evaluation of 
inward FDI seems to stem from the belief that locally developed strategic assets (or 
advanced factors as he calls them) should be used exclusively by domestically owned firms
Dunning (1993: p.61) considers this to be the fastest growing motivation o f  FDI.
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in order to guarantee their predominance in international markets. In the case of a stage 3 
country like Portugal (cf. chapter 4), however, strategic asset seeking inward I'D I is 
unlikely. Instead, market access and relative costs are normally the dominant motivations, 
with the former progressively replacing the latter (chapter 5). And there is no reason to 
imagine that these investments are harmful to the receiving country.
Chapter 4 showed that the evolution of FDI stocks in Portugal fits very well with the IDP 
framework, in particular under the new polynomial function proposed8. Portugal had all 
the characteristics of a stage 1 country until the end o f the 1950s, with very low inflows of 
inward FDI and almost no outward investment at all. It was after 1960 that inward FDI 
started to rise, in response to a radical change in government policies (see above). Cost 
reduction was the main motivation for foreign investors in the following years, as 
confirmed in chapter 5, but some market seeking investment was also registered9.
Portugal’s move from stage 2 to stage 3 was, however, very slow. The failure of the first 
internationalisation movement of local firms, in the early 1970s (when it seemed that 
Portugal was making that transition), highlighted the weaknesses of the local industrial 
structure despite fifteen years of strong economic growth. The domestic firms’ ownership 
advantages were essentially country specific (privileged access to the colonial markets) and 
they were not able to adapt to the changes in their home base (the revolution and the 
independence o f the colonies). On the other hand, new internal and external conditions in 
the 1980s (political stability and EEC membership) gave way to a new economic cycle, 
including a new and stronger wave of inward FDI.
As in the 1960s, cost reduction was the main motivation for inward FDI in this 
expansionary period. This was hardly surprising since Portugal still enjoyed the lowest 
labour costs among its main trading partners. Outward FDI remained negligible, as is 
typical of a stage 2 country. Nevertheless, major transformations in the country’s economic 
structure seem to have occurred in this period, and transition to stage 3 was completed 
during the 1990s (chapter 4). Efficiency seeking FDI has dropped steadily from 1990 
(chapter 5), but local firms became increasingly involved in outward investment. Economic 
development and thirty years of a strong presence of foreign firms in Portugal were 
strongly associated with this transformation (chapter 6).
8 As explained in section 4.6, the quadratic function traditionally used to test the IDP, incorporates a 
violation o f the very principles o f the IDP. Henceforth, a new polynomial function was proposed in section 
4.6, and shown to be much more consistent with the IDP rationale.
183
It is at this point that the issue of national competitiveness arises with some pertinence. A 
cursory interpretation of the data may lead to the conclusion that Portugal’s international 
competitiveness has increased substantially in recent years, at least if  it is accepted that 
competitiveness goes hand in hand with the level of development. The IDP function 
(section 4.6) suggests that Portugal is now approaching stage 4 of the five levels of 
development predicted. But this correspondence with the theory is more apparent than 
real (cf. chapter 4).
Dunning (1981b: p .9) suggests that in stage 4, “depending on the amount of [international 
investment] specialization, outward investment may be associated with substantial or little 
inward FDI”. Portugal being a small open economy, it is likely and desirable that it 
registers a high level of specialisation “in which it seeks to attract inward direct investment 
in those sectors in which comparative location advantages are stronger but the comparative 
ownership advantages of its enterprises are weakest, while its own enterprises invest abroad 
in those sectors in which their comparative ownership advantages are strongest but their 
comparative location advantages are weakest” (Dunning, 1981b: p.9). This implies large 
FDI inflows in stages 3 and 4 of the IDP, which have not been happening in Portugal in 
recent years. As seen above, inward FDI flows were in 1999 at their lowest level since the 
1950s, pointing to a sharp erosion of the country’s competitiveness as a location for FDI. 
The results obtained suggest that Portugal lost attractiveness as an export platform (as 
predicted by the IDP) but has so far been unable to attract alternative investments (chapter 
5). This is particularly worrying in terms of the long term prospects of the country because 
FDI has been instrumental in the diversification of the Portuguese industrial structure 
(Simoes, 1985; Gonsalves and Guimaraes, 1996). It contributed to the development of 
new clusters and to the expansion o f existing ones.
As for outward FDI (chapter 6), the growth in recent years must be interpreted as a sign of 
the favourable evolution of the country’s competitiveness. Gn one hand, it shows that the 
ownership advantages of the Portuguese firms are increasing (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b). On 
the other hand, it can be expected that outward FDI will improve local clusters and with 
them the competitiveness of the country (Porter, 1990). Nevertheless, the international 
expansion of the domestic firms is still at an early stage, as would be expected in a ‘stage 3 
country’. Their ownership advantages remain very much dependent on the characteristics 
o f the home country. Language, Portugal’s colonial past and EU membership still assumed
9 Compare this analysis with the description o f  the IDP, in chapter 2.
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a major role in the location decision. Many o f these first movers are also very exposed to 
the evolution of the Brazilian economy, with inherent risks for the whole 
internationalisation process.
An alternative, less optimistic view of the recent evolution of outward FDI is that it simply 
represents more evidence of the erosion of the country’s locational competitiveness, just 
like the decline in inward FDI. In this perspective, the internationalisation of the 
Portuguese firms represents a threat to the domestic economy because it corresponds to 
investment diverted from the domestic economy (e.g. Bessa, 1998, 2000). However, this 
hypothesis was not confirmed in the research described in chapter 6. Cost reduction was a 
rare motivation amongst the firms surveyed (although it was a growing concern). Instead, 
most seemed to be engaged in strategic asset seeking FDI, being the acquisition of 
marketing capacity or simply the search for new markets to support the firm’s growth, 'l ’his 
is just the kind of investment that can be expected to improve the competitiveness of local 
clusters.
It seems that Portugal is at a crossroads. Inward FDI flows have been declining, and 
outward investment still exhibits many signs of weakness. At this stage, the role of the 
government may be cntical to guarantee the necessary conditions for the transition to a 
fully developed economy (Dunning, 1981a: p.41). Much of this involves the development 
of created assets, which requires increased expenditure on education, vocational training 
and innovatory activities (Dunning and Narula, 1996b: p .5). Successive governments have 
seemed to be aware o f this, and investment in these areas increased substantially over the 
last two decades. Direct aid from the European Union has also been of utmost 
importance. I lowever, the dramatic fall of FDI inflows in recent years suggests that not 
enough has yet been done10. The same can be said of the fact that the unavailability of 
skilled workers was one o f the main difficulties faced by foreign firms in Portugal (chapter 
5). It was considered by foreign firms operating in Portugal a much more serious problem 
than rising labour costs, for example.
The difficulties faced by foreign investors in Portugal call for a different type of 
government intervention. Bureaucracy and the legal system topped the list of the main 
problems faced by foreign investors (it was the only problem to be considered more
10 In terms o f  the quality o f  human resources, one o f the main difficulties is, necessarily, the size o f the 
transformations needed. Until 1974 basic education corresponded to no more than 4 years and in practice 
was not compulsory. In 197(3, 29 per cent o f  the population could not read or write (Pimenta et al., 2000).
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important than labour skills)". The government, or successive governments, arc clearly 
responsible for the institutional failure this suggests. Furthermore, the size of the domestic 
market makes the elimination of bureaucracy and the development of created assets even 
more critical. In bigger countries, market seeking FDI may compensate for the loss of cost 
advantages that normally accompany economic development. But this is unlikely to 
happen in countries with domestic markets the size of the Portuguese.
7.6. F u t u r e  r e s e a r c h
Although the number of possible extensions is almost overwhelming, a few appear to be 
particularly promising. The most obvious is probably the need to monitor the evolution of 
the nascent Portuguese MNI^s. This process being very recent, it should be easy to follow 
the cases of success as well as failure, which are normally more difficult to investigate. The 
evolution o f the whole process of internationalisation is another source of interest. 
Assorted data collected during the later stages o f this investigation suggests that the 
number of Portuguese firms involved in outward FDI continues to expand. Brazil seems 
to remain the main destination, but there were even more examples of investments in 
other Latin American countries and in North Africa.
As for inward FDI, one interesting approach to complement this research would be to 
survey the headquarters of the investing firms. This should offer a different perspective on 
the attitude of foreign investors to investment in Portugal. In particular, it should reveal 
more clearly the differences between Portugal and other locations, whether alternative or 
complementary in the perspective of the investors. An investigation of the firms that 
divested in Portugal or that considered investing in Portugal but opted for other locations 
could also be important. The identification of the population would be a major obstacle in 
this case, however.
The data collected on inward FDI could also be used for further research. One possible 
avenue amongst many is a more detailed analysis of the results of the cluster analysis. The 
clusters identified seemed to have little homogeneity. I lowever, they might hide similarities 
at the level o f the firm that could not be identified above. This investigation would almost 
certainly require a wholly different approach to the analysis of the questionnaires, which at
11 This contradicts the country’s official marketing, which presents the Portuguese economy as “non 
bureaucratic and flexible” (ICEP, 2000). The offer o f  low taxes was also in sharp contrast with the opinion 
o f  the participants in the survey (cf. chapter 5).
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a first stage needed to be analysed individually in a more qualitative manner. Eventually, 
the most promising clusters would require the collection of further data. The use of more 
inductive techniques, such as interviews may be necessary.
A study o f firms that have been foreign subsidiaries but belong now to Portuguese 
investors seems to be another promising approach. The characteristics of the investors, the 
reasons for the change in ownership, and the implications of that change on the firm’s 
strategy may provide valuable information on the changing patterns of national 
competitiveness both in terms of the country’s location advantages and on the evolution of 
the ownership advantages of domestic firms.
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